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 Disclaimer: Though discussing de facto-states, this thesis holds no opinions on the legitimacy of their existence 
nor on their present, future or past status. Names of entities may vary elsewhere. For example, Transnistria is 
also known as Trans-Dniester, and Northern Cyprus as TRNC. Here, the most common names from English and 
Norwegian literature are used. 
i 
 
 
  
ii 
 
Abstract 
The thesis analyses de facto-states from the creation of the United Nation in 1945 until and 
including 2012. Twenty-three entities are identified, of which four have had success and 
become UN members, and ten have failed and become reintegrated into their parent state. 
Nine are still incomplete and have uncertain outcomes. Crisp set QCA and descriptive 
analyses are applied to investigate first which causal combinations lead to success or failure. 
These results are then used to analyse the entities without clear outcomes to identify which 
could be expected to succeed and fail. The causal conditions included are A: Ethnicity as state 
foundation, B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state, C: UN veto 
power opposition,  D: UN veto power support, and E: Economic level significantly different 
from the parent state.  
 
Only weak combinational connections have been found though cs/QCA, but the descriptive 
analysis have identified three patterns. First, that the conflicts where economy have been an 
important factor tend to become resolved to a larger extent than those where this is not 
percieved as important.Second, that all the recognised entitiets are created outside of the two 
major state creation waves of decolonisation and the fall of the communist unions. Third, that 
which UN veto power that gets involved appears to be of importance. None of the entities 
Russia has supported have neither failed nor succeeded, but remain in a state of limbo. The 
reasons for this are unknown, but suggestions regarding realpolitical conciderations are made. 
The three analyses combined indicate that Somaliland and Puntland are the two entities in the 
strongest position to be recognised per 2012.  
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1. Introduction 
The United Nations originally had 51 members at its creation in 1945. Per 2012, it had 193 
full members. In addition to these, there are 23 entities that have attempted to be recognized 
as states and become UN members, but without success for an elongated period of time. Some 
of them have become recognised after a while, some have disappeared into their parent state 
and around half of them still exist. The term de facto-state includes both those still present and 
those that have later disappeared. But, the entities are only analysed with data from their time 
as such an entity. They are more or less functioning state-like entities with at best limited 
recognition by the international society. What is interesting for this paper is to find out what 
leads to the different outcomes these non-recognised de facto-states face. The results from the 
analyses of the entities that have either succeeded or failed are used on the entities still 
existing as de facto-states per 2012. This is done to explore which of them are to be expected 
to succeed and fail.  
 
The research question is as follows: Why do some non-recognised de facto-states become 
internationally recognised through United Nations membership status, while others fail and 
are reintegrated into their parent state? 
Some of these entities receive much international attention. The declaration of independence 
by Kosovo in 2008 placed de facto-states on the agenda for many. The effect was not lessened 
by the soon following Russian-Georgian war taking place in the two Georgian de facto-states 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Others are nearly invisible in international debate. Both 
Somaliland and Puntland have functioned more or less independently from Somalia for about 
two decades, yet they are largely ignored by the international society. As will be shown in this 
thesis, they perform most state capacities better than Somalia. Yet the latter is recognised 
while they are not. This kind of contrast makes de facto-states a particularly interesting 
juridical and political conundrum. 
 
1.2 Rationale for the thesis 
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 15-19) argues that it is important for social research to 
contribute both to theory and to the real world. This thesis answers the claim. The 
investigation of which causal combinations lead to which outcomes is theoretically interesting 
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for the following reasons: De facto-states have been largely ignored in political research until 
lately2. After the declaration of independence of Kosovo in 2008 the interest has greatly 
increased from politicians and academics alike. Analyses of singular entities or groups based 
on time or geography have been performed, seeking answers to the conundrum of why some 
of the de facto-states fail while others succeed. However, no analysis of all the entities 
together has yet been done. This analysis attempt to rectify this, by including all identified de 
facto-states who have existed in the time span between the creation of the United Nations in 
1945 and 2012. 
 
The topic is interesting to the world for at least three reasons. Politically, because a deeper 
understanding of these entities could improve relations between them and the outside world. It 
can create a deeper understanding of the situations in which the de facto-states’ inhabitants 
and political leaders live and operate. And, last but not least, the results might lay the 
foundation for understanding or predicting the developments of the frozen conflicts that often 
correspond with de facto-states. 
1.3 Chapter overview 
Chapter two: Theory, defines and discusses recognised and non-recognised de facto-states. It 
defines the state in international law through declarative and constitutive theory. A state’s 
legitimacy can come in two forms: internal and external. De facto-states are states by 
function, but they are not recognised as such and are thus excluded from the international 
society. Where the de facto-state originates and how it survives is analysed in the second half 
of the chapter. Lastly, the different ends of the entities are discussed, and the hypotheses and 
causal conditions are identified.  
 
Chapter three: Data, clarifies the data selection criteria, and presents the included entities. It 
continues with closer descriptive attention to the entities, seeking  the most obvious patterns.  
 
Chapter four: Methods, presents and argues for the choice of Crisp Set QCA as the method to 
be used in this study.  It is the logical method for medium-N analyses, but is also particularly 
suited for analyses of causal combinations. In addition to cs/QCA, descriptive analyses will be 
                                                 
2
 The first major work on investigating this as a concept rather than  individual singularities is Pegg (1998). 
Other notable researchers include Silvia von Steinsdorff, Dov Lynch, Pål Kolstø and Nina Caspersen, who have 
performed thorough investigations on de facto-states, particularly after 2008, but also before.  
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used to provide a further elaboration of the combined effects of the causal conditions. The 
chapter then provides the operationalization of the causal conditions.  
 
Chapter five: Analysis, has three main parts. One is the cs/QCA-analysis which finds the 
logical formulas for success and failure. The second is the descriptive analysis, seeking the 
same through description. Thirdly, the identified causal combinations leading to the different 
outcomes are applied to the entities still in progress, to identify which of them one could 
expect which outcomes for.  
 
Chapter six: Conclusion, summarises and discusses the results of the analysis, and brings 
suggestions to further research. 
 
The Appendices one to four presents the tables forming the basis for this thesis.  
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2. Theory chapter: recognised and non-recognised de facto-states  
This chapter sets the stage for the thesis and describes and explains what is going to be 
investigated. It is constructed by two main parts, going from a broad description of the 
concept of states and state recognition to the more specified outcomes for the non-recognised 
states. Part 2.1 focuses on recognised states and starts by discussing the juridical concept of 
the state before moving to how states are created and why their recognition is a problematic 
issue. United Nation membership is used as a proxy for international recognition, so the UN 
admittance process is clarified and its development discussed. 
 
Part 2.2 focuses on non-recognised states: Where they come from, how they are met, how 
they survive and what ends they can meet. After a debate on the different theoretical 
perspectives regarding what causes recognition, five hypotheses are established. They seek 
patterns in the development trajectory of non-recognised states by investigating their 
resources, ethnic composition, the involvement of other actors, and the level of democratic 
institutions in the entity. 
2.1 Defining the state  
In order to examine non-recognised states, it is necessary to first illuminate its contrast - the 
recognized state. What the state is and how it is created, recognized and admitted to the 
United Nations will be examined in the first half of the theory chapter.  The concept of what 
constitutes a state is multi-faceted. Here, I shall elaborate on the juridical and political 
perspectives on recognised states. After that, I will describe the requirements for admittance in 
the United Nations and how they have evolved since the organisation’s creation. 
2.1.1 Defining the state in international law: declarative and constitutive theory 
In this thesis, International law is loosely defined as regulating the legal positions or res 
judicata between states in their position as such (Fleischer 1994, 17) and is generally seen as 
valid through common law and norms rather that supranational legal institutions (Fleischer 
1994, 21-22). A state in international law is assumed to be the highest authority over a given 
area (Fleischer 1994, 49). The precise definition as to exactly what it constitutes is unclear, 
and at what point each definitional criteria is fulfilled. In addition, there are several instances 
that can offer or deny recognition of the aspiring state. Acceptance by the international 
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community3 grants states the opportunity of pursuing political, economic and other activities 
closed to non-recognised entities. There are nuances to this recognition, but it is here 
interpreted in the following manner: a state is recognised by the international community fully 
and wholly if it is a UN member state. 
 
Here it is assumed that United Nations membership4 can serve as a proxy for international 
recognition as acceptance would by definition mean that the state is acknowledged by not 
only the veto powers but also the majority of the other member states (The United Nations 
General Assembly 1945 Rule 136 ). This would thus mean that there is a general acceptance 
for the entity’s status amongst the other recognised states in the international community and 
that it is both de jure and de facto recognised. 
 
That an area is defined as a state in international law generally means that it fulfils four 
criteria and that it thus has the rights and duties in accordance with this. These criteria5, as 
summarised by Fleischer (1994, 49  Italics in the original. Author’s translation. ),  are: 
1. A state must have a stable population that can renew itself and maintain the duties of 
the state over time. 
2. A state must have a fixed territory. 
3. A state must have an organised, central government, capable of securing rule of law. 
4. A state must have a certain level of sovereignty. It is, however, not necessary for the 
state to be completely independent.  
5.  
Fleischer also pointed out the need for stability, demonstrating that the state can survive and 
that the organisation and government are indeed functional.  
 
International law presents two points of view regarding state recognition (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica 2013, Hillier 1998, Fleischer 1994, Boczek 2005). The first is declarative theory, 
in which a geographical entity is a state as long as it fulfils the necessary criterions stated 
above. In this perspective, recognition is seen as a mere political factor ipso post facto, and it 
                                                 
3
 Jackson and Rosenberg (1982, 12) describes this as “a community composed solely of states and the 
international organizations formed by states”. 
4
 The fact that Switzerland became a member as late as 2002 does not indicate it was not recognised before that 
point. (The United Nations General Assembly 2002a).  
5
 The criteria can be seen as a somewhat expanded version of those known from the Montevideo convention 
(1933Article 1). In Fleischer (1994), criteria 1 also included the point that “a random group of bandits settling in 
an area does not make a state” and criteria 4 that there is in effect a gliding scale of sovereignty. 
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does not influence the states existence as such. This is contrasted by the second viewpoint, 
known as constitutive theory. Here, the acceptance of others is the defining factor. Who is a 
state therefore hinges on who is recognised as one, not on what technical criteria are fulfilled. 
In practice, these definitions often overlap. Only a few recognised states are not recognised in 
both manners6. As these criteria are open for interpretation, some countries recognise states 
that others do not7.  
 
For this thesis, it is the entities that are states by declarative theory without being so when 
utilising the constitutive viewpoint that are interesting. These are known as non-recognised or 
de facto-states (Kolstø 2006). 
2.1.2 Internal and external state legitimacy 
The distinction from declarative and constitutive theory is also visible when discussing state 
legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy will in this text be conceptualised as two functions. 
These are 1) internal and 2) external legitimacy. The first, internal legitimacy refers to the 
belief of its citizens in the viability and justification of its existence as a separate entity 
independent from the parent state. The second, external legitimacy, concerns what status 
already recognised states gives the entity. If an area is accepted by others as a state, it holds 
external legitimacy. (Bakke, O’Loughlin, and Ward 2011, 6, Kolstø 2006, 724, von 
Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, von Steinsdorff 2012).  
 
Kolstø (2006, 724) explains how most states enjoy double legitimacy, meaning that it is 
accepted as such by both its inhabitants and other states. But, entities can have one without 
the other8. Entities with only external legitimacy are known as failed states (Krasner 2004, 84-
85, Kolstø 2006, 724-725)  and are seen as de jure states though not de facto. Contrastingly, 
entities with internal legitimacy only are de facto but not de jure states. The latter are the ones 
who are interesting for this thesis. 
                                                 
6
 These recognised states who fail to comply with Fleischer’s criteria one to three are known as failed states An  
example is Somalia, who is a recognised state lacking both territorial control and a stable, organised central 
government (Failed States Index 2012). Entities that generally fulfil said criterions one to three but not number 
four are not externally recognised and are described as de facto- states (Kolstø 2006). 
7
 Kosovo is, for instance, per December 2012 recognized by 95 UN member states (Kosovo Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 04.12.2012) . 
8
 Examples externally recognised states with debateable internal legitimacy per 2012 can include Somalia, who 
is the home of between two and four secessionist areas (Mesfin 2009) and Georgia, being in a similar position 
(Ciobanu 2008). 
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2.1.3 State success defined as United Nations membership  
To be able to discuss the outcomes of de facto-states, it is necessary to define what constitutes 
success and failure. The potential outcomes for this type of entity will be more closely 
debated later in this chapter. United Nations membership will be used as a proxy measurement 
for international recognition, because acceptance into the union means recognition by all its 
member states. I argue that this is a practical way of separating complete from partial success, 
and thus making a distinction between entities accepted by many states and those accepted by 
all.  
United Nations membership criteria and admission procedures 
UN membership is not the only measurement of statehood, and can be claimed to be a 
conservative measurement9. Though other alternative measurements are possible, UN 
membership is here considered the most practical proxy available. Seeing that the 
membership application evaluation is a two-step process demanding acceptance both from the 
veto states in the Security Council and two thirds of the member states in the General 
Assembly (The United Nations 07.12.2012b), any opposition to the existence of the state will 
by definition be by a small minority and not by a veto power. UN membership includes that 
all member states must relate to the new member as a state, regardless of whether or not they 
voted in favour of the inclusion (Fleischer 1994, 57-58). While other states might also be 
major international players, the veto states are the most powerful single members in the UN. 
UN membership does not make an entity a state, but it most certainly indicates the acceptance 
of it.  
 
In order for a political entity to be accepted as a member state in the United Nations, the 
following criteria must be fulfilled. First, a formal application must be submitted to the 
Secretary-General. Second, it will be given to the Security Council for consideration. If the 
Security Council recommends membership, the General Assembly will vote on the inclusion 
of the new member (The United Nations General Assembly Chapter 14, Articles 134-138, The 
United Nations 07.12.2012b). To be accepted, a positive vote from a two-thirds majority of 
the present states is required. The charter of the United Nations states that hopeful states in 
spe can be accepted for full membership if they accept the obligations declared in the Charter, 
                                                 
9
 Two other manners of counting states springs to mind, but they do not allow for the same level of self-
determination for its entities as a full UN membership does nor are they as accepted as statehood indicators: 1) 
The United Nations also operates with a kind of semi-membership which allows for entities being Permanent 
Observers, but it does not constitute full membership and they do not hold the same rights as complete members 
(The United Nations 2013a, b). 2)  ISO 3166-1 lists 249 entities and includes autonomous areas as well as 
independent states (ISO 2013).  
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and if they “in the judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations” (The United Nations 1945Article 4, section 1). Acceptance is thus not an 
automatic procedure, and each hopeful member must apply before it is to be considered.  
 
The United Nations can also hinder recognition. Dugard and Raic (2006, 101) shows how the 
organization has directed non-recognition from its members in cases of claims being based on 
aggression10, systematic, racial discrimination or human right-abuse11 or denying self-
determination 12 even in cases where the declaration of independence did not lead to the entity 
applying for membership status.   
 
The United Nations does not endorse unilateral territorial changes to existing states. 
Territorial integrity of member states is protected by the declaration that they “shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state” (The United Nations 1945Article 2, section 4). The 
Declaration on friendly relations (1970) attempts to reconcile the right of self-determination 
and the right of territorial integrity. It states that the state must not discriminate against or 
engage in oppressive behaviour towards any groups and that the state’s integrity is only 
assured under certain obligations. Buchanan (1995, 1997) demonstrates that the most common 
argument for secession by those attempting it is a breach on these principles.  Pavkovic and 
Radan (2007, 23) argues that while it could appear that the UN prohibits secession this 
declaration makes  room for a discussion on whether oppressive and exclusive behaviour from 
the state opens for self-determination triumphing territorial integrity. Exactly when, why and 
how this can happen remains an open question, despite being much debated13. Being vague, 
the suggestions for narrowing down the criteria are many and differing, and no final answer 
has been identified (Hannum 1998, Birch 1984, Beran 1984).   
2.1.4 Creating new states: a terminology of secession 
The changing of borders on the geopolitical map of the world is a complex matter. 
Investigating how states are created and how they disappear is important for understanding 
                                                 
10
 For instance, The Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus, see UN Security Council resolution 541 (1983) . 
11
 See for instance the United Nation’s reaction to the independence declaration of Rhodesia (The United Nations 
General Assembly 1968, The United Nations Security Council 1965b). 
12
  This argument was used by the United Nations when debating the independence declarations of both  Katanga 
and Rhodesia (The United Nations General Assembly 1968, The United Nations Security Council 1965b, 1960, 
Council 1960, The United Nations Security Council 1961a) . 
13
 See for instance the discussion sparked and elaborated by Buchanan (1995, 1991, 1992, 1997) and followed up 
by amongst others, Hannum (1998) ,Gauthier (1994) and Wood (1981). 
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the discussion of non-recognised states. New states are created on territory formerly 
controlled by another entity. In other words, by some form of secession14. Though fully 
recognising the importance of specificity, the concept “secession” will be used as signifying 
the creating of a new state from parts of the territory of another throughout this thesis unless 
otherwise stated. The focus will be on unilateral secessions that are not accepted by the parent 
state. 
 
Wood (1981) highlights the importance of a clear set of terminology when dealing with 
secessionism15. The exact meaning of the word “secession” is requested. He distinguishes 
between “separatism” and “secession” by the degree of their desire to be independent from 
the state centre. Separatism is here seen as the desire not to be further incorporated, whereas 
secessionism describes the wish for less incorporation (Wood 1981, 109-110, Hechter 1992, 
267).  Both subcategories will be included here. 
 
Secession, in whatever form it shows itself, includes claims of a justifiable right of self-
determination. The entity in question argues for the power of deciding for itself whether it 
wishes to remain part of the parent state or not. Understanding the rationale behind a decision 
to leave is important in order to be able to evaluate the righteousness of the cause. Lloyd 
(1994-1995, 432-433) discusses four criteria for credible secessionist claims. These are: 1) 
systematic discrimination or exploitation against a sizeable, self-determined minority; 2) the 
existence of a distinct, self-defined community or society within a state, compactly inhabiting 
a region, which overwhelmingly supports separatism; 3) a realistic prospect of conflict 
resolution and peace within and between the new and old state as a result of the envisaged 
self-rule or partition; and 4) the rejection of compromise solutions on the part of the central 
government (see also Dugard and Raic 2006, 106). While these arguments are used by the 
vast majority of non-recognised states to explain why they ought to be recognised, it is not 
necessarily clear what is meant by them. What, for instance, is a “sizeable” minority, “realistic 
prospects” and “overwhelming” support? The seeming impossibility of creating clear-cut 
answers to in what situations an area can secede has led to a general fear of a so-called 
domino-effect in which progressively smaller and smaller areas create their own states (Beran 
1984) .  
                                                 
14
 As Beary (2008) shows, there is no shortage of areas with separatist murmurings. Only few of them manage to 
become sufficiently strong to be classified as a de facto-state. Table 9on page 100 gives a list of considered but 
excluded entities. 
15
 See Pfirter and Napolitano (2006, 375-377) for a more detailed elaboration of different kinds of secession.  
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The purpose of the de facto-states examined here is assumed to be recognition of statehood, 
which means splitting from their parent state and succeeding despite the opposition from the 
latter. The exact manner in which they separated is not the most interesting point here. 
Regardless of their specific type of secession, non-recognised states are here seen as frozen or 
unsettled conflicts where the secessionists have won the territorial but not political struggle 
(von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, Simão 2012, Smolnik 2012, Fawn 2008, 269). 
Similarly, it is not interesting per se whether the de facto-state leaders have credible claims to 
their secession. Their reasons for seceding are not as interesting as their ability, and no 
discrimination based on intent will be done. The inherent unclarity of Lloyd’s (1994-1995, 
432-433) criteria opens for claiming them as fulfilled in very differing situations.  The 
interesting point here is not the arguments but the manifest factors contributing to recognition. 
2.1.5 State creation: a history in three waves  
In their book Creating new states,  Pavkovic and Radan (2007) identify two waves in state-
creation taking place after the creation of the United Nations16. Firstly, and largest, the wave 
connected to the end of colonialism. Second, the wave connected to the dissolution of the 
communist unions. The growth of members in the United Nations from the original 51 in 
1945 to 19317 in 2012 is largely due to decolonization (Kohen 2006, 2). This illustrates the 
developments in which entities are admitted as UN member states.  
The first wave: decolonisation 
Decolonization was facilitated by the UN Declaration of the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples18 (1960). A key feature in this process was the notion of uti 
possidetis juris19, where the borders of the colonial entities would be maintained as the 
borders of the new state (Pavkovic and Radan 2007). Some regions in former colonies 
attempted secession from the newly independent colony in which they were placed, but these 
were not accepted by the United Nations20.  In total, 80 UN member states and three de facto-
states21  were created during this wave (The United Nations General Assembly 1955, The 
United Nations 24.03.2013a, b).  
 
                                                 
16
 This wave structure is also seen in Kolstø (2006, 736). 
17
 For a list of UN members and acceptance year, see  The United Nations (07.12.2012a). 
18
 Resolution 1514 (The United Nations 1960). The UN states what entities considered as colonies in The United 
Nations (24.03.2013a).  
19
 As you legally possess. 
20
 Biafra is an  example of such (Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 22). 
21
 The de facto-states created in the first, decolonisation wave are Katanga, Biafra and Rhodesia.  
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After this decolonization wave the creation of new states has become more difficult. Most of 
the UN member states admitted after 1990 were created due to the collapsing of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia (Kohen 2006, 2). While The United Nations (1945) charter expresses 
support for the right of self-determination it is at the same time negative to secession from 
independent states outside of this framework. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 23) argue that while 
decolonization is the withdrawal of a territory controlled by another state but not part of it, 
post-decolonisational state creation is another story. Here, the territorial integrity of the 
existing state is seen as clashing with the right of self-determination of the peoples living in 
the potential state.  
 
As the debate on who should be considered as having a right to secede developed, the need to 
specify arose. While the colonies had this right, they were not allowed to change the existing 
borders. Nor was colonial domination an accepted reason to secede for any and all regions. 
The United Nations adopted the so-called salt-water criterion, signifying that only territories 
that were “geographically separate” and “distinct ethnically or culturally from the country 
administering it” were defined as non-self-governing territories with the right to secede 
(General Assembly Resolution 1541 of The United Nations General Assembly , quoted in 
Pegg 1998, 139, see also Brilmayer 1991, 182, Lloyd 1994-1995, 425, Österlund 1997, 181).  
The second wave: communist union dissolution 
The break- up of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia led to a multitude of new states being 
accepted as UN member states. That their acceptances were generally unproblematic22 
demonstrates that the UN now operates with two situations where the question of admittance 
is fairly obvious: former colonies - with a body of sea water between them and the centre - 
and federal entities in collapsed unions. In total, nineteen UN members and nine23 de facto-
states were created in this period (The United Nations 07.12.2012a, Pellet 1992, Council 
1993b, Hilde 1999, Council 1993a). 
 
The discussions arising after the decolonization and expanded during the second wave were 
                                                 
22
 Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a plethora of complications after their application for independence, but 
at a structural level the case was fairly clear. They were accepted as a state by the Badinter committee and 
swiftly incorporated as a UN member state in 1992 within months of their declaration of independence (The 
United Nations 07.12.2012a, Rich 1993, 48-50, OSCE). The Greece - Former Yugoslavian Republic Of 
Macedonia (FYROM) name dispute (seeThe Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has also not 
hindered FYROM’s UN membership status and general recognition. Sub-federal units like Vojvodina, Kosovo 
and Chechnya were rejected in their application for state status. 
23
 The de facto-states created in the second, union dissolution wave are Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, Kosovo, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska Krajina, Republika Srpska, South-Ossetia and  Transnistria. 
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still valid. Despite the existence of the UN Declaration on friendly relations (1970) the 
question was still open as to who holds the right to separating from the territory of the state 
they originated in, and for what reasons. Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 23-24) point out that the 
UN does not define what constitutes a people or how to distinguish between groups. Creating 
a new state is further complicated by the fact that only very few states24 have constitutional 
secession clauses, and those that have them tend to not be very specific as to when it is 
legitimate to secede and who is allowed to do so (Bordignon and Brusco 2001, 1812). Chen 
and Ordeshook (1994)  argues that a reason for this is that including such a clause is believed 
to lead to increased risk of fractional struggles. By having the option to opt out from the state 
if only the protest is large enough, small, regional frustrations might be cajoled into larger 
events causing much distress from the inhabitants of the area. 
A third wave? 
In the years after the publication of Pavkovic and Radan (2007)  there appears to be a new 
trend manifesting itself in the relationship between non-recognised states and international 
actors. This could indicate that one is approaching a different, more pragmatic attitude 
towards these entities25. With the decolonisation and union dissolution periods generally over, 
the fear of a domino-effect might be less justifiable. A total of five UN member states and 
eleven de facto-states fit into this category26. 
 
Since the creation of  the de facto-state in Taiwan after the Communist takeover of China in 
1949, there has been a small but steady stream of de facto-states created outside of the two 
scenarios presented by Pavkovic and Radan (2007). These are not related to communist union 
dissolution or to decolonisation as such. Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Somaliland and 
South Sudan are in areas that have a colonial history, but their two-step process of secession 
does not fit with the concept of decolonisation. They have seceded from areas that have 
themselves seceded27, or have split from an entity created by the merge of two or more former 
                                                 
24
 Bordignon and Brusco (2001, 1812) identify Yugoslavia and Ethiopia - both of which have experienced 
attempted secession. 
25
 The de facto-states created in the third ware are Anjouan, Bangladesh, East Timor, Puntland, South Sudan, 
Eritrea, Iraqi-Kurdistan, North Cyprus, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam and Taiwan. 
26
 The five recognised are: Bangladesh (1974), East Timor (2002), Eritrea (1993), Montenegro (2006), and South 
Sudan (2011) (The United Nations 07.12.2012a). Note that Montenegro’s admission can be considered a 
continuation of the dissolution of Yugoslavia though happening over a decade after the rest. Switzerland became 
a member of the UN in 2002, but the statehood of that particular state has not been subject to question here. 
27
 Bangladesh broke loose from Pakistan, who itself seceded from the English colony of India. For a timeline, 
see for instance BBC (2013a) and Encyclopædia Britannica (2013c). 
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colonial entities28. The creation of North Cyprus has nothing to do with decolonisation or 
union dissolution, and the same holds true for Iraqi-Kurdistan and several other entities29. 
Tamil Eelam is not in this wave as they broke loose nearly forty years after Sri Lanka’s 
independence30. This is so long that it appears obvious there must be something else going on 
than mere decolonisation. What is new is therefore not the existence of these entities, but the 
treatment of them by the international society. Falling outside of the other two waves, these 
are special cases and it appears that in the later years they have become to a larger and larger 
extent treated as such.  
 
The consequences of this are twofold. First, there is the actions and attitudes of international 
society. Second, there is the behaviour and rhetoric of the states-in-spe themselves. From the 
first, international perspective, Hoch (2011, 81-82)  investigates trends in the development of 
the European Union (EU), and  notes a general moving away from the dichotomous notion of 
either full recognition or full rejection of state status.  After 2010, the EU seems to have 
adopted the strategy of “engagement without recognition”31, indicating more and closer 
connections with the relevant entities. Hoch (2011) further claims there is a changing rhetoric 
from the EU, based in the idea that they would rather influence and ameliorate the situation on 
the ground in these areas than firmly stand by their principles of non-recognition and 
contribute to harsh living conditions within the non-recognised state’s borders. If this is the 
case for other states then only the EU member states, it would mean an interesting change in 
the international climate regarding state recognition. 
 
From the perspective of the non-recognised state leaders, we also see a change in debate 
tactics and development focus. The latter is to a large extent based on the international 
response to Kosovo’s struggle towards their declaration of independence in 200832. The 
“standards before status” policy introduced by The United Nation Interim Administration in 
                                                 
28
 East Timor, Eritrea, Somaliland, and South Sudan merged with other former colonies to form the entities they 
eventually seceded from.  See for instance BBC (04.07.2011, 2012c, 2013c, f), Lloyd (1994-1995), BBC 
(2013b), Encyclopædia Britannica (2013g, k, h). 
29
 For more on the history of North Cyprus, see Freedomhouse (1998n), Altinay (2000), Bahcheli (2004). For 
more on Iraqi-Kurdistan, see for instance Freedomhouse (1998k), Carver (2002), Olson (2006).  
30
 Sri Lanka, then known as Ceylon, became independent from the United Kingdom in 1948 (Encyclopædia 
Britannica 2013l). It was admitted to the UN as a member state in 1955 (The United Nations General Assembly 
1955).  Pegg (1998, 77) claims that Tamil Eelam was a de facto-state from 1986 onwards. 
31
 For example unofficial meetings with leaders of civil society organisations, supporting said organisations, 
aiding humanitarian work et cetera. See for instance (Civil Georgia 2010, ISS 2010). 
32
 See The Republic of Kosovo (2008) for the declaration of independence, and Kosovo Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (04.12.2012)  for a list of those recognising their sovereign statehood. 
16 
 
Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003) formalized the then new notion that Kosovo could be recognised if 
it proved to have fulfilled certain democratic criteria and upheld democratic standards. Its 
subsequent recognition by several states in 2008 has led to an increased focus on structural 
and organisational development in the post-Soviet non-recognised states (see for instance 
Caspersen 2008b, c), and there is no reason to believe it will not be affecting leaders of other 
such entities as well. However, as Caspersen (2008b) points out, the recognition of Kosovo is 
intended as a sui generis and thus not as a precedent for other, similar reactions regarding the 
other non-recognized states of the world.  
2.1.6 Responses to state declaration  
When a territory declares itself independent, the international society will have to react. The 
hoped reaction is naturally recognition and acceptance, but this is by no means assured. The 
international society is conservative regarding borders, and particularly so for unilateral 
secessions (Fawn 2008, Kolstø 2006, 736, Hoch 2011, Pavkovic and Radan 2007, 23). If the 
declaration is made by an application for UN membership, the process is theoretically fairly 
straight-forward. All applications for full membership is evaluated by the Security Council, 
and if they can support the request, it is sent to the General Assembly for consideration (The 
United Nations General Assembly Chapter 14, Articles 134-138, The United Nations 
07.12.2012b).   
 
This is not the only way of proceeding. Independence can be declared without directly 
applying to the UN. Examples include referenda, unilateral declaration, or simply making it 
clear in some manner that the region in question operates separately from the state it used to 
be part of. If the declaration initially is bilateral, meaning that both the original and new state 
agrees to it beforehand, there is no perceived problem with recognition33. Relatively 
uncontroversial events of this type will not be included here. It is the more problematic 
unilateral declarations that are in focus here, including those that eventually became 
bilaterally accepted.  
Responses from the UN and regional organisations 
Should a secessionist area break loose from its mother state, even without applying to the UN 
for membership, the Security Council will evaluate whether they perceive the event a threat to 
international peace. If that is the case they can decide to discuss an appropriate response, up to 
                                                 
33
 For instance, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia was a relatively problem-free bilateral division, and the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia gained membership in the UN without delay (Hilde 1999, Council 1993a, Council 
1993b). 
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and including armed military action, though peaceful means are favoured (The United Nations 
1945Chapters 5-9). In addition, regional organisations such as the African Union34, may 
express opinions on the legitimacy of the proposed state. As mentioned above, UN 
membership is used as a proxy for status as a recognised state, but this neither means that the 
UN is the only organisation that entities can become members of nor that states cannot 
recognise entities without UN approval. Indeed, some de facto-states are recognised by 
several UN member states, though this is only the case for a small minority of them35.  
Responses from the individual UN member states 
Having territorial control over an area indicates the lack of armed forces there from the 
parent-state. Anderson (2011) describes the situation as one where the war over the territory is 
over, and the conflict moves to frozen stability. In other words, the conflict is not solved, yet 
not actively fought over. Though the constant fear of military attacks often leads to militarised 
societies and an official rhetoric focused on this (Byman and King 2012, 54), the de facto 
states are on a rule ignored by international society. Their declarations of independence36 
normally create little more than small ripples in the international, political climate. This 
means that trade, political cooperation or any other activity lending legitimacy to the leaders 
is minimal (Caspersen 2008b, 13).  
 
Wood (1981, 125-128) claims that contrary to what one might believe, the parent state 
normally reacts peacefully to declarations of independence from secessionist areas. He 
presents two options for the parent state in such situations: Either forceful repression or 
attempting to incorporate the region by giving it a stronger autonomy.  The first is very costly, 
and carries with it only a small chance of success in the long run, though it can subdue the 
conflict for a time. Wood (1981, 126) argues that aggressive reactions from the central 
government carries with it a high risk of  increasing the feeling of separateness amongst the 
inhabitants of the secessionist area. To avoid a long-lasting conflict, he finds it is logical for 
most governments to go for the second option. Constitutional reform increasing cooperation 
and acceptance of divisions are seen as the most efficient way of reacting to secession37.  
                                                 
34
 As it did when rejecting the proposed Azawad in the northern regions of Mali (The African Union 2012). 
35
 Anderson (2011, 185) shows that the de facto-states which have been recognised by UN member states but are 
not themselves members are: Abkhazia (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru), Biafra (Gabon, Haiti, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Zambia), Chechnya (Georgia), Kosovo (95 states)35, Northern Cyprus (Turkey), South 
Ossetia (Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru), Taiwan (22 states)35. 
36
 Declaration of independence is here considered a step in the process as it is assumed they do not declare it if 
they believe the possibility of obtaining it as completely unfeasible or dangerous. For a list of which entities have 
declared independence, see footnote 86 on page 42. 
37
 Brancati (2006) argues that regional autonomy can increase conflict by facilitating participation in regional 
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Each state can decide whether or not to acknowledge the independence of new states. 
Acknowledgement can take the form of de jure official recognition, or de facto by practical 
actions making it clear that the state is assumed to be legitimate and valid by for instance 
commencing trade relations or talks with the entity’s political leaders. Often states offer de 
facto recognition first, while they wait to see if the new state is actually viable before de jure 
recognising it (Fleischer 1994, 55-57). In cases where the separating region does not belong to 
the two abovementioned categories of being either a former colony or having status as a 
republic in a union that is dissolving, the most common response is that of ignoring. Not 
having trade partners or others to lean on makes the survival of the non-recognised state 
difficult and it can be problematic to imagine how they manage to keep their internal 
legitimacy for a long period of time facing such little aid and having only few political 
connections. 
2.1.7 Summarising state creation 
The first section of this chapter has defined the state. In international law, the state must have 
a stable population, a fixed territory, a government and sovereignty. In declarative theory, an 
entity is a state if it fulfils these criteria. In constitutive theory, an entity is a state if it is 
recognised as such by other states. A state can have internal and external legitimacy. External 
means that it is accepted as a state by other states, while internal indicates it is accepted as 
such by its population. These two are, as demonstrated, not always present at the same time. 
For this thesis, state success is defined as being a UN member state. New states are created 
through secession, a concept which here envelopes all subcategories of the concept as long as 
the separation is unilateral and not accepted by the parent state. The UN is not in favour of 
altering the borders of existing member states, except for through decolonisation. They have 
also opened for new states created after the dissolution of the communist unions. These two 
constitute the two largest waves of state creation. In addition, there has been identified a third 
wave, unconnected with any major international change of the aforementioned type.   
2.2 Non-recognised states and the world - the de facto state 
The second half of this chapter describes those areas that have failed at gaining international 
recognition but still manage to continue existing for at least two years. This section describes 
the concept of the de facto-state, developments leading up to their creation, how they manage 
                                                                                                                                                        
politics and thus strengthen the feeling of distance to the centre. Flamand (2013) finds that decentralisation 
cannot prevent secessionist conflict. 
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to continue existing for years despite being outside of international society and what ends they 
meet. Based on this information, I seek to identify what can explain the development of non-
recognised states. Four factors are found, namely their resources, their ethnic composition, the 
involvement of other actors and the level of democratic institutions within the entity.  
2.2.1The de facto-state 
Before discussing de facto-states, a clarification of what they are is necessary. Kolstø (2006) 
defines it in the following manner.  
“To be classified as a [de facto-state], a political entity must fulfil three criteria. Its 
leadership must be in control of (most of) the territory it lays claim to, and it must 
have sought but not achieved international recognition as an independent state. 
Finally, to eliminate a whole spate of ephemeral political contraptions, I exclude those 
that have persisted in this state of non-recognition for less than two years.”(Kolstø 
2006, 724-725)  
This definition is widely accepted38 and forms the basis for the selection of entities in this 
thesis.A de facto-state is thus an entity fulfilling the first three of the state criteria set forth by 
Fleischer (1994, 49). It is a state by declarative, but not by constitutive theory.  Likewise, it 
has internal legitimacy, but not external. It is important to note that the concept does not only 
apply to entities without clear outcomes. A de facto-state stops existing when it is admitted as 
a UN member or reintegrated into its parent. But, between its creation and its disappearance 
all entities included here are de facto-states. In other words, “de facto-state” applies to both 
present and past entities included in this thesis39. 
 
The definition of a state in international law as summarised by Fleischer (1994, 49) defines a 
state as a territory having  a stable population, a fixed territory,  an organised, central 
government, capable of securing rule of law and  a certain level of sovereignty. In order to be 
defined as a non-recognised state in this thesis, the territory in question will have fulfilled 
these claims without achieving international recognition as a state.  As previously mentioned, 
unproblematic secessions accepted without major delay by the parent state are not included 
here. The focus is on those entities that are in limbo, that are not accepted as fully-fledged de 
jure states while at the same time not being de facto part of their parent. The large number of 
entities claiming, exercising or desiring self-determination outside of their parent state means 
the data selection will have to come as a result of close evaluation of several more criteria.  
                                                 
38
 See for instance Pegg (1998), Caspersen (2008c, 2010a), von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer (2012),  or Byman 
and King (2012). 
39
 Another concept that signifies the same can be non-recognised state. 
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2.2.2 Surviving as a de facto- state 
Surviving as a de facto- state is complicated. Having none or little recognition, they have very 
few options for international cooperation, they have a minimum of political contact with 
others, and international trade, export and import is logically difficult to organise. Caspersen 
(2008c), Lynch (2002) and Hoch (2011) details how the non-recognised states are often 
thought of as criminal havens, ripe with organised crime, human trafficking and smuggling. 
The claims are frequently repeated by parent states attempting to stop external interaction 
with these entities. While such accusations are found to be overplayed, they still have 
elements of truth to them. Non-recognised states are often “built on shaky economic 
foundations” and may not see other alternatives than having a shady economy (Byman and 
King 2012, 51). Often, non-recognised states are indeed “weak, poor and corrupt” (Caspersen 
2008c, 117), but not uniformly so40. Indeed, Kolstø (2006) and von Steinsdorff (2012, 204) 
finds that some perform better at several democratic and institutional indicators than their 
parent states. Often themselves emerging from war and weak states, the non-recognised states 
generally have a poor starting point for their development of stable institutions and economic 
growth (see for instance Mazrui 1995, Caspersen 2011). Having a reputation as a criminal 
region will necessarily make it even more difficult to engage in cooperation with other states.  
 
After the introduction of the “standards before status” policy in Kosovo by the The United 
Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003), democracy and democratisation 
have become focal points for many non-recognised state leaders (Caspersen 2010a, 2, 2008c) 
and some are indeed scoring higher on democratic measurements41 than their parent states 
(von Steinsdorff and Fruhsdorfer 2012, 204). Kosovo’s declaration of independence and its 
subsequent recognition by multiple major states has caused many a non-recognised state 
leader and patron state leader alike to argue that there is no reason why recognition of other 
entities should be withheld (see for instance Caspersen 2008c, b). 
 
Kolstø (2006, 2008) identifies five factors that aid the survival of non-recognise states. The 
most important is the process of nation building. Here, the leaders of the entity attempt to 
                                                 
40
 Non-recognised states are not alone in this. Recognised states can also be weak (Failed States Index 2012), 
poor (UNDP 2013) and corrupt (Transparency International 2012).  Taiwan is an example of a de facto-state that 
is neither of the three (Freedomhouse 2012m, Nation Master 25.02.2013). Both Somaliland and Puntland, though 
themselves troubled, scored better than their parent state Somalia on these indicators(Arieff 2008, Freedomhouse 
2012h, i, Mesfin 2009, BBC 2012c). 
41
 Scheindlin (2012) questions the validity of certain so-called democratic indicators, particularly referenda, in 
non-recognised states. 
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create a shared identity among the inhabitants to ensure backing from within (see also 
Scheindlin 2012). Developing common points of reference and identity markers can be and 
are done by for instance using propaganda, writing and teaching the history of the area and 
cultivating traditions and national customs. This is frequently done through upholding the 
memory of the civil war that preceded the birth of the non-recognised state. Thus, a clear 
image of us-versus-them can be maintained. Honour is given to those that fought on the right 
side, while the image of the enemy seeking their obliteration is kept in focus.   
 
Kolstø (2006, 730-731) points out that the population of de facto-states normally supports the 
cause for independence. He argues this is because those opposing it are likely to have left 
during the process of independence and supporters from the outside are likely to have 
immigrated.  But a focus on soft power is not the only way to keep the public on your side. A 
militarization of society is also a common manner of upholding the existence of a non-
recognised state, creating what Caspersen (2012a, 133) calls frozen situations of “no peace, 
no war”. Relative to the size of the population, the military normally constitutes a formidable 
force (King 2001, 535, Kolstø 2006, 731-732). In addition, the parent state is by necessity 
sufficiently weak - militarily, institutionally, politically or otherwise - to not being able to 
regain control over the territory. As long as chaos continues, the parent state is thus prevented 
from launching full strength-campaigns to reintegrate its lost land. However, not all parent 
states remain weak. Both China and Russia are strong states, both militarily and economically, 
yet they have not completely regained control of respectively Taiwan and Chechnya .  
 
Powerful patrons can play a large part in the development of non-recognised states, both if the 
relationship is officially acknowledged or simply implied42. The support may reach such a 
high level that a master/puppet-relationship is born. Here, the entity is so dependent on 
external support from its patron that the latter completely dominates the aspiring state. A 
symbiosis between the two might, however, be desired in irredentist secession43. Caspersen 
(2010b) finds that this situation is less frequent than might be expected, and often 
exaggerated. Indeed, the tables are sometimes turned completely44. Though non-recognised 
                                                 
42
 For example, Caspersen (2010b) points out the clear support of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia by Russia in 
2008, Byman and King (2012, 48) further mention Russia’s aid to Transnistria, Armenia’s help to Nagorno-
Karabakh and Turkey’s support of Northern Cyprus. 
43
 Such as Republika Srpska Krajina and Republika Srpska’s desire to maintain and cultivate their Serb identities 
(Caspersen 2010b, 50). 
44
 For instance, the Armenian president Robert Kocharian is originally from Nagorno-Karabakh and has twice 
been the president there as well (The Republic of Armenia 2013). 
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states are often dependent on external patrons, the degrees of subordination are highly varying 
(Caspersen 2008a, 2007) . External support need not only come from other states. 
International organisations can likewise play important roles in the survival or disappearance 
of seceded states through for instance taking over some of the basic functions of the state 
(Kolstø 2006, 734-735)45.   
 
The importance of geographical and political positions in the world is highlighted by Levitsky 
and Way (2006) in their article “Linkage and Leverage”. They claim that where a country is 
situated and who it has relations with has a strong effect on how it develops. The argument is 
supported by Doorenspleet (2004) who finds a clear effect of a country’s role in the world 
system having an “unexpected impact” on structural development. Though not originally 
discussing state recognition, the articles illustrate the potential in having friends in positions 
that can influence the opinions of other states.  Byman and King (2012, 47) claim that it is 
indeed the case that geopolitical positioning is important for the probability of the disputed 
state being recognised. 
2.2.3 De facto-state status: independence, limbo and reintegration  
 Non-recognised states exist because their strive for recognition is not obtained for an 
elongated period of time. While some of them float in undefined positions for several years, 
most of the entities that have come into existence since the creation of the United Nations 
have reached an end. A few have been recognised as states and have received UN 
membership. For most of them, the end result is different. They either become reabsorbed into 
the parent state with no special status, they reach a compromise with the parent state securing 
increased autonomy, or they are integrated in their patron state (Kolstø 2006, 735). Seeing as 
none of the entities identified in this thesis have become part of their patron state, it will not 
be possible to analyse this specific type of events. That gives three categories: independence, 
limbo and reintegration. 
 
Independence is a rare outcome. Only four of the twenty three de facto-states included in this 
thesis46 have reached independence: Bangladesh, Eritrea, South Sudan and East-Timor. That 
the number is so low is not surprising, since cases where independence is expected and easily 
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 The EU has taken an active interest in promoting democracy in Nagorno-Karabakh (Simão 2012). Kosovo 
sees a high level of positive involvement by the international society via EULEX (23.01.2013) and NATO K-
FOR (2013) while Katanga was brought to its knees partly by a UN intervention (The United Nations Security 
Council 1961a). 
46
 A discussion of the data selection and included entities is found in the Data chapter. 
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juridically defendable are not expected to have a protracted period of non-recognition before 
they are included as UN members. In addition, as Pegg (1998, 220) points out, there are many 
organisational and normative obstacles  potential states have to overcome.  
 
Being in limbo means having an undetermined outcome. The process is yet unfinished. These 
entities vary in their degree of recognition (Pegg 1998, 209-220). Some are accepted by 
multiple states, while others are merely ignored by almost everyone47. Their undecided 
position does not mean that their development is frozen. They are constantly attempting to 
reach their goal of independence, be it via extortion-like techniques or institutional 
restructuring (Byman and King 2012, 51). Evolutions in degree of recognition can be difficult 
to spot, and may come in different forms. Offering or retracting recognition is not the only 
way of showing support and acceptance of a non-recognised state. Development in trade and 
political contact might be indicators of change in status, even though no official 
proclamations are made.  
 
Failing as a non-recognised state can have different outcomes, namely an increase or decrease 
of self-government, or maintaining the status quo ante48 (Kolstø 2006, 764-738, Pegg 1998, 
209-220). In practice, this has two outcomes: Some kind of federal agreement can be reached 
with the central government, allowing an autonomous status to the secessionist area49.  
Otherwise, the formerly non-recognised state becomes fully absorbed into the parent state and 
functions as any other part of the country. In this case it might keep its old form50 or have its 
borders redrawn51. 
2.2.4 Identifying causal conditions and hypotheses 
Here, theories on what causes which outcomes for de facto-states are discussed. Four topics 
are presented, and from them five hypotheses regarding influence on the outcomes of the 
included de facto-states are formed. The topics are 1) Economic situation, 2) Involvement of 
international actors, 3) Ethnicity as a state foundation, and 4) Democratic institutions. From 
these four, five hypotheses are extracted. They are operationalized in the Methods chapter, 
after having discussed the method of choice.  
                                                 
47
 A list of entities in limbo and their recognisers can be seen in footnote 35 on page 17. 
48
 That is, the level of autonomy they had before the secessionist conflict erupted. 
49
 For example, partial autonomy was granted Republika Srpska (Kolstø 2006, 738). 
50
 As an example, Chechnya still has its old borders (Kolstø 2006, 738). 
51
 For instance: Biafra’s borders were completely altered after the conflict ended (Commision 2013, Cahoon 
2002, The Robinson Library 2012).  
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The hypotheses are presented individually, but in the analyses the focus will be on seeking 
effects of their combinations.  They are presented individually because the theoretical 
background to the hypotheses all focuses on the influence of the specific, discussed factor. No 
combined hypotheses have been possible to discern from the literature included here, and they 
are thus kept in their single form to provide the chance of testing them as they are presented. 
The hypotheses below present the direction in which each one is expected to influence the 
outcome. They are assumed to work together, but it what manners are yet unclear.   
 
Seeking patterns in the development of non-recognised states is a complicated project. The 
difference in the background of these regions might be too great for any meaningful 
interpretation to be made. They come from different times and situations. They have high 
variations in resources and political systems and are spread over several continents. The 
factors ultimately determining52 their outcomes is, according to Pegg (1998, 224), not in their 
control. Still, they often look to each other for inspiration and information (Pegg 1998, 167-
170, Caspersen 2008b, Fawn 2008, Charney 2001). The recognition of one non-recognised 
state by a UN member leads to reactions from the others and possible parent and patron states 
as well with demands for equal treatment.  Still, investigating whether such patterns exist is 
important. The findings can indicate directions for future research regardless of whether any 
pattern is found or not. Likewise, the energy of the non-recognised states could be more 
effectively spent if effects of the included factors can be discerned.  
 
The following topics and causal conditions are found by studying articles on single cases or 
small groups of de facto-states singling out what appears to be the most prominent factors. It 
is not intended to be an exclusive list. It is made after assessing both credibility and frequency 
of the arguments made by other researchers. This means that it is researcher-dependent and its 
explanatory strength potentially weakened by omission of important factors. In order to avoid 
this as much as possible, it is important to use a multitude of sources. If the analysis chapter 
reveals contradictory outcomes for entities with the same developmental trajectory and 
matching causal combinations, a further discussion of potentially missing factors must be 
included. Some arguments have been considered, but excluded. Reasons for this include being 
                                                 
52
 Pegg (1998, 224) identifies three main factors influencing the outcomes of the non-recognised state’s struggle 
for recognition: 1) acceptance by the parent state, 2) massive and prolonged human rights violations, and 3) 
force. Factor one is irrelevant here, as only problematic secessions will be included. Factor two is seen again in 
the search for omitted causal conditions in the analysis chapter. Factor three has not been examined. 
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1) mentioned only by one or few authors53, 2) receiving the same value on all or nearly all of 
the data54, or 3) being used to explain the outcome of only one or few entities55.  
Topic 1: Ethnicity as a state foundation 
Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation 
H1: Having an ethnic base increases the chances of international recognition 
 
The causal condition and hypotheses presented here are based on discussions regarding the 
importance of ethnicity as an identity marker and its effect on the development of the de 
facto-state. This involves point one in Fleischer’s (1994, 49) criteria for statehood in 
international law, namely the need for a stable population. It examines the population of the 
non-recognised state and compares it with that of its parent.  
 
The principle to self-determination56 is described in the Charter of the United Nations (The 
United Nations 1945) Articles 1(2) and 55, and in Article 2 of  (The United Nations General 
Assembly 1960) is described as a right all peoples have. On the surface this might seem 
straight-forward, as one might simply ask the people whether they wish independence. But, as 
(Pegg 1998, 138) illustrates, the complications are many. For who are the people? And what 
about the territorial integrity of the parent state?  
 
Both the UN charter and Resolution 1541 come with modifications, attempting to narrow 
down the number of groups being entitled to self-determination (see a discussion in Pegg 
1998, 136-142) . This is also strengthened in practice by generally only allowing statehood to 
post-colonial entities and federal units after union collapse. The perceived discrepancies 
found between the articles granting the right to self-determination and those rejecting it are at 
the core of many fights for independence. One reason for this is that the main distinction 
between decolonisation and secession can be said to be simply geographical distance,  and 
that there are thus inconsistencies in the application of the norms (Pegg 1998, 140, Buchheit 
                                                 
53
 Islam (1985, 212) argues that one of the reasons why Bangladesh was recognised is its geographical separation 
from its parent state. This is ignored here, as it is not a repeated claim by others or in other situations and only 
can be used to describe Anjouan, Bangladesh, Rhodesia, Taiwan and Transnistria. 
54Both (Haugland 2008, 70-75) and (Islam 1985) find that the level of human rights violations prior to the 
attempt at being accepted as a state has an impact. However, the causal condition is not translatable. All of the 
entities included have a violent background. That some of them suffered long bouts of violence from their parent 
state before the war that led to secession is not considered interesting here. 
55
 Haugland (2008, 70-75) find that the status as federal entity contributes to the likelihood of being recognised. 
As Eritrea is the only former federal entity in my data set, this variable is excluded. 
56
 See Kamanu (1974) for a discussion on territorial integrity versus the right of self-determination in post-
colonial Africa. 
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1978, Collier and Hoeffler 2002, Demissie 1996-1997). The potential for secessionist 
conflicts are more strongly illuminated when one considers that the majority of states are in 
fact comprised of a multitude of ethnic groups (CIA World Factbook 12.02.2013).  
 
Wood (1981, 112-116)  analyses preconditions for successful secession, and finds that a 
concentration of one main ethnic group appears to increase the de facto-state’s chances. 
Similarly, both Hroch (1998),  and Guiberneau and Rex (2012) illustrate the power of 
ethnicity as a rallying point. Several of the de facto states that have existed since the creation 
of the United Nations have come in the form of an ethnical group that wishes to separate from 
the other ethnicity of the parent state and go from being a minority in one state to a majority 
in their own57.  
 
Summarising, it is clear that the theories argue that having a distinct ethnicity different from 
the population in the rest of the parent is assumed to be positive for the chances of 
recognition. 
Topic 2: Democratic institutions 
Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state 
H2: Having a higher level of democratic institutions than the parent state increases the 
chances of international recognition 
 
This argument revolves around the abilities of the administrative organization of the de facto-
state in comparison to that of its parent. During the last ten years or so, a new discourse 
regarding non-recognized states has arrived58. It can be seen particularly in the international 
society’s reactions to the situation in Kosovo Here, the states who recognized59 Kosovo 
argued this was possible due to its strong level of democracy60. This line of arguments have 
also been seen in the contact recognized states have with entities such as the present-day post-
Soviet ones and Taiwan (Hoch 2011). The argument that democratic institutions improve a de 
facto state’s chances of obtaining recognition is also put forwards by Pegg (1998, 42).  
Caspersen (2008b)  argues that though both the US and the EU refuse that the recognition of 
Kosovo should set precedence for what is required for other states to be accepted, it could still 
                                                 
57
 Abkhazia, South-Sudan and Biafra are examples of de facto-states with an ethnic foundation. Entities such as 
for instance Eritrea and Transnistria are examples of the contrary. 
58
 This is described in the section A third wave? on page 14. 
59
 A list of who recognises Kosovo is seen in through the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs (04.12.2012). 
60
 For a discussion on this argument, see for instance (Caspersen 2008b, Fawn 2008, Slomanson 2009, BBC 
2010, The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) 2003, NATO 1999). 
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have political consequences.  
 
Several non-recognised state leaders argue that if Kosovo could be recognized due to its 
democratic institutions, they should too61.  After the introduction of «standards before 
status»62 for Kosovo in 2003, the focus of many leaders of Post-Soviet non-recognized states 
has been on strengthening and putting the limelight on already existing democratic and 
institutional credentials. They argue that they ought to be recognized, particularly seeing that 
they have a higher level of democracy than their parent states (Caspersen 2011, 338, 2008b, 
2012a).  
 
The claim of an influence of democratic level compared to the parent state can also be seen in 
the evaluations of de facto-states in the literature. For example: In her analysis of Nagorno-
Karabakh and its parent and patron, Caspersen (2012a) concludes that the lack of stable, 
democratic institutions has checked Nagorno-Karabakh’s development towards a solution and 
kept it existing as a non-recognised state.  
 
This corresponds to part three of the criterions of statehood in international law, namely 
having “an organised, central government, capable of securing rule of law” (Fleischer 1994, 
49). The arguments presented here indicate that if the de facto-state is more successful than its 
parent in this, it is more likely to be recognised as a UN member state.  
 
While non-recognised state leaders argues that accepting Kosovo should lead to an acceptance 
of the post-Soviet satellites, the EU claims Kosovo is a one-off situation (Caspersen 2008b). 
But structural stability and democracy - particularly in otherwise unstable or closed regions - 
has shown to be beneficial for the recognition of  for instance Somaliland (Arieff 2008, 67-
70) - at least in practice if not officially. However, how democratic institutions affect state 
recognition is unclear. Haugland (2008, 68) finds there to be no correlation between 
institutions and international accept. 
 
This hypothesis is thus meant to test the claims that the democratic level of the de facto-state 
                                                 
61
 See for instance (Smolnik 2012) and (Caspersen 2012b, 1-3).  
62
 «Standards before status» refers to the Standards for Kosovo and how the entity would have to fulfil these 
criteria before being able to be considered as a state (The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) 2003). 
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matters for its recognition - particularly in relation to its parent.  
Topic 3: Involvement of international actors 
Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition  
H3: Opposition from a UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition 
Causal condition D: UN veto power support  
H4: Support from a UN veto power increases the chances of recognition 
 
The hypotheses presented here are founded on arguments regarding support or opposition by 
UN veto holders.  The underlying reasons for their involvement is not evaluated, nor is it 
possible to discern them from the data collected. What is investigated here is not why these 
states involve themselves, but what the effect of it is.   
  
That international support is important for the for the survival of de facto-states is argued by 
both Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2008), Kolstø (2006), Ishiyama and Batta (2012) and Hoch 
(2011, 74). This is both because contact with others can help economically and militarily, but 
also because the recognised friend might convince others to support the de facto-state as well. 
Similarly, opposition can prove fatal63.  
 
Though UN membership admissions are few and far between for entities not part of the 
decolonisation or post-union dissolution waves, this rule is not set in stone.  Wood (1981, 130-
133) explains that exceptions might happen in a small number of cases where “strategic, 
economic, or ideological motives override the more conservative tendency” of not supporting 
secessionist claims. His example is Bangladesh64, whose recognition was aided by India’s 
intervention. But, as Wood (1981, 133)  stresses, having external support is not the same as a 
guarantee of eventual acceptance by others. Nor does support for one non-recognised state 
mean that the big power will be generally supportive of all such claims65.  UN veto power 
support is not synonymous to UN membership acceptance66. UN veto opposition and support 
is changeable, and initial rejection does not indicate permanent exclusion67. 
                                                 
63
 Katanga is a good example of a de facto-state stopped in its tracks by international involvement(Hughes 2010, 
Islam 1985).  
64
 Another example is Taiwan, who is protected from China by the USA  (Kolstø 2006, 733). 
65
 As seen with the USSR, who supported Bangladesh but went against both Katanga and Biafra (Pegg 1998, 
131). A contemporary example is Russia, who is in opposition to Kosovo while supporting several of the post-
USSR-entities (Fawn 2008, 274, UNPO 2009, Ciobanu 2008, 121, Caspersen 2008b, 1, BBC 2010). 
66
 This can be seen in for instance South-Ossetia, who is supported by Russia but is not a UN member state 
(Slomanson 2009, Nichol 2008, Global Security 2011b). 
67
 The changeability of UN veto power opposition is well illustrated by Bangladesh who was initially opposed by 
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The potential power of big actors is underlined when considering how the veto powers can 
block application processes in the UN Security council68. International actors going against 
the desire of independence of secessionist areas is found to decrease the area’s chances of 
recognition (Haugland 2008, 68). This position is mirrored in the realist paradigm which 
states that power is the currency of international relations (Slaughter 1995, 507, Haugland 
2008, 26) which leads to the assumption that an already strong and recognised state will hold 
great sway over others and can retard or even stop an aspiring state in its attempts at 
becoming an included member of the international society. Lack of opposition from an 
international power is found to be important for the chances of international recognition 
(Haugland 2008, 73).  
 
UN veto holders are the most powerful single states in discussions of admittance of new 
member states, as they can stop the entire process by laying down vetoes69 (The United 
Nations 07.12.2012b).  One can assume that this power can be extended to also include 
relations with other member states. Thus, if one of them is positive to the recognition of one 
de facto-state it might be able to convince others that they should be so too. Due to their veto 
position, and their generally strong position in economic, military and other questions70, they 
are here assumed to hold potentially leading roles in the process towards recognition or 
rejection.  
 
Summarising, it is assumed that being opposed or supported by a UN veto holder can 
potentially be very important for the success or failure of non-recognised states. 
Topic 4: Economic situation significantly different from the parent state 
Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state  
H5: A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition 
                                                                                                                                                        
China but became a UN member state in 1974 (The United Nations General Assembly 1974, USUN 
13.05.2013). 
68
 As illustrated by the USA effectively blocking Palestinian bid for membership (Negroponte 2002, The 
Negroponte Doctrine 2003, Spillius 2011, Vick 2011, Krever and Vaccarello 2011, Ravid 2011). 
69
 Of course, UN veto states are not the only ones that can influence the future of these entities. Bangladesh, as 
previously mentioned, was strongly aided by India (Islam 1985, 218, Akram 2006, 29, The United Nations 
General Assembly 2004, 15, USUN 13.05.2013). Similarly, Armenia has been vitally important for Nagorno-
Karabakh (Hughes 2001, 14, BBC 2012e, Caspersen 2008a, 367-368).  For a list of states supporting or opposing 
de facto-state see Appendix 4.  
70
 Levitsky and Way (2006) discusses the powers of states in international relations, and argue that some states 
are more powerful than others.  Veto states are assumed in this thesis to be part of the category for the very 
influential. 
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For most secessionist areas, economy is an important factor (Buchanan 1995, 58-60).  Collier 
and Hoeffler (2002) and  King (2001) all argue from different perspectives how secessionist 
entities with a significantly different economic position are likely to attempt divorcing 
completely from their parent state. Further, the international society is also apt to react to 
conflicts if economy is an important manifest political cleavage. This is supported by Islam 
(1985, 213), who claims that one of the reasons the Katanga conflict faced such a harsh 
international reaction was its obvious economical aspect. The Biafra conflict, on the other 
hand, had a lower economic foundation and is claimed to therefore face a lower level of 
international reactions71. 
 
Anesi (2011) investigates the role of economy on secession development and finds that what 
matters is not which party of the conflict has the most resources, but whether economy plays a 
central role (see also Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 319,  and Ziblatt 2006).  Entities where 
economy plays an important role for the desire for secession are argued to be more likely to 
achieve success then entities without an obvious economical aspect. Should the resources be 
evenly spread, Anesi (2011) finds that the correlation disappears. Hence, conflicts in which an 
economic cleavage is important are expected to have increased chances for success.  
 
To summarise, the argument claims that de facto-states with a significantly different economic 
level from their parent - in either direction - are more likely to succeed in gaining UN 
membership than those with roughly the same level.  
2.3 Chapter summary 
The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a background for understanding de facto-
states. The concept of state is described via international law and internal and external 
legitimacy. UN membership status has been chosen as a proxy for recognition. Two state 
creation waves are results of official UN policy changes: the decolonisation and communist 
union dissolution waves. A third, potential wave was claimed, consisting of those new states 
that do not fit into the two previous categories. It was argued that recognition of these entities 
was becoming more frequent as the distance to the two other categories increased.  
 
                                                 
71
 That is not to say the conflict was ignored by the international society. See for example The Robinson Library 
(2012), Nafziger and Richter (1976),  and Post (1968). 
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The second section turned to de facto-states and their existence. They are found to have 
highly heterogeneous backgrounds, but have in common that they are born through war. 
Though often considered as weak, poor and corrupt, some of them display higher levels of 
democracy than their parents. They often depend on patrons to survive, but many stand alone. 
The entities can face two kinds of ends: success via recognition as a UN member state and 
failure through some form of reintegration into their parent. Entities without clear outcomes 
are still in limbo. Much internal variation exists.  
Using existing theory, five causal conditions with pertaining hypotheses were identified. 
These are as follows: Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation; B: Level of 
democratic institutions as compared with the parent state; C: UN veto power opposition; D: 
UN veto power support and E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state.  
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3. Data chapter: on de facto-states 
This chapter will provide a more close discussion of the criteria needed to be included in this 
analysis. There will be two main parts. The first part consists of an attempt to give an 
operational definition of the non-recognised state using both a negative and a positive 
description and will end by providing a list of the identified entities from the creation of the 
United Nations until 2012. The scope and purpose of the thesis is defined, and the case 
selection criteria are developed.  
The second part seeks to illuminate the diverse history and development of the de facto-states 
and contains descriptive analyses of the entities. The latter investigates whether there are any 
obvious patterns that can aid in understanding the outcomes of the non-recognised states, and 
focuses on the four topics presented in the theory chapter. These are 1) State foundation: 
ethnicity or geography2) Democratic institutions, 3) Involvement of international actors, and 
4) Economic situation significantly different from the parent state.  
3.1 The scope and purpose of the thesis 
The scope of the thesis has been set as from the creation of the United Nations in 1945 up 
until and including 2012.  If any entities had been created before 1945 or was nearing 
fulfilment of the criteria immediately after 2012, this could have caused a dilemma regarding 
whether or not to include them after all. This has not been a problem, as no de facto-states 
existing immediately before 194572 have been found, and no entity existing in 2012 has 
existed for only a little less than two years73. The included entities stem from all continents 
and all backgrounds, and are elected based on the criteria discussed below.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to seek patterns and identify which de facto-states achieve 
recognition and UN membership status, and who fail and are reintegrated into their parent 
state. In other words, which factors lead to which outcomes? This includes seeking the causal 
combinations behind both success and failure, in order to examine whether any common 
patterns exist, or whether their developments are purely individual and non-generalizable. In 
                                                 
72
 Manchukuo could have been relevant, as it existed from 1932-1945. Its break-down in 1945 makes it simple to 
reject, as it existed for no more than one year during the time investigated here and thus misses the two-year 
criterion. In addition, it is described as a Japanese puppet-state and would have been dismissed on that ground 
alone anyway. For information on Manchukuo, see for instance Encyclopædia Britannica (2013j) and Duara 
(2004).  
73
 The identified entity closest to reaching the two-year mark is Azawad, which was created in the spring of 2012 
and declared independent on April 6th that year. For more information, see Acherif (2012) and Morgan (2012). 
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addition, it applies the knowledge from the completed de facto-states to those still existing. 
The purpose of that is to see which of the latter match their trajectories and thus can be 
expected to have the same outcomes. It follows the logic of Lijphart’s (1971) hypothesis-
generating category. According to Van Evera’s (1997, 55) definition, it could be called a 
theory- generating study. Using Yin’s (2008) classifications would place it in the exploratory 
category. Though the categories are different, they all describe the purpose of the 
investigation: seeking to find out what causes which outcomes for de facto-states.   
 
No corresponding meta-analysis has been performed of all de facto-states existing after the 
creation of the UN before now74.  While several studies of single cases and groups of cases 
exist, there is a distinct lack of comparative analysis of non-recognised states and how they 
develop. This means that while the selection of cases will have to be restrictive in which 
entities it includes, the analysis in itself should be open and inclusive in order to discover as 
many patterns as possible. In other words, the selection must follow a clearly stated list of 
criteria75. The analysis, as will be described in the Methods and Analysis chapter, will be very 
open to varying interpretations of developments and will make use of descriptive analyses in 
addition to the main QCA-investigation.  
 
How the cases for analysis are selected can, as Geddes (1990) shows, have an impact on the 
end result of the analysis. One particular point, which is supported by Mahoney and Goertz 
(2004), Ragin (1997) and Ragin (2000), is that of the importance of negative cases. Mahoney 
and Goertz (2004) introduce the Possibility Principle. This states that negative cases should 
be chosen if it is possible that the outcome of interest could have appeared there. If it, on the 
other hand, is impossible that the outcome should appear, the case should be considered 
irrelevant and thus not included in the examination. This is done so as to maximise the 
validity of causal inferences and is particularly relevant for exploratory research such as this 
thesis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004, 653). It is seen as uninteresting for the case selection 
process which outcome the entity has had, or even whether it is still without a clear 
conclusion. The cases are not chosen due to their success or failure in obtaining statehood, but 
because they are or have been de facto-states in the specified time period.  
                                                 
74
 Pegg (1998), Kolstø (2006), Haugland (2008) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) provide notable exceptions, 
but their work is either too old to include all entities anno 2012, focus on the creation and sustenance of the 
entities rather than on their outcomes or examine different variables with a different scope and purpose than this 
thesis.  
75
 For a discussion on the perils of concept stretching and the watering out of concepts, see Sartori (1970). For 
more inclusive selection designs than the stringent one used here, see Collier and Mahon Junior (1993). 
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3.2 The selection of data  
The cases are selected on the basis of a set list based on the criteria developed by Pegg (1998) 
and Kolstø (2006). Potential cases failing to fulfil all the positive criteria are excluded. 
Likewise, cases demonstrating any one of the criteria listed in the negative list by Pegg (1998) 
are not included. Excluded entities can be seen in Table 9 on page iii in Appendix 2. 
3.2.1 Case selection criteria 
As already stated, the basic description of what a non-recognised state is, comes from Kolstø 
(2006, 724-725), who defines a non- recognized state as a political entity that has 1) control 
over most of the territory it claims, 2) has sought recognition as a state without receiving it 
and 3) have existed for more than two years. The entities analysed in this thesis will be chosen 
on a basis of this description. However, some specification and additional discussion is 
necessary. The specifications following each of the listed criterions will generally lead to 
specified exclusion of potential entities, but not to discussions on who are included unless 
they are cases of potential doubt that require particular attention and justification. This is 
simply because all of the entities fulfil all of the requirements. After the case selection criteria 
have been evaluated, the complete list over entities will be presented in Table 1on page 41. 
The end selection is not assumed to be exhaustive nor is it expected to be taken as un-
debatable, due to the necessarily unclear status and trajectory of this kind of entity.  
Byman and King (2012, 46) specify that there must be conflicting claim to sovereignty over 
the territories. This claim is naturally part of the selection tools as areas with only one 
claimant cannot be contested. There is no limit to geographical location. The included states 
must have come into existence after the creation of the UN, meaning after 1945. The upper 
year limit for inclusion is 2012.  
Based on the criteria set forth by Fleischer (1994) and Kolstø (2006), the basic structure for 
the selection is therefore as follows: 
1) Population 
2) Fixed territory/ territorial control 
3) Government 
4) Having sought recognition 
5) Length of existence 
6) Discussion of cases of doubt 
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Pegg (1998, 28-42) identifies a negative set of criteria, meant to exclude those territories not 
fitting in the category of de facto-states. These are: 
a) Power vacuum 
b) Terrorist groups 
c) Entities that do not seek international recognition 
d) Puppet states 
e) Peaceful secessionist regions 
f) States internationally recognised by a minimum of two permanent UN Security 
Members or by a majority of the members in the General Assembly  
g) Short term entities lasting fewer than two years 
 
Pegg’s negative criteria a)-d) and g) will be discussed under the appropriate headings 1)-6) 
and will be represented by cursive writing. His exclusion of peaceful secessionist regions is 
here seen as a matter of course, as such an entity is assumed to cooperate with the central 
power of the parent state in lieu of existing outside of it as the de facto states included here76. 
Seeing as UN membership is used as a proxy for international recognition, the precise number 
of member states recognising an entity is not considered relevant. The point of interest is first 
and foremost whether or not it is a full UN member. The number of states offering recognition 
is potentially interesting if analysing the development of the level of recognition of the de 
facto-state and its potential support or opposition from international powers. Here, there is no 
fixed upper limit for inclusion77.  
1) Population 
The criterion of having a population is here seen as straight forward. A group cannot claim a 
territory for itself if none of the people of the group live there. Naturally, this does not mean 
that it is necessary for each and every member of any potential ethnic majority or generally 
interested group to be living on the territory. The population numbers of the UN member 
states vary from nearly one and a half billion in China to less than ten thousand in Nauru (CIA 
World Factbook 22.02.2013), so the size of the population does not appear to be of high 
importance for recognition.  
                                                 
76
 Peaceful secessionist entities are for instance be Scotland and Catalonia. See Barnes (2012) or Carrell (2013). 
77
 A list of which of the still existing entities are recognised and by whom can be seen in footnote 35 on page 16. 
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2) Fixed territory/ territorial control 
Controlling “most of the territory” will be defined on a gliding scale. Both Pegg (1998, 47) 
and  Dugard and Raic (2006, 60) point out that some already recognised states are without a 
clearly defined border78, so a too stringent requirement would mean running the risk of 
making the selected data worthless. Therefore, the limit is being set at holding at least the 
majority of the claimed area79. It can be difficult determining what the claimed area actually 
is, depending on who made the statements and in what fora. There will necessarily have to be 
a certain degree of ad hoc evaluations in determining this. Polisario80 controlling as little as 
one third of Western Sahara (Kolstø 2006, 726) 81 means that the entity cannot be included. 
Tibet controls none of its claimed area despite having had a long-living government, and is 
excluded. The Palestinian Authority is also excluded as it controls only little of the West 
Bank82, and in 2007 this level became even smaller, when Hamas split from the organisation  
and claiming control over Gaza (Black and Tran 2007).  
Seeing as no state controls an area mired in long-lasting civil war (McNemar 1967, 14-16), 
areas who have succeeded in removing the central power of the parent state without managing 
to implement its own will be excluded83. This last criterion is based on the idea that actual 
territorial control is not present during war. This will also mean that any de facto state falling 
into all-out war with itself, its parent state or any other will have the start of the war as a cut-
off point.  
3) Government 
Having a government does not signify having a democratic leadership (Raic 2002, 62), nor 
does it signify any particular set of government institutions. Seeing as a number84 of 
recognised states have experienced having weak or no central authority while still remaining 
part of the international society of states and being treated as such by other states, this is not a 
                                                 
78
 Their example is Israel, but also Sudan and South Sudan are in this situation (Lloyd 1994-1995, Dagne 2011). 
79
 Caspersen (2012b, 11) uses two-thirds as a benchmark for how much of the area claimed the de facto-state 
must control. 
80
 Polisario, or Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro, is recognised by the UN as the 
representatives for the Saharawi people and Western Sahara (The United Nations General Assembly 1979). 
81
 A share made even smaller due to the extensive placement of Moroccan mines along the separating wall 
(Gegic and Harutyunyan 2008). 
82
 The West Bank is divided into three kinds of sections, each governed to a specific degree by Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. See Oslo II (1995). For a list of sovereign states recognising Palestine, see The Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (2011). 
83
 Thus excluding Bougainville (Regan 2008, Ghai and Regan 2006, Cornish 2010, Laracy 1991, Islam 1991). 
84
 The Failed States Index (2012) provides a list of examples.  
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clear-cut concept (Pegg 1998, 47-49). However, to exclude areas that are mainly a result of 
power vacuum or that are best defined as a territorially based terrorist group, it is clearly 
important with some form of central power in place. In this thesis, it will entail having a clear 
authority that generally is able to demonstrate its governance throughout the area. But, that 
does not mean other forces cannot be in play. It will only signify that one of these forces is by 
far the most prominent. This is to avoid situations where smaller groups form clan-like 
structures controlling small fractions of the area without an overarching power base (Fleischer 
1994, 49).  
Areas under international administration do not have an independently functioning 
government. East-Timor, for example,  was partly governed by UN missions during its spat as 
non-recognised state with territorial control  (The United Nations 10.02.2013).  However, 
these missions are normally initiated when it is clear that the entity will be recognised to 
facilitate its future as a well-governed state. Areas clearly not under the control of the patron 
state power centre will be included even if the regional government is propped up by 
international agents attempting to guide its already present administrative structure towards 
successful state governance.  
4) Having sought recognition 
Seeking international recognition will also be treated as a plastic criterion. A formal 
application to join the UN need not be present as long as the intention of being or remaining a 
sovereign state is clear. It can be complicated distinguishing those entities that seek 
independence from those that do not seek international recognition, for a number of reasons. 
Many contrasting versions of what the desired outcome for the area is can exist. Reasons for 
this can be that there is a discrepancy between what is wished as an end-result and what is 
deemed practical and realistic at the time (Caspersen and Stansfield 2011, 3).  
A gradual increase in what is hoped for as the entity proves its survivability is not unexpected, 
but can lead to troubles for outside observers finding out what is actually the case. The entities 
must rely on their skills in realpolitik to survive, and may realize that not formally declaring 
independence might be one of the things ensuring their continued existence85. Entities biding 
their time while waiting for a more favourable international climate can still be analysed, 
seeing as UN membership is dependent on recognition by most of the world’s other states. 
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 As is claimed to be the case for Taiwan (Byman and King 2012, 50, DeLisle 2011, 2). Footnote 86 on page 42 
demonstrates which of the included de facto-states that have declared independence and which have not.  
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Similarly, the non-recognised states are expected to attempt testing the waters for their level 
of acceptance before applying to the UN. Declaring independence is thus seen as one step of a 
long process that begins long before the point of announcement, and Puntland and Iraqi-
Kurdistan both demonstrate that it is possible to function as a state without claiming to be 
one86. Therefore, a minimal criterion of existing outside the central control of the parent state, 
with a common sense of identity in the population as other than that of the patron state is 
required, but an actual declaration of independence or a UN application is not.  
To exclude puppet states, it is required that the area must have attempted secession by own 
initiative. This signifies that areas having been created by the initiative of other states for 
whatever purpose will not be included here87. This is for the reason that such an entity would 
clearly diverge from the others and thus decrease the analytical validity of the findings.  
5) Length of existence 
The exclusion of short-term entities by fixing a two-year limit might seem arbitrary, and it is. 
It is kept for the same reason it was created: to avoid befuddling the worth of the analysis by 
including short-lived entities incapable of surviving and thus uninteresting for this 
examination88.  Having existed for precisely two calendar years is, however, not necessary. 
Some ad hoc-evaluation will be necessary, guided for instance by what happened with the 
region after disappearance. Should it, like Iraqi-Kurdistan does89, still attempt self-
government after its reincorporation, it will count towards inclusion though the precise length 
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 Puntland and Iraqi-Kurdistan have varying claims as to their desired future, and no clear official declaration of 
statehood, but functions as such separately from the central powers of the parent state and are included in this 
thesis. Those entities that have formally declared independence are: Abkhazia (12.10.1999) (Ardzinba 1999), 
Anjouan (03.08.1997)  (Abdallah 1998), Bangladesh (27.03.1971)  (CBS 2012, Ahmed 2010), Biafra (30. 
05.1967) (Ojukwu 1967), Chechnya (12.03.1992)(The Chechen Republic 1992), East Timor (30.08.1999) (The 
United Nations Security Council 1999), Gagauzia (1991) (Minorities at Risk (MAR) 27.03.2013, Zabarah 
2012), Katanga (11. 07.1960) (Tshombe 1960), Kosovo (17.02.2008) (BBC 2008), Nagorno-Karabakh 
(02.09.1991) (The Nagorno Karabakh Republic 1991), North Cyprus (15.11.1983) (TRNC 1983), 
Republika Srpska (28.02.199286)  (Trbovich 2008), Republika Srpska Krajina (01.04.1991) (Sudetic 1991), 
Rhodesia (11.11.196586) (Smith 1965), Somaliland (18.05.1991) (Madar and Aadan 2001), South Ossetia 
(1990) (Youzhnaia Ossetia 2001), Transnistria (26.08.1991) (Kolstø and Malgin 2007, 109). Taiwan (1999) 
(DeLisle 2011, Taiwan DC 26.03.2013, Chiang 1999, 959) has a de facto but not de jure declaration. No official 
declarations were  made by Eritrea (declared 07.04.1993) (The Government of Eritrea 1993, Caspersen 2012b, 
9), Iraqi-Kurdistan, Puntland (The House of Representatives 2001), South Sudan (09.07.2011) (Igga 
10.06.2011, Mayardit 2011), Tamil Eelam (but by 1985 LTTE controlled most of  its claimed territory) (Pegg 
1998, 76)Note that the Puntland Constitution declares Puntland as a region of a restored Somalia (The House of 
Representatives 2001, 2), but for all practical purposes it is a self-governing entity and is generally discussed as 
such in the literature (Gikes 1999, Hesse 2010, 77, 81). 
87
 This excludes the South African Bantustans (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013d).  
88
 Some entities, like Herzeg-Bosna and Western Bosnia survived for nearly two calendar years, but are 
excluded. 
89
 For more on Iraqi-Kurdistan after its reintegration in Iraq, see for instance (Olson 2006). 
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of time borderlines too short. It can be difficult to determine exactly when de facto-states are 
created and when they disappear90.  
6) Discussion of cases of doubt 
Though this thesis evaluates the development of unilaterally declared non-recognised states, 
one of the areas included is special. South Sudan had gained a permission from Sudan to 
manage itself, the two entered a cease-fire and a referendum regarding the future of South 
Sudan was planned. Can South Sudan be said to have been a de facto-state during that period 
when it existed as part of an agreement with its parent? Yes, it can. Sudan and South Sudan 
entered the agreement to end a long lasting war91 in which the north had not had more than a 
porous grip on the south for several years. South Sudan fulfilled the rest of the criteria at the 
point of signing, and can be considered the winner of that particular war. That the north had 
formally agreed to stay out between the signing and the referenda is not so different from for 
instance Georgia’s informally staying out of Abkhazia that it can lead to South Sudan being 
excluded.  
Pegg (1998) points out that there is a difference between a non-recognised regime and a non-
recognised state. The first entails an unaccepted government, whereas the second focuses on 
the existence of the state as a polity separate from other states. In other words: it is possible to 
not accept those who govern a state while at the same time accepting that the state as a 
political actor exists. As Owtram (2011, 130) illustrates: the non-recognition of the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan did not signify that the state of Afghanistan disappeared. This was a 
matter of a disputed leadership secession (Bajoria 2011). In the case of Rhodesia, it can seem 
difficult distinguishing between the two since the state and the government were created more 
or less simultaneously. In fact, it might be a situation of both at the same time. When it 
declared independence, the United Nations called for non-recognition92 from its member 
states, based on the principle of ex injuria non oritur93. This was because of Rhodesia’s 
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 For instance, it is difficult to determine precisely Iraqi-Kurdistan time of existence as a de facto-state, but 
Gunter (1993) describes it as so near to two years of existence in 1991-1992 that it will be included. For the time 
span of the existence of the included entities, see Table 1on page 45. 
91
 Bougainville and Papua New Guinea also entered such an agreement, but Bougainville did not succeed in 
keeping territorial control for a full two years before the Papua New Guinean central powers returned and retook 
too large a part of the island for the territorial control-criterion to be fulfilled (Ghai and Regan 2006). Had the 
Bougainville secessionist leaders been more organised, it is claimed that independence would have been likely 
achieved due to the island’s cultural, economic and historical separateness from the rest of Papua New Guinea 
and the long period of time this desire had been professed (Ghai and Regan 2006, Regan 2008). 
92
 See  The United Nations Security Council (1965a). 
93
 A right cannot originate in a wrong.  
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segregation. However, these policies alone are not enough to negate status as a non-
recognised state, as already recognised states followed a similar political line94. It is included 
here due to the fact that it declared independence from its colonial master the United 
Kingdom and sought status as a fully-fledged state (Smith 1965)95. The regime existed 
separately from the central power of its former colonial masters  in the United Kingdom and 
controlled all the territory the rest of the world recognised as South-Rhodesia until 1979, 
despite Great Britain’s lacking accept and the UN’s discouragement of interaction from other 
states (McDougal and Reisman 1968, Cockram 1966). It is not merely a question of 
recognising a state’s new leadership in this case, as it was not a state to begin with.  
 
When discussing the case of Northern Cyprus, it can be argued that the de facto-state was 
created by an external force - in this case Turkey - and that it thus should be excluded for not 
coming into existence by its own initiative. However, I will argue that Turkey’s intervention 
can be seen as an answer to the Greek Cypriots goal of union with Greece (eniosis) and the 
perceived threat of removal of the Turkish Cypriots from the island. The Cypriote 
Constitution provided a certain degree of autonomy to the two communities, and the Treaties 
of Alliance and Guarantee between the UK, Turkey and Greece were seen by Turkey as 
giving them reason to intervene in protection of the Turkish Cypriots after the proposal of  
Greek-benefiting new constitutional amendments (Pegg 1998, 99-107). These amendments 
would threaten the Turkish Cypriot political status, and they protested. Thus, I propose that 
the Turkish Cypriots though greatly aided by Turkey, started the movement themselves. 
Being dependent on Turkey for the success of the entity is therefore not necessarily relevant 
(see also Berg 2005, 223). Another interesting point is whether Northern Cyprus should be 
considered a Turkish puppet state and therefore excluded from the data here. Again, applying 
Pegg’s (1998, 112-113) definitions, it is claimed that  Northern Cyprus does not fall into the 
puppet-category for two reasons. Firstly, it was not imposed from the outside on an unwilling 
population. Secondly, the national administrative staff is Cypriote and the state apparatus 
independent of the Turkish, even though they closely cooperate. 
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 South Africa is an obvious example, but also the US has had a similar system. See for instance Encyclopædia 
Britannica (2013b) and Encyclopædia Britannica (2013a). 
95
 Rhodesia was declared independent of Great Britain in 1965, and was pronounced a republic in 1970 (BBC 
1970). The non-recognised state lasted until 1979, when it returned to UK control with the Lancaster house 
Agreement and subsequently became Zimbabwe in 1980 (Sibanda 1991). 
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3.2.2 Selected cases 
Based on the discussions in the first section of this chapter, the entities shown in Table 
1below are selected to be analysed. They are sorted by political status as of December 2012, 
and placed in three main groups. The first, success, contains those former de facto states now 
members of the United Nations. The category undecided shows a list of those non-recognised 
states who still exist in a state of limbo at the time of writing. These have no clear political 
status, and are greatly differing in their degrees of recognition96. The last category, failure, 
shows the former non-recognised entities who did not succeed in surviving as a de facto- 
state. The first category is by far the clearest cut, as the conclusion to their struggle by a UN 
membership is obvious. For the other entities, it can be complicated evaluating which entities 
still fulfil the selection criteria and which have evolved into a different type of unit. For 
example, it can be argued that Iraqi-Kurdistan still exists. This case has been placed in the 
category for failed entities due to its cease fire and acceptance of autonomous status in Iraq 
(Constitution of the Republic of Iraq 2005).  
Table 1- List of entities 
Success N = 4 Undecided N = 9 Failure N = 10 
Bangladesh (1971-1974) 
East-Timor) (1999-2002) 
Eritrea (1991-1993) 
South Sudan (2005 - 2011) 
Abkhazia (1992 -) 
Kosovo (1990-) 
Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-) 
North-Cyprus (1983 - ) 
Puntland  (1998 -) 
Somaliland  (1991-) 
South-Ossetia (1992-) 
Taiwan (1949 - ) 
Transnistria (1990-) 
Anjouan  (1997-2008) 
Biafra (1967-1970) 
Chechnya (1991-1994, 1996-1999) 
Gagauzia (1991 - 1994) 
Iraqi-Kurdistan (1991-1994) 
Katanga (1960-1963) 
Republika Srpska (1992-1995) 
Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995) 
Rhodesia (1970-1989) 
Tamil Eelam (1986-2009) 
N = 23.Years as de facto-state in parentheses. Source for year; see Table 10 on page iv in Appendix 2. All dates 
are subject to discussion, as seen for instance by the alternative starting points presented in (Bakke, O’Loughlin, 
and Ward 2011, 5) 
3.3 Case description: about the included de facto-states 
In order to be able to seek patterns in the development of the level of recognition of de facto-
states, it is necessary to have a thorough understanding of the entities. Though a multitude of 
case studies of single territories and grouped analyses exist, it is still relevant to attempt 
creating an overview of the entities presented in Table 1above. The tables in this chapter are 
based on the Raw tables in appendices 3 and 4. 
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 Footnote 35on page 16 lists the entities and their recognisers. 
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De facto-states generally have a background of war with the mother state, which they won97. 
Territorial control and political institutions necessarily means sufficient force to remain in 
position - at least for a time. They are strong enough to survive, but not to be recognised 
(Byman and King 2012, 46). Though coming from very different backgrounds and existing in 
a multitude of situations during a time-span of nearly 70 years, all the participant on the list of 
non-recognised states have one thing in common: they do not wish to continue being there. 
Recognition is the ultimate goal, continued existence second best, with increased autonomy in 
the mother state normally at a grudging third place (Kolstø 2006, Pegg 1998, 204).They 
initially have a strong card in negotiating with the mother state, for simply by existing they 
control parts of the original state’s territory, they have internal legitimacy from a people not 
wishing to lose their rights98. And, for every year they continue existing, the international 
society grows more accustomed to their presence. This is not to say that merely being present 
will ensure a future recognition by international society and an eventual UN membership, as 
the fate of Tamil Eelam can illustrate99.  
3.3.1 De-facto state origins 
Unrecognised states generally find their roots in one of two political situations. They are 
either the result of 1) displeasedness with the existing borders of the countries emerging after 
the end of colonialism. Alternatively, they were under a different colonial power but became 
absorbed into another colony before independence100.  Or, 2) they are the result of the same 
sentiments after a union dissolution. In both these situations, the already existing borders are 
generally kept and the discussion is not necessarily about border placement but border status. 
Only three have other origins.  
  
                                                 
97
 Winning a war is a relative concept. Ciobanu (2008),  and Anderson (2011)  use  the term «frozen conflict», 
which indicates that the central power of the parent state has left the territory and that active warfare is over, but 
that it is not officially peace in the region. More on the general background of de facto-states can be seen in 
works such as Kolstø (2006), Pegg (1998), Caspersen (2012b) and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) 
98
 Internal legitimacy in de facto-states does of course not always hold the same level. Islam (1985) demonstrates 
the differing levels of support from the population in the cases of Biafra, Katanga and Bangladesh. 
99
 Tamil Eelam disappeared as a de facto-state in 2009, after having existed for two and a half decade (Stokke 
2006, Freedomhouse 2009c). 
100
 For example, East Timor was a Portuguese colony, while Indonesia was Dutch (CIA World Factbook 
16.04.2013a, Encyclopædia Britannica 2013g, BBC 2013b). 
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Table 2- The origins of de facto-states 
Political origins 
Former colonial history 
N = 11 
Anjouan0, Bangladesh, Biafra0, East-Timor, Eritrea, Katanga0, Puntland0, Rhodesia, 
Somaliland, Tamil Eelam0,  South Sudan 
Union break-up 
N = 9 
Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia,  Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Republika Srpska, 
Republika Srpska Krajina South-Ossetia, Transnistria, ,  
Other 
N = 3 
Iraqi-Kurdistan, North Cyprus,  Taiwan,  
Geographical origins 
Europe N = 6 Gagauzia, Kosovo, North-Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, 
Transnistria 
Asia N = 9 Abkhazia,  Bangladesh, Chechnya, East-Timor, Iraqi-Kurdistan, Nagorno-
Karabakh, South-Ossetia, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam 
Africa N = 8 Anjouan, Biafra, Eritrea, Katanga, Puntland, Rhodesia, Somaliland, South Sudan 
0
= not existing political entity in former colony. N= 23  
 
Despite these initial similarities, the entities have very differing backgrounds. Their 
emergence is highly heterogeneous, and one must be aware of the wide variety existing when 
analysing. Simply having formerly been a part of the Soviet Union, for instance, does not 
necessarily indicate many similarities with other ex-USSR-entities. Nor does being a former 
colony make a region the same as any other that happens to have been one. Similarly, 
geographical origins, as shown in Table 2 above, do not indicate having the same outcome. 
On the contrary, there is an almost even spread of successful, undecided and failed non-
recognised states over the three continents afflicted. 
Communist union break-up 
The dissolution of the two communist unions of USSR and Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s led 
to a number of new sates in the world, and most of the present-day non-recognised states101. 
None of them have succeeded in becoming UN members. Most are still undecided cases. 
Though the recognition of Bangladesh had led to hopes among these entities that the denial 
from the parent state of basic state functions such as civil and political rights could strengthen 
their case, this was generally not the outcome. The precedence of maintaining already existing 
borders was continued, and only former republics within the unions were to be recognised 
(Caspersen 2008b, 4).  
 
The dissolution of the USSR has produced six non-recognised states, none of which have 
moved on to be recognised. None of them were federal entities on the highest level in the 
Soviet Union, though most of them were so on lower levels. Every entity has been met by 
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 The entities in question are these. From the former USSR: Abkhazia, Chechnya, Gagauzia, Nagorno-
Karabakh, South-Ossetia, and Transnistria. From the former Yugoslavia: Kosovo, Republika Srpska, and 
Republika Srpska Krajina. 
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opposition from their mother state, but only two have since disappeared.  It’s worth noting 
that all non-recognised states either supported or recognised by Russia have survived for 
several years, while Chechnya, opposed by Russia, has met its end. Their levels of resources, 
ethnic compositions and level of development of political institutions are also highly varying. 
 
The outcomes for the three post-Yugoslavian entities in the same table, is equally unclear, 
though also here none have been recognised. Kosovo is by far the one entity that is closest to 
obtaining its goal of recognition of the de facto- states presented in this category, but it is still 
not internationally recognised nor a UN member. Though all of them are similar in that they 
are based on ethnic identity and with low levels of resources, they differ in their level 
governmental structures and the involvement of external forces. Although present-day Serbia 
clearly is and has been an important player for all of them, this cannot be said to be enough to 
explain their outcomes - particularly since their status per 2012 are not in accordance with 
Serbia’s desires. Both the NATO102 and the EU103 have more leeway for action in this area 
than in former USSR territory, and they have been actively interested. This has among other 
things led to strong international involvement in Kosovo, something without a comparable 
parallel in the former Soviet area.   
Former colonial history 
The entities coming from former colonies share little save exactly that. As colonial borders 
were apt to change with time, one cannot expect fully stable historical identities in these 
regions. However, the states they were under and the status they had shortly before 
independence can be believed to be important for the formation on identity in the inhabitants. 
By this it is not believed that there is a difference in which country had the colony other than 
as a part of many in the creation of identity amongst the inhabitants of the area. Table 2 on 
page 43 lists the relevant entities. Comparing these with the information on present political 
situation in Table 1 on page 41 shows how the majority of cases of breakaway states amongst 
the former colonies have been settled and are either fully-fledged UN member states or have 
disappeared. 
 
All the entities with colonial pasts differ in degrees of ethnic homogeneity, levels of resources, 
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 For a statement from NATO regarding the situation after the Yugoslavian dissolution, see (NATO 1992). 
103
 For an analysis of EU (then EC) involvement in the Yugoslavian dissolution period, see (Marolov 
10.12.2012).  
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and democratic institutions104. However, those of them that have succeeded in becoming UN 
member states have received support from international actors105.  Pavkovic and Radan (2007, 
22) explain how the UN resolution 1514 (1960) facilitated independence only while 
maintaining the colonial border present at the time. We see that those entities that had the 
same colonial master as their parent state have nearly all failed. The only exception is South 
Sudan, which in practice was governed differently from the rest of Sudan (Belloni 2011, 412).  
 
East-Timor, Eritrea, Puntland and Somaliland are areas that were merged with other entities in 
connection with the decolonisation process. For these, the outcomes are very different. Not 
one of them has disappeared, and half of them have been recognised. The reasons for this are 
not obvious. Though it is possible to speculate that the international reaction might be less 
negative in a situation where the borders are recent, this idea is not verified. Both East-Timor 
and Eritrea did, however, receive international assistance in their process towards 
independence, and Somaliland is generally ignored rather than opposed. That Puntland’s 
situation should be undecided is not too surprising, as the entity’s desired goal varies between 
federal region in Somalia and separate state106.  
Other backgrounds 
Three events can be identified that have neither colonial nor communist union history: 
Taiwan, North Cyprus and Iraqi-Kurdistan. Taiwan and North Cyprus are still in limbo per 
2012. Iraqi-Kurdistan has disappeared.  
 
The three entities differ in their ethnic composition. Taiwan’s population is diverse, and the 
entity was not created in order to gain a homeland for a distinct ethnic group. Though mostly 
Han Chinese, it includes at least three other groups. According to Harrell and Huang (1994, 
14-15) and DeLisle (2011, 1), this might be changing as the Taiwanese identity appears to be 
taking over from other ethnical groups. Iraqi-Kurdistan, on the other hand,  has an ethnic 
foundation in the Kurdish people’s long wish for self-determination (Naamani 1966).  North 
Cyprus was also created with the purpose of creating a territory for the Turk Cypriots 
(Freedomhouse 1998n, 1999a, Berg 2005, Dodd 2009).  
 
                                                 
104
 Sources: see Raw Table 12 on page 105 in Appendix 2. 
105
 The independence of East-Timor by Indonesia was originally supported by Australia. For a discussion on the 
Australia-East-Timor-relationship, see (Pietsch 2010).  
106
 Both Mesfin (2009), Gikes (1999) describe Puntland as non-independence-seeking, but according to Hesse 
(2010, 77, 81) the reality of the hopes for Puntland’s future political status is more complex.  
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Their economical and resource level differ as well. Iraqi-Kurdistan has a large oil reserve, but 
has had trouble in utilising it (Olson 2006). North Cyprus, despite previously being fairly 
equal with the southern part of the island, is more economically challenged and 
underdeveloped than its neighbour (Gosh and Aker 2006, Bahcheli 2004). Taiwan has a strong 
and growing economy (Freedomhouse 2012m, Harrell and Huang 1994, CIA World Factbook 
26.03.2013b, Nation Master 25.02.2013). 
 
The placement of the three de facto-states in international society also differ greatly. Taiwan is 
claimed to be kept from reintegration into China by its relationship with the US (Kolstø 2006, 
733).  North Cyprus has a strong ally in Turkey, but is otherwise generally ignored by other 
states(Atasoy 2003, Bahcheli 2004). Iraqi-Kurdistan appears to have neither strong 
sympathies nor antipathies from recognised states. Turkey, a regionally important state, is 
claimed by Olson (2006) to have had a chilly relationship with the de facto state at the time in 
question, but that the relationship was thawing at the time of writing (see also Wolff 2010).  
 
Regarding democratic institutions, the situations in the three entities also vary. Iraqi-Kurdistan 
is described by Gunter (1993, 297) as anarchistic and corrupt, despite holding elections for 
government. DeLisle (2011, 1-2) argues that Taiwan has well-functioning, consolidated 
governmental institutions. North Cyprus has obtained a slightly lower Freedomhouse (1998n, 
1999a, 2012c, g) score throughout its existence, but still holds a generally high level.  
Timing 
The time and setting in which an entity was created is not an aspect of the entity in the same 
way its geographical placement and demographical pattern is, but it is still interesting to 
investigate whether the waves identified in the Theory chapter are identifiable for the de 
facto- states as well as the recognised ones.  
Table 3- De facto-states and their outcomes by state creation wave 
State creation wave De facto-state with outcome Number of entities 
First: Decolonisation 
N = 3 
Biafra+,  Katanga+, Rhodesia+  Failures: 3 
Second: Union dissolution 
N = 9 
Abkhazia0, Chechnya+, Gagauzia+, Kosovo0, 
Nagorno-Karabakh0, Republika Srpska Krajina+, 
Republika Srpska+, South-Ossetia0, Transnistria0 
Undetermined: 5 
Failures: 4 
Third: Pragmatism? 
N = 11 
Anjouan+, Bangladesh*, East Timor*, Eritrea*, 
Iraqi-Kurdistan+, North Cyprus0, Puntland0,  South 
Sudan* Somaliland0, Tamil Eelam+, Taiwan0 
Successes: 4 
Undetermined: 4 
Failures: 3 
N = 23. * = recognised, 0 = undecided, + = disappeared. Sources: See Appendix 4. 
Looking at Table 3above it does indeed appear that this could be of some importance. The 
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first wave brought the lowest number of entities, all of which are in Africa and at present 
disappeared. This, coupled with the observation that all the recognised entities are from the 
third wave, makes this factor sufficiently interesting to be brought to the main analysis. 
3.4 Chapter summary 
After discussing the definitions of the de facto-state, 23 entities were chosen for the analysis 
and presented in Table 1on page 41. These underwent a series of descriptive analyses, seeking 
development patterns based on geography, colonial or post-union history and support by 
regional or international powers. The four topics discussed in the theory chapter leading up to 
the thesis’ hypotheses (resources, ethnic composition, external involvement and democratic 
institutions), were also investigated. It is shown that the entities are very heterogeneous. The 
timing and situation of the creation of the entity and which wave it belong to will be further 
investigated in the Analysis chapter. 
  
48 
 
4. Methods Chapter: Crisp set QCA and description 
The methods chapter shows how the development trajectory of de facto states will be 
analysed and presents the research design. The successful and failed entities will be analysed, 
and the results will be applied to those de facto-states yet uncompleted. The method utilised is 
the Crisp Set version of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (cs/QCA). Since data selection is 
covered in the Data chapter, two main parts exist here. First, I will argue the choice of method 
and describe what it is and how to utilise it. The chapter will discuss the strengths and 
weaknesses QCA crisp set can present for this analysis. Second, I will discuss and describe 
the specific analysis in this thesis and present the data set. The operationalization of the 
outcome and each causal condition will be specified, along with the measurements and coding 
for the respective values.  
 
In addition to QCA, simple descriptive analysis will be utilised as supplements to the main 
analysis throughout the process. Ragin (1987, 98) states that investigator input is important, 
so combining cs/QCA with descriptive analyses seems logical. This includes for instance 
cross tables, matrixes sorting information by category and more. QCA provides the main 
structure for the investigation, but it is constantly supplemented by additional examinations. 
These simple descriptions will not be evaluated in the Methods chapter, but described when 
appropriate in during the analyses. 
4.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis - what, why and how 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) was introduced by Charles Ragin (1987) as a tool to 
be used when analysing set-oriented, complex causalities and asymmetrical influences. It is 
based on Boolean algebra and has three main sub-types, namely crisp, fuzzy and multivalue 
(mv) sets. This section provides a short introduction to the method and the arguments for 
utilising crisp rather than the other sets in this thesis. The application of the method will be 
further elaborated during the analysis. This chapter argues for the choice of method and serves 
as an introduction to cs/QCA. 
4.1.1 Introducing QCA 
QCA is based on Boolean algebra (see Boole 1854) and Mills methods of logic (see Mill 
1843) , and was introduced as a social-scientific method by Ragin (1987)107. It is particularly 
                                                 
107
 The software used for the analyses can be found at online at the Arizona University Website  (Ragin 
15.03.2013). 
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useful for medium-N-analysis (Ragin 2007), such as this thesis. It embraces both case- and 
value-oriented analysis, and presents a middle path between them: seeing cases as 
configurations of attributes.  It’s main focus is on single or combined causal conditions rather 
than the entities themselves, but it benefits from constant supplementary attention to empirical 
observations (Ragin 1987, 166-168). 
 
QCA’s set-orientation contrasts with the two most common approaches in social science, 
namely case- and variable-oriented comparative methods108. While case-oriented methods 
often focus on interpreting historical trajectories or complex, multi-faceted wholes across a 
small-N number of cases (Ragin 1987, 34-52, Ragin 2000, 67-70), variable-oriented methods 
investigate large-N data seeking generalizable findings  (Ragin 1987, 52-68). Set-orientation 
allows for asymmetrical connections and focus on combinations rather than addition, 
something Ragin (2008, 14-25) argues makes it a valuable tool for seeing patterns missed in 
case-analysis while identifying connections missed by correlational methods.  
 
Using a truth table to display all potential logical combinations of outcomes, QCA examines 
both combinations of factors and isolated effects and attempts to isolate which factors are 
necessary (AND) and which are sufficient (OR) for an outcome (Goertz 2006b, 39-46, Ragin 
2000, 88-95, Rihoux and De Meur 2009). The causal conditions are listed horizontally in a 
truth table, with each horizontal row representing one possible outcome. With n conditions, 
the table will contain 2n rows. Each case will then be placed in the corresponding row, 
depending on their combination of values on the causal conditions. Thus, it is the 
combinations that are analysed, and not the cases themselves (Ragin 2000, Ragin and Sonnett 
2004, Hicks, Misra, and Ng 1995, 334-335). The collected combinations are known as the 
property space of the analysis (Ragin 1999, 1230, 2000, 76-82). Limited diversity of naturally 
occurring cases is thus not a problem for the analysis (Ragin 1987, 85-102, Ragin and Sonnett 
2004, 4-6).   
 
The most obvious difference between crisp, fuzzy and multivalue sets lies in the coding of the 
causal conditions109. Cs/QCA is the method chosen for this essay and  uses dichotomous 
                                                 
108
 For a closer discussion on the differences between case- and variable-oriented research design and methods, 
see Ragin (2007). 
109
 Fs/QCA and mv/QCA will not be further discussed here, but more information can be found in the following. 
For fs/QCA: Stockemer (2012), Ragin (2000, 2008). For mv/QCA: Cronqvist (2005, 2004, 2003), Vink and van 
Vliet (2009). 
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causal conditions110, allotting a value of either 0, indicating absence, or 1, indicating presence 
of each causal condition(Ragin 2000, 120-145, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 33-67). This 
dichotomisation is by necessity based on thick knowledge of the cases in question, and with a 
basis in theory, previous research and empirical knowledge (Grendstad 2007, 125).  
4.1.2 Why QCA: seeking combinations 
Arguments for and against the use of QCA in this type of analysis is discussed and it is 
concluded that the method is suitable for more reasons than the number of entities examined. 
Strengths of QCA 
The number of entities analysed makes selecting QCA  a simple choice, as it is highly suitable 
for medium-N analysis (Ragin 1987, Grendstad 2007, 122, Haugland 2008).  Thirteen entities 
with clear outcomes - success or failure - is too little to utilize the most logical quantitative 
alternative of logistical analysis with interaction effect. At the same time, it is too many for a 
normal qualitative case-study111. But numbers alone is not the only reason.  QCA is able to 
handle high levels of causal heterogeneity and social diversity. It does not assume additive 
causality, but rather on a complex combination of causal factors (Ragin 2000, 88-119, 
Grendstad 2007, 124, Ragin and Sonnett 2004, 4-7). As pointed out by Haugland (2008, 35), 
it is highly plausible that there is more than one path to recognition. Additionally, it is possible 
that the effect of one causal condition might depend on the presence or absence of another. 
QCA is suitable for an evaluation of entities as diverse as de facto-states.  
 
Ragin (2000, 88-119) argues that there is an underlying assumption of causal additivity in 
quantitative methods that makes statistical analysis unable to present high levels of 
diversity112. Some outcomes are not a result of one factor, but a multitude of causes at the 
same time. Some can even be argued to be a result of an absence of a specific factor. QCA can 
identify heterogeneity, and focuses on the internal complexities of cases.  
 
While qualitative case-studies is able to handle multiple trajectories and internal complexity, 
Ragin (2000, 90) claims that these methods do not provide tools for assessing neither 
generalizability nor the nature of the causation. It is further argued that it is impossible 
                                                 
110
 The concept of “outcome” is similar to what in quantitative methods is known as “dependent variable”. 
Similarly, “causal condition” could be roughly translated as “independent variable”.  Another word used in this 
thesis for describing the latter is “factor”. Ragin (1987, 87) uses “binary variables”. 
111
 For a further elaboration on QCA compared with other methods, see Ragin (1987, 89-91) and Grendstad 
(2007). 
112
 See Grendstad (2007), Stockemer (2012) and Grofman and Schneider (2009) for a discussion of the merits of 
quantitative logistical analysis as compared to cs/QCA. 
51 
 
through qualitative analysis to differentiate between necessary and sufficient causes (see 
Ragin 1997, Grendstad 2007)113. QCA, on the other hand, holds the distinction between the 
two to be very important (Grofman and Schneider 2009, Ragin 2000, 99-101). A cause is 
defined as necessary if it must be present for an outcome to occur, and sufficient if it by itself 
can produce an outcome114.  In studying entities as heterogeneous as de facto-states, this 
perspective can greatly add to the understanding of the development trajectories at hand.  
 
Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 8-12) demonstrate how the use of QCA is beneficial for the clarity 
of the investigation, as the thorough description  needed both for the process of coding and 
analysing gives the reader and the researcher a detailed and structured view of the 
assumptions behind each action. They claim the systematic, logical approach needed for using 
QCA ensures the rigorous system of qualitative methods while maintaining the descriptive 
and explanatory transparency in qualitative research. Maintaining a structural approach while 
opening for empirical discussions is of the highest importance when dealing with entities as 
heterogeneous as de facto-states. 
 
The focus on potential dependency between factors in order to bring forth an outcome might 
lead the statistician to wonder why a statistical analysis - logistical regression for cs/QCA - 
with interaction effects is not applied in lieu of QCA. In this analysis, the number of entities 
eliminates this option. But even with a sufficient number, QCA could have proven a good 
choice for this type of entities. Grendstad (2007) points out two reasons why the causal logic 
of QCA and quantitative methods are very different. First, he argues that QCA follows a 
contextual logic of combinations and substitutionability of its factors. The effects of 
independent factors are seen as impossible to add or average. Logistic regression, on the other 
hand, follows an additive and multiplicative logic (Stockemer 2012, 87). Grofman and 
Schneider (2009, 663) states that while standard statistical methods are good at assessing the 
net effect of single variables, QCA excels in in detecting different conjunctions that lead to the 
same outcome. Second, logistic regression offers one non-substitutable set of conditions while 
QCA explores the full range of complementation and co-variating causal paths at hand.  
Grendstad (2007) argues that QCA has a deterministic causal epistemology, while logistic 
regression focuses on probability. In other words: QCA offers a pattern-seeking procedure 
                                                 
113
 For a further discussion on necessity and sufficiency, see (Ragin 1997). For more on how to separate between 
trivial and relevant necessary conditions, see (Goertz 2006a). 
114
 A single cause might be necessary and sufficient, necessary but not sufficient, sufficient but not necessary and 
neither necessary nor sufficient. See Ragin (2000, 99-101) for an elaboration of the differences. 
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while logistic regression confirms and disconfirms existing hypotheses.   
Weaknesses of QCA 
Naturally, QCA has its weaknesses (see Ragin 1987, 103-118 for a more detailed elaboration).  
One obvious complaint is the potential loss of information when dichotomising data in 
cs/QCA and when assessing scores in fuzzy and mv/QCA (see for instance Grendstad 2007, 
125-126, Braumoeller 1999, 13, Kangas 1994, 361, Herrmann and Cronquist 2009). Another 
critique is the high degree to which the method relies on the researcher’s ability to maintain 
control over large amounts of information and correctly assessing value scores making the 
results potentially difficult to verify and replicate. In this thesis, these complaints are 
attempted met by the expansive descriptive analyses provided, in addition to tables with 
sources for all data coding and a replication the coding process of randomly selected entities 
performed by others.  
 
Grendstad (2007, 124-125) also points out that as QCA has for the most part been applied to 
extant cases only and thus has accepted determinism at the cost of probability (see also 
Lieberson 1992, Herrmann and Cronquist 2009, 38-40). In other words, that QCA can be used 
to describe but not predict. Lieberson (1992) argues that this distinction between deterministic 
and probabilistic perspectives is particularly important in small-and medium N-investigations.  
 
As other generalising methods, QCA is dependent on all relevant causal conditions being 
identified if it is to be used to predict outcomes outside of its included entities. Should some 
be lacking, the results cannot realistically be expected to be fully generalizable. Therefore, the 
results found can only be understood as valid for the causal conditions included (Wickham-
Crowley 1991, 102,  in Haugland 2008, 36). As Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 8-15) argue, this 
problem is not necessarily relevant if QCA is used in order to understand the underlying 
processes taking place in the selected entities. This is not a generalising method, but one used 
to provide a deeper understanding of the entities present.  
 
Should using the results of the investigation to assess other entities be desired, the point 
discussed above could potentially become problematic. One could think that a solution to this 
could be to increase the number of causal conditions. But, as Grendstad (2007, 125-127) and 
Ragin and Sonnett (2004) points out, limited empirical diversity in naturally occurring social 
phenomena means that the number of causal conditions must be limited. As n causal 
conditions leads to 2n rows in the truth table, an increased amount of causal conditions leads 
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to an exponentially larger set of rows to be filled. Too many causal conditions might lead to 
the analysis turning into a description of each combination rather than providing the grounds 
for a fruitful analysis.   
 
Additionally, QCA has been criticised for not being able to identify the strength of each causal 
condition (Grendstad 2007, 127, Haugland 2008, 36-37). Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 13-14) 
argues that this is not necessarily a problem but rather a strength of the method, as social 
phenomena are not uniform in their distribution. Occurrences of events outside of the typical 
distribution do not indicate that the event itself is less interesting. Since QCA gives equal 
weight to causal combinations regardless of their frequency, cases that would typically be 
ignored with statistical methods are here included. For an investigation of a highly 
heterogeneous set of rarely occurring events such as de facto-states, this is a benefit.  
 
The problem on limited diversity reducing the validity of the investigation is also relevant 
(Ragin 1987, 13). This can happen when a combination of two events occurs. The first is 
having too many explanatory factors. The second is the limited availability of naturally 
occurring events. To avoid this, the number of causal conditions in this thesis is kept to a 
minimum. 
4.1.3 The method of choice: cs/QCA 
Cs/QCA has been chosen as the tool for examining and analysing the development trajectories 
of the non-recognised de facto-states identifies in this thesis. The method offers fewer nuances 
than the other two QCA-alternatives115, as it is the only one of the three which uses only 
dichotomous codes. There are three reasons why it has been chosen: 
 
The first relates to the external outcome of the analysis. Though it is possible to expect that 
different degrees of presence by each causal condition can be found to have different effects 
on the outcomes, that is strictly speaking not the point of interest. It is interesting to see if an 
effect can be found, not whether or not it is of a higher or lower intensity. This is rather an 
examination of whether the presence or absence of the causal conditions has an effect at all.  
 
The second reason relates to the internal process of evaluation. Clarity is of the utmost 
importance in a work seeking to compile new data and evaluate processes that have yet to be 
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 For more on Fuzzy and Multivariate QCA, see footnotes 109on page 50. 
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done elsewhere. By using dichotomous than multi-valued data I hope to strengthen the 
visibility of potential patterns.  One could argue that the possibility of allowing some 
conditions to be dichotomous while others could be trichotomous could increase the 
transparency of this investigation116. However, lack of theoretical justification for such an 
action leads to this not being done in this text.  
 
Third lays a matter of practicality. Evaluating the strength of influence by potential actors for 
every entity is simply not feasible at the moment. Too much data would have to be collected.  
4.2 Research design: structure and calibration 
This second part of the methods chapter will show the application of cs/QCA for this 
particular investigation. QCA has four stages, each of which will be presented and used to 
build the analysis. The causal conditions will be operationalized and the values coded as 0 or 
1, and the data set will be presented. The application of the method will be further detailed in 
the Analysis chapter.  
 
In addition to the steps included in the QCA-analysis process, descriptive analyses will be 
made in order to have as thorough an analysis as possible. Cs/QCA is not expected to provide 
all the answers needed to have a foundation for creating clear conclusions as to which entities 
face which destinies. By following Ragin’s (1987) recommendations that the researcher 
should be an active participant in the analysis, constant attention to patterns will be paid. The 
cs/QCA will be supplemented by simple descriptive analysis whenever necessary in order to 
add more depth to the investigation and to present a more well-founded conclusion. 
4.2.1Step by step cs/QCA 
There are four stages to applying QCA (Coverdill and Finlay 1995, 461). These are as 
follows:  
1) Pre-QCA work 
2) Coding data and constructing  the data matrix 
3) Constructing the truth table 
4) Causal identification and minimization 
 
Researcher interaction is relevant at all points. For example, through readjustment and 
                                                 
116
 Particularly for causal conditions C and D: Involvement of international actors and E: Economy.  
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reformulation of the causal conditions and data codes to ensure a correspondence between the 
analysis and the empirical observations. This is particularly relevant in moving from state 
three to four. Additionally, the analysis of the findings in point four can be usefully elaborated 
through description.  
1) Pre-QCA work 
In this stage, the causal conditions and data are identified and retrieved (Coverdill and Finlay 
1995, 461, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 39-44). This process is largely covered in the theory 
and data chapter. It consisted of inductive and deductive strategies. Deductive, because it 
assessed and evaluated theories and concepts presented by other scholars. Inductive, in that it 
also considered what factors empirically seemed to be the most important. Since no other 
collective meta-analysis has been made of the general development of de facto- states, this has 
been an important part of the preparations.  
 
Collecting the data for the analysis has proven complicated. One reason for this is that the de 
facto-states are rarely considered a separate entity by those compiling data-sets. Consequently, 
a variety of sources has been used in order to illuminate each causal condition from different 
perspectives, hoping to properly being able to identify what value each should obtain. The 
sources and discussions of the coding can be seen in the Raw table in Appendix 3and 4 but 
will not be included in the main text.  
 
Collecting data for Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation (Hypothesis H1), 
distinguishing whether or not the entity holds a distinct ethnic group, has shown to be more 
accessible information. Either because it is normally discussed in articles about the region, or 
because demographic distribution has been detailed by others. Causal condition B: Level of 
democratic institutions as compared with the parent state (Hypothesis H2) has been 
somewhat difficult to collect information on. Finding information on the de facto-state’s 
institutions is fairly straightforward when reading articles about the region, but being able to 
compare it with that of the parent state can be more complicated. When possible, both the 
situation at the time of seceding and per 2012 has been included for both de facto-state and 
parent. If this has not been possible, the information r for the closest possible time has been 
included. Collecting data for Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition and Causal 
condition D: UN veto power support (Hypotheses H3 and H4), has proven itself to be a varied 
experience. Finding official statements and involvement is not complicated, but assessing 
informal leverage most certainly is. For this reason, mostly official relations have been 
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included. Informal connections are ignored unless they are frequently discussed in the 
literature and claimed to be of utmost importance for the de facto-state.  Information for 
Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state (Hypothesis 
H5), has proven to be particularly difficult to obtain information for, but it has been possible 
to cover all of the entities. The evaluations of the Serb Republics are the most uncertain. Since 
none of the sources discussing resource distribution in the former Yugoslavia in general or the 
two entities in particular claimed that economy or resources were at any time a topic, they 
have been considered as having a similar niveau as their parents.      
2) Coding data and constructing the data matrix 
This step produces the foundations for the upcoming Raw data table and the Truth table. The 
operationalization and coding required for the creation of the table will be further described in 
section 4.3 below. The causal conditions are created by the researcher and based on previous 
analyses. The logic is that if something repeatedly is seen as important for different non-
recognised stated, it is interesting to explore whether this will turn out to be generally 
influential as well. What has been identified in the majority of case- and regional studies is 
mostly overlapping with the causal conditions identified by both Pegg (1998) and Kolstø 
(2006). Seeing as both these studies took place before the declaration of independence by 
Kosovo in 2008, gathering input from articles written after that has been valuable117.  
 
Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-463) identify three problems during the coding process. The 
first is the need for comparable data on every case. Since QCA is dependent on the 
researcher’s ability to correctly assess the information and code it thereafter, perfect 
comparability on all data is difficult to obtain. To obtain the highest level of comparability 
possible and minimise the risk of human error by the researcher, there are multiple sources 
behind each allotted value in the Raw table. Due to the sometimes sparse information 
available, the data obtaining and coding process has proven to be extremely time consuming. 
It has taken a full half of the time that has been required to complete this thesis. The second 
problem identified by Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-463)  is that of correctly coding each 
causal condition for each entity without tweaking the results in the expected direction based 
on holistic impressions. Third comes the potential problem of finding the best cut-off point 
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 Caspersen (2008c, 2010a, 2008b, 2010b, 2008a, 2007, 2011, 2012a),  and Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) 
have been particularly useful for identifying the potential effects of democratic institutions and the apparent 
change in discourse by the international community, as also discussed in the Theory chapter. 
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between the value 1 and 0 on the outcome when no natural break-off points are present118. 
Any cases where this has proven problematic are elaborated upon in the Raw table in 
Appendix 3. 
 
In order to minimize the risk of the researcher mistakes, as explained by Coverdill and Finlay 
(1995), the coding of parts of the raw table will be replicated by externals. Three de facto-
states are chosen randomly from the sample, and were given to volunteers119 together with the 
original sources and the operationalization of the causal conditions. Should their coding give a 
different result, the operationalization would be improved and the coded values re-evaluated.   
This has not proven to be the case, which means that the construction of the Truth table can 
commence.  
3) Constructing the truth table 
Here, the Truth table is constructed (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44-47). Coverdill and Finlay 
(1995, 464) describes the process as follows: First, a Raw data matrix120 should be 
constructed, listing all the entities, with their respective values on each causal condition. This 
case-oriented table sets the ground for the configuration-focused Truth table that is to follow. 
In the latter, all logically possible outcomes are listed, and the cases are placed in their 
corresponding rows. The operationalizations that the codes are based on are presented below. 
 
Between steps three and four, the researcher must evaluate whether the operationalization and 
coding has been good enough. Cs/QCA does not have a way to handle contradicting outcomes 
with the same attributes.  
4) Causal identification and minimization 
QCA is not concerned with the individual effects of causal conditions, but rather the 
configurations of them. It is fully possible that one factor proves important in collaboration 
with another despite not having any obvious effects by itself. For this reason, all the causal 
conditions will be added before the analysis can begin. If any of them prove to be irrelevant 
for the outcome, it will be removed from the investigation as part of the minimisation process. 
                                                 
118
 The sources and reasons behind each value will be displayed in Appendix 3 instead of in the main text, so as 
to maintain a clear and easily followable text in the thesis.  
119
 All the volunteers have a master’s degree or higher in either social sciences or the humanities, and were 
recruited amongst people from the researcher’s own social circle. After being given the sources and the coding 
operationalizations for their entity, they worked solo. This tests whether the original coding is replicable, and if 
the operationalizations are clear and logical. This evaluation was identical to the original, indicating that 
researcher bias and unjustified coding is not a big problem here. The recoded entities are Anjouan, Gagauzia and 
Somaliland. 
120
 A full version with sources is found in Appendix 3 and 4, and Table 11 and Table 12 in Appendix 2. 
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The last stage before the analysis can begin in earnest is the minimisation of the truth table 
(see for instance Ragin and Sonnett 2004, Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 56-59). The causal 
combinations will be sorted by their outcome into 0 and 1-configurations and analysed 
separately. The formulas for success and failure are identified. Then the results of those 
analyses will be used on the de facto-states with no clear outcomes, to investigate whether it is 
possible to evaluate the strength of the position of the different uncompleted entities based on 
the results of this analysis. The specificities of this will be further commented in the Analysis 
chapter. 
 
 Ragin (1987, 95-99) describes that Boolean implicators - that is, the reduced causal 
combinations - can be further minimised through reduction to prime implicants. Though this 
could contribute to an increased parsimony, it will not be done here. Considering the low 
number of included entities, reducing too much might obfuscate as much as it clarifies.  
 
In addition to the four first steps, Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 59-65) proposes a fifth: 
bringing in the “logical remainders” cases - that is, logical combinations with no empirical 
matches. This is meant as a means to achieve more parsimony, and is done by including non-
observed logical remainders. This is not done here, for reasons further discussed in the 
Analysis chapter.  
 
Necessary and sufficient causes and combinations thereof will be identified for the successful 
de facto-states and for the failures. Ragin (1987, 99-100) defines a condition as necessary if it 
“must be present for an outcome to occur”, and sufficient if it “by itself can produce a certain 
outcome”.  
4.3 Operationalization of the outcome and causal conditions 
To properly code the data and construct the relevant tables, the operationalization of the 
causal conditions and outcome will be explained. The information used for the analysis is 
compiled by the researcher, using a multitude of sources like quantitative data-sets, news-
articles and scientific articles. Data on non-recognised states can be both difficult to find and 
trust, so it is important in all the causal conditions to ensure credibility by gathering 
information from various sources. Where the sources contradict each other, there will by 
necessity be an evaluation of trustworthiness and quantity that decides the allotted value. For 
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instance, if several researchers argue one point, and only one or a few contradict it, the many 
will win over the few, given equal trustworthiness.  
 
It is not expected that the included entities will be universally accepted as the ultimate 
selection. Although  the definition of  de facto-states by Kolstø (2006, 724-725) is widely 
used, the selections based on it are not always completely overlapping121. Considering the 
highly diverse nature of these entities, disagreement on which entities are to be included must 
be expected. The same goes for the operationalization of the causal conditions and the coding 
of the different values. The coding of all causal conditions will entail measuring and 
evaluating approximates, as the relevant information in most cases is general and unclear. In 
addition there is the problem of the credibility of the data. Being conflict zones - though 
frozen - it is expected that differing accounts of these entities may exist due to propaganda or 
misinformation of other sorts122. To ensure that any potential damages by this on the validity 
and quality of the analysis are kept to a minimum, the coded data is based on multiple sources 
and any disagreements between them are pointed out in the Raw data table in Appendix 3.  
 
In order to maintain transparency, the operationalization and coding will be discussed in this 
section. Starting with the outcome and continuing with the causal conditions, each point will 
be discussed in order chronologically from the theory chapter. Special attention is given to 
coding that is particularly debatable or difficult to pin down. 
4.3.1 The outcome: state recognition 
State recognition will here be defined as UN membership. As previously mentioned, this does 
not entail full acceptance by all other UN member states. It does, however, mean that the area 
in question has been recognised both by the major veto powers in the Security Council and 
the majority of other states in the General Assembly, and that all the other members must 
relate to it as a state (The United Nations 07.12.2012b). As the outcome here is dichotomous 
by nature, this coding is not expected to pose any problems. 
 
UN membership is given the value 1, non-membership is given the value 0. 
                                                 
121
 As an example, note how the compilations of de facto-states since the second world war made by Caspersen 
(2012b, 4) and Anderson (2011, 185) differ both in what entities are included and their time of existence even 
though they are sections in the same work. 
122
 Of the five steps Kolstø (2006) presents from the process of de facto-state building, information and other 
“soft power” is seen as the most important. This also includes the possibility of a certain bias in the information 
spread about the entity. 
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4.3.2 Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation 
This causal condition reports whether the de facto-state was founded on the concept of 
ethnicity. Though the concept of ethnicity is a contested one123, it is not the goal of this thesis 
to give evaluations regarding the legitimacy of claims of being an ethnic group or 
membership in one. Here, I will examine what others have considered as constituting ethnic 
groups.  
 
The basis for the de facto state is considered to be ethnicity if the de facto-state was founded 
as a homeland for an ethnic group which is distinct from the population in the mother state. 
This would also include cases such as Abkhazia, where the purpose clearly was creating an 
Abkhaz state despite the fact that the Abkhaz were initially a minority in the region124. Any 
entity where ethnicity was an important part of the discourse of creation is placed in this 
category. It is not the specific size of the ethnic group that is the most important, but whether 
the entity was created with the ethnic group in mind. 
 
Entities not considered as having ethnicity as a base includes situations when the ethnic 
composition is the same - mixed125 or homogeneous126 - in the two entities. If ethnic 
composition was not seen as important during the creation of the de facto-state, it is included 
in this category.  
 
If the state foundation is considered as ethnic, the de facto-state is coded 1. Otherwise, it is 
coded 0. 
4.3.3 Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent 
state 
This causal condition measures the level of democratic institutions as compared with the 
parent state.  What is interesting is seeing if the de facto-state holds a higher level of 
democracy than its parent. In situations where this is not the case, it is seen as irrelevant to 
distinguish whether the parent is at the same level or above127.  
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 See for instance Baumann (2004) for a discussion on the concept.  
124
 For more on how the ethnic composition in Abkhazia has changed over the years, see (UNPO 2009, Clogg 
2001, Ciobanu 2008, 118-121, Beachain 2012). 
125
 Eritrea is an example of a de facto-state with a heterogeneous population splitting from a heterogeneous 
parent. See Lloyd (1994-1995, 418-419), Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 20-22), CIA World Factbook (12.02.2013), 
Encyclopædia Britannica (2013i). 
126
 Somaliland and Puntland are examples of de facto-states with a homogeneous population splitting from a 
homogeneous parent (Gikes 1999, Mesfin 2009, UNHCR 1999, Huliaras 2010). 
127
 These distinctions can be seen in the Raw table in Appendix 3.. 
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Having “democratic institutions” does not mean that there is a fixed set of criteria the entity 
must fulfil. Being a democratic entity as such is therefore less important than being more 
democratic than the parent. The focus is on organisational abilities. This includes elections, 
governmental turnover, citizen participation, welfare systems, level of electoral violence, 
creating and maintaining infrastructure, and so on. Being a democratic polity first requires 
there to be an organised government. This means that there are no universal criteria being 
applied here, since the situation is expected to be different in each case. The entities need not, 
for instance, hold democratic elections in consolidated democratic regimes.  
 
To measure this, report from Freedomhouse and CIA World Factbook is used in tandem with 
analyses of case and regional studies. The numeric codes in the former are considered 
unproblematic to compare for the parent and the de facto-state, for they are each evaluated 
using the same mechanisms. Analysis from the literature is more complex, but it is assumed to 
be valid if the entity is portrayed as more democratic than its parent in multiple sources. 
 
Institutional strength and democratic level is measured in comparison with the parent state 
due to the arguments presented in the Theory chapter. This distinction is thus common in the 
theory on the field. Testing for the presence of democratic institutions in general is not seen as 
making sense in this case as the arguments are relational128.   
 
Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1, otherwise the value given 
is 0. 
4.3.4 Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition and Causal condition D: UN veto 
power support  
These conditions report whether the de facto-state has faced international involvement by UN 
veto holders or whether it has not. The Theory chapter presents hypotheses that go in opposite 
directions, and gauges that involvement can be of both a positive and negative kind. UN veto 
powers are the most mighty single states when determining membership in the UN, so the 
focus will be on the actions of these states. Naturally, they are not the only states capable of 
aiding or harming de facto-states, but in this specific situation they do hold enormous power.  
 
“Involvement” implies several things, the three most important of which here are diplomatic, 
                                                 
128
 Haugland (2008) analyses the presence or absence of democratic institutions per se in her included states-in-
spe, and finds no connection between the causal condition and UN recognition.    
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military and economic intervention. The first, diplomatic intervention, involves active support 
or opposition of the state-status of the entity.  Recognising the entity entails supporting it, as 
does arguing its case in important fora129 or providing help in developing state institutions130. 
Diplomatic opposition could be laying down a veto, or strongly arguing in favour of the 
parent state or the value of territorial sovereignty131.  
 
Military intervention with the goal of supporting or opposing132 the entity counts, but not 
cases where the purpose is simply resolving the conflict. For example: International 
intervention in North Cyprus is nearly exclusively done to promote diplomatic relations and 
conflict resolution - not to support or oppose the de facto-state (Sonmez and Apostolopoulos 
2008, Atasoy 2003, Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999, Dodd 2009). This kind of activity 
does not count here.  
 
Economic intervention can come in many forms, but is here generally seen as trade - 
including blockades - and economic aid to the regime133.  
 
A veto power can, like other states, change its opinion on international matters and vote 
differently in different UN Security Council meetings regarding the de facto-state. This has 
indeed been the case for Bangladesh, but not for the other successful entities134. For this 
reason the focus is on data from as close to the time directly after the de facto-state was 
created as possible.  
 
For causal condition C, having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1; otherwise it will 
be coded as 0. For causal condition D, having UN veto power support will be coded as 1; the 
lack thereof will be coded as 0. 
                                                 
129
 Russia argues in favour of the recognition of, amongst others, South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Fawn 2008, 273, 
UNPO 2009, Ciobanu 2008, 121). 
130
 Both Kosovo and East Timor have received important international aid to develop their political institutions 
(K-FOR 2013, EULEX 23.01.2013, The United Nations Security Council 1999). 
131
 Russia opposes the recognition of Kosovo, arguing amongst other points that the territorial integrity of Serbia 
is important (Caspersen 2008b, 1, Fawn 2008, 270, 290, BBC 2010, Ciobanu 2008, 159).  
132
 Both the UK, the USSR and USA were militarily involved against Biafra (Berg 2005, 228, Ciobanu 2008, 71-
72, 84). 
 
133
 The United Kingdom imposed blockades on de facto-state Rhodesia (Pinkston 2005, 7). 
134
 For Bangladesh, see (USUN 13.05.2013, The United Nations General Assembly 1974). For East Timor, see 
(The United Nations Security Council 2002) . For Eritrea, see (United Nations Security Council 1993). For 
South Sudan, see.(The United Nations General Assembly 2011, The United Nations Security Council 2011). 
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4.3.5 Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state  
This causal condition reports whether the economic situation in the de facto-state is similar to 
or disproportionally different from the rest of its parent. In other words, it measures whether 
the parent state faces 1) no significant and unproportional economic changes by the 
disappearance of its rebel entity or 2) an economic loss or gain by losing the secessionist 
entity. This is done to find out whether economy has played an important role for the 
secessionist conflict. 
 
Economy and natural resources are hard to measure, so the focus is on relative terms. Will the 
parent state be economically wounded through the loss of the de facto-state? Will it benefit? 
The answer “yes” to any of those two questions are here seen to indicate that when 
considering resources, the region is significantly different from the rest of the state it is 
attempting to split from.  And thus, that economy can be expected to have been an important 
factor. In situation where both have more or less the same level, it is logical that this cannot 
have been of a high importance. If the parent does not face significant losses or gains, the 
economic situation in the de facto-state is not considered to be sufficiently different for 
economy to matter largely. 
 
By “economic level” it is not meant only money or Gross Domestic Products. Also included 
are resources such as for instance oil or minerals, even if they are or were not extracted and 
taken full advantage of during the de facto-state’s existence. This includes having 
proportionally more or less of the state’s industry135, holding important harbours136 or oil 
deposits137 et cetera.  
 
What is meant by a “significant” loss or gain is impossible to numerize, as it is a matter of 
relative proportions. What matters the most is that it is perceived as important138. It is 
unrealistic to expect the potential in natural resources or lack thereof to be assessed in detail. 
Central banks and detailed budgets are not necessarily existing or trustworthy for these types 
of entities. It is therefore impossible to set numerical thresholds. The belief of loss or gain can 
                                                 
135
 For example, Transnistria has un-proportionally much of Moldova’s industrial factories on its territory (Berg 
2005, 228, Ciobanu 2008, 71-72, 84). 
136
 The main harbour in the Comoros was in Anjouan at the time of the conflict  (Ayangafac 2008, 3-5, Cornwell 
2010, 55-56). 
137
 South Sudan has nearly all of the oil previously owned by Sudan (Ross 08.07.2011). 
138
 The focus on perceived resources and their distribution is supported by Wood (1981, 116-117) Laracy (1991), 
Ghai and Regan (2006),  and Cornish (2010). 
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be interesting here. If is it claimed that the parent state stands to lose or gain much by the loss 
of its unruly region, it is counted as relevant. If scientific articles on the entity claim that there 
is a resource distribution discrepancy, this is also understood to be relevant.  
 
If the parent state stands to lose or gain economically by the loss of the de facto-state, the 
code will be 1. Otherwise, the value is 0. 
4.4 Chapter summary 
Crisp set QCA has been chosen as the method for this thesis. Partly because it is well suited 
for medium-N-analyses. Also because it is well-suited for assessment of causal combinations. 
QCA-analysis has four steps, namely 1) Pre-QCA work, 2) Coding data and constructing the 
data matrix, 3) Constructing the Truth table and 4) Causal identification and minimization. To 
add more depth, descriptive analysis will be used as an analytic tool.  
 
Then, the operationalization of the causal condition was performed and is summarised as 
follows. Outcome: UN membership is given the value 1; non-membership is given the value 
0. A: If the state foundation is considered as ethnic, the de facto-state is coded 1. Otherwise, it 
is coded 0. B: Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1; otherwise 
the value given is 0. C: having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1; otherwise it will 
be coded as 0. D: having UN veto power support will be coded as 1; the lack thereof will be 
coded as 0. E: If the parent state stands to lose or gain economically by the loss of the de 
facto-state, the code will be 1. Otherwise, the value is 0. 
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5. Analysis Chapter: seeking patterns  
In this chapter, the main analysis takes part. The chapter starts with a presentation of the 
strategy of the investigation, presenting what will be done how and why.  Then the actual 
analysis will be performed and the results discussed in relation to the thesis’ research 
question. Further, the potential patterns for the successful and failed state-creation attempts 
will be used to try to give an evaluation of the de facto-states whose status is not yet decided. 
All configurations will have the values 1 or 0, meaning that “don’t care”- outcomes and 
logical remainders will be avoided (Rihoux and De Meur 2009, 44). Though utilising the 
QCA-software139 in the analyses, it is important to note that cs/QCA is a process open for 
researcher input at every stage of the procedure. Following the recommendations by Ragin 
(1987, 164-171), descriptive analyses and evaluations will be included throughout the process 
as supplements to the main analysis. Only the Truth tables are presented in the text. The Raw 
table with sources can be found in Appendices 3 and 4. 
5.1 Strategy of analysis: how the investigation will be performed 
First analysis: Crisp set QCA  
The cs/QCA-analysis will be presented first, identifying the logical formulas for successful 
and failed de facto-states. The entities with no clear outcome will not be included in this part 
of the investigation. 
Step one - The Truth table and preliminary results.  
The entities and causal conditions will be transformed into configurations of cases. They will 
be sorted into 1/ 0- configurations for success and failure respectively. The analyses of the two 
will proceed in tandem. The most obvious findings will be identified and collected 
immediately.  
Step two - Creating a model: Minimisation, and the minimal formulas.  
This section creates the Truth table and identifies the formulas (or simplified Boolean 
equations) for success and failure. This creates a model for evaluation of de facto-states. The 
unreduced, primitive causal terms will be reduced using Boolean minimization and the 
process behind them is discussed (Haugland 2008, 52-53, Ragin 1987, 85-101).  
                                                 
139
 The Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis Software by Ragin (15.03.2013) can be used for both crisp  
and fuzzy set analyses.  
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Second analysis: Descriptive analyses 
The cs/QCA-analysis will be further complemented by a descriptive analysis based on the 
same data as collected for the QCA-analysis, seeking to present a deeper understanding of the 
outcomes experienced by the de facto-states included.  
Step three - Distribution: identifying the typical causal combination for success and failure 
By evaluating the distribution of the presence and absence of the different causal conditions 
the typical formula is identified. Due to the low number of entities in each of the two 
categories, it is possible that some important knowledge is missed. Identifying the typical 
combination could add robustness to the assessments of what leads to which outcomes. 
Step four - Including the time aspect 
As could be seen in the introducing descriptions in the Data chapter, the setting in which an 
entity was created is potentially important for its outcome.  A closer analysis of the entities in 
light of which wave they belong to is performed. 
Step five- A closer look at particular patterns identified through analysis 
This section presents a closer look at patterns becoming apparent through the analyses, but 
which are not covered in the Truth table. 
Third analysis: Using analyses one and two to evaluate the undetermined entities 
This section takes the analysis one step further and attempts using the knowledge of the 
successes and failures to analyse the entities with no clear outcome. 
Step six - Analyses one and two applied to the entities with undetermined outcomes 
This section evaluates the potential outcomes of yet undetermined entities in light of the 
causal combinations identified in analyses one and two. 
Step seven - Adding extra causal conditions 
Causal conditions identified by other researchers are applied to the identified data in order to 
evaluate their positions more precisely.  
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5.2 First analysis: Crisp set QCA 
The following is the cs/QCA-analysis, applied to the successful and failed entities separately.  
5.2.1 - Step one - The Truth table and preliminary results. 
In the Truth table, each logically possible combination of the causal conditions is listed as 
rows. As explained above, N causal conditions create 2N rows. Each entity is placed in the 
appropriate row sorted by the values of the different causal conditions. Seeing as this analysis 
has five causal conditions, there are 32 possible logical combinations. Table 4 below shows 
the truth table sorted into one group for those entities who have achieved UN membership and 
one for those who have become reintegrated into their parent states.  
Table 4- Truth table for the first analysis 
De facto-
state 
A 
Ethnicit
y 
B 
Democracy 
C 
Veto opposition 
D 
Veto support 
E 
Economy 
Formula 
SUCESSES (N = 4) 
Bangladesh 1 1 1 0 1 ABCdE 
East-Timor 1 0 0 1 1 AbcDE 
Eritrea  0 1 0 0 1 aBcdE 
South 
Sudan 
0 1 0 1 1 aBcDE 
FAILURES ( N = 7) 
Anjouan 0 0 0 0 1 abcdE 
Biafra, 
Chechnya 
1 0 1 0 1 AbCdE 
Gagauzia 1 1 0 0 1 ABcdE 
Iraqi-
Kurdistan  
1 1 0 1 1 ABcDE 
Katanga 0 0 1 0 1 abCdE 
Republika 
Srpska,  
Republika 
Srpska 
Krajina, 
Rhodesia 
1 0 0 0 0 Abcde 
Tamil 
Eelam 
0 0 0 1 0 abcDe 
N = 11. Sources: see Appendix 3. 
 
Each row in the Truth table represents one causal combination140 and includes all entities with 
matching combinations. One causal combination can include many de facto-states. For the 
causal terms, majuscules represent presence and minuscule absence of a causal condition, like 
the numerical values 1 and 0. There are no contradictory cases, making recoding or adding 
                                                 
140
 Or «primitive causal term» (Haugland 2008, 52). 
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causal conditions seem superfluous (Coverdill and Finlay 1995, 466), Rihoux and De Meur 
(2009, 48-56), Ragin (1987, 113-118). Eleven of the 32 possible logical combinations have 
corresponding empirical cases. There are only two sets of combinations with more than one 
matching case, none of which have succeeded in achieving statehood. They are 1) the Serb 
Republics and Rhodesia, and 2) Biafra and Chechnya. No causal combination has more than 
three matching entities. This might serve as a reminder of the heterogeneous nature of these 
entities, as is already discussed in the Data chapter.  
 
Is it possible to make a general analysis based on combinations with such a low frequency as 
this? Haugland (2008, 49) points out the potential loss of reliability in analyses with low 
frequency. The logic is that an analysis which only identifies that entities are different does 
not really explain much. Should only the combinations with the most corresponding cases be 
analysed further? Ragin (1987, 46) recommends setting the frequency threshold for inclusion 
to one or two corresponding cases when performing small and medium-N analyses. This is in 
part based on a practical evaluation: specific social phenomena do only rarely occur in large 
quantities. Having a high threshold might lead to a more generalizable outcome, but only if 
there are sufficient cases to perform the analysis. Due to the limited number of cases, the 
frequency threshold is here set to one and all existing cases are brought on to the further 
analysis. The undetermined cases are kept out of the analysis for now. Only logical 
remainders with no corresponding cases are excluded.  
 
Ragin (1987, 109) points out that ignoring the lacking empirical cases is not a matter of 
course. Another procedure is to assume that the non-existing combinations would lead to 
failures and code them as such. It is also possible to use the existing theory and place them 
based on assumed outcomes. The conservative option of excluding them was deemed as most 
appropriate for this thesis for two reasons. The first is that coding the non-existent 
combinations as failures would ultimately limit the credibility of the analysis of that category. 
The second is to maintain the focus on empirical evidence rather than on theoretical 
evaluations. This thesis is written in the hope of finding patterns in existing de facto-states 
and their development pathways, and a focus on occurring events is therefore necessary. 
 
Rihoux and De Meur (2009, 57) recommends minimizing the 1 and 0-configurations 
separately seeing that perfect causal symmetry is not to be expected in social sciences. In 
other words, the minimal formula for the 0-configurations is not necessarily the opposite of 
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the one for the 1-configurations and the one can thus not be deduced from the other. For this 
reason, the two will be considered separately. The cases falling into the “Undecided”-category 
will be left out of this part of the analysis, since it is not yet clear whether they will succeed in 
becoming a state or fail and reintegrate into their parent. This is to avoid comparing same with 
same and muddling the value of the analysis. The cases with undecided outcomes will be 
brought in to the analysis after the investigations of the successes and failures, and an 
evaluation of them based on the findings from the two other categories will be attempted. 
 
It is possible to discern patterns already at this stage. The successful de facto-states have in 
common that they all had a different economic level than their parent state at the time of the 
split. Only Bangladesh was opposed by a UN veto power when they first came into existence. 
None of them had both an ethnically homogeneous population and a higher level of 
democracy than their parent. That the failures are a more heterogeneous set is not surprising, 
considering that there are more than twice as many cases and causal combinations. Despite 
this, some impressions are possible. Most of them had a different economic level than their 
parent, and a similar or lower level of democracy. Nearly all entities with veto opposition are 
found in this category, and the same is the case for those with the same economic level as 
their parent.  
5.2.2 - Step two - Creating a model: Minimisation, and the minimal formulas. 
The unreduced causal terms as shown in the Truth table can be minimised and shown as a 
minimal formula and are represented in the text on bold letters. There will be one formula for 
success and one for failure. This is done by comparing the causal combinations and 
identifying those that are similar in all but one aspect. Logically, that particular aspect is not 
relevant for the outcome, and can be eliminated from the equation. This is repeated until all 
the remaining formulas differ from each other in two or more aspects. The remainders are 
known as minimal formulas and form the basis for discerning which causal conditions are 
necessary and which are sufficient for the respective outcome. Note that logical algebra does 
not strictly follow arithmetic patterns (Ragin 1987, 92). Sufficient conditions are represented 
by the logical AND, or *. Logically necessary conditions, OR, are presented as +. Thus, as an 
example, the minimal formula ab indicates the combination of a and b, a+b signals either a or 
b and a(b+c) a combined with either b or c. 
 
The heterogeneity of the examined entities does, as is apparent from the Truth table, not bring 
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to light any obvious common patterns for neither success nor failure of obtaining UN 
membership. That leads to a necessity of a discussion on thresholds for inclusion in the 
further analysis. Two possible paths are 1) exclusion of combinations and 2) exclusion of 
causal conditions. First: It could be possible to obtain a more parsimonious minimal formula 
if some of the entities are kept out of the equation. For instance, accepting that the formula 
covers a general or qualified majority of the combinations, could contribute to a clearer 
answer to the question on what entities or causal combinations gain UN membership. This 
will not be done here, for fear of choosing the wrong combination to exclude. One of the most 
important purposes for this thesis is to seek patterns for all of the de facto-states, and 
exclusion of those that do not fit seem a poor manner of achieving this goal - particularly so 
when considering the low number of combinations in each category. The second suggestion of 
treating as irrelevant those causal conditions not displaying any apparent effect is more 
relevant. If a fifty-fifty spread of a condition it is found where the outcomes 1 and 0 are not 
corresponding with the spread of any other causal condition it is logical that this condition has 
not had an effect on the outcome.  Any such conditions will thus be removed from the 
analysis.   
Table 5- Minimal formulas of reduced causal terms- a model for success and failure 
for de facto-states 
Success (O) Failure (o) 
 
O = ABCdE+ AbcDE+ aBcdE+ aBcDE 
 
 
o = abcdE+ AbCdE+ ABcdE+ ABcDE+ abCdE+ 
Abcde+ abcDe 
 
Factored terms: Factored terms: 
 
Including all causal conditions: 
 
O = aBcE+AE(BCd+bcD) 
 
After removing conditions D and A: 
 
O = BCE+bcE+BcE → O = E(BC+bc+Bc) 
 
 
Including all causal conditions: 
 
o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD) 
 
No removal of conditions is possible. 
A: Ethnicity, B: Democracy, C: Veto opposition, D: Veto support, E: Economy, O: Outcome  
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Analysis of the formula for Success: O = E(BC+bc+Bc) 
After having removed as irrelevant D: UN veto power support and A: Ethnicity as state 
foundation, the reduced formula is O = E(BC+bc+Bc). There are thus three main types of 
successful de facto-states. The formula shows condition E as necessary, but is not by itself 
sufficient for the outcome.  In other words, the entity must have a different level of economy 
than its parent, but this is not by itself enough to create the outcome success. 
 
The formula indicates that all successful de facto-states have had a score of 1 on causal 
condition E, or a different level of economy from its parent state at the time of secession. This 
corresponds with the expectations presented by H5: A different economic level than the parent 
state increases the chances of recognition. Though this seems like a clear finding, it is worth 
keeping in mind that it is fully possible that what is found is more an indication that entities 
with a different level of economy more frequently attempts secession than others. It is also 
unclear whether it is the kind of resources, the level of difference or the net value that is 
behind this effect. Similarly, it is impossible to read from this analysis what lies behind this 
finding. Is it an endogenous or exogenous effect, or maybe both? Regardless, it is the single 
causal condition with a clear presence in all successful de facto-states and it supports previous 
literature on the field.  
 
The values BC+bc+Bc show the different combinations of causal conditions B, Level of 
democratic institutions as compared with the parent state, and C, or UN veto power 
opposition. The results shown are partly contradictory, but still have some things in common. 
The most striking is that none of the three shows UN veto opposition coupled with a lower 
level of democracy than the parent. It is more common to have than to lack a higher level of 
democracy, supporting the assumed effect presented in H5: A different economic level than 
the parent state increases the chances of recognition.  Two of the three combinations show an 
absence of veto opposition. This is in accordance with the assumptions H3: Opposition from a 
UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition, but no combinatory causality is clear. 
Any consistent combination of the two factors is not discernible. More of the entities show a 
presence of a higher level of democracy coupled with a lack of veto opposition.  
 
A summary could therefore be: the successful de facto-states who have become UN members 
have differing levels of resources from their parents. Generally, they exhibit a higher level of 
democracy than them, and they are not opposed by UN veto holders.  Removing causal 
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conditions A and D has weakened hypotheses H1and H4. The hypothesis H5has been 
strengthened, whereas H2 and H3 are unafflicted by the results. 
Analysis of the formula for Failure: o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD) 
For the failed de facto-states, it is not possible to remove any causal conditions as irrelevant, 
since the spread is never evenly split in any direction. The reduced formula created after 
analysing the failed attempts at secession is o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD). No 
conditions are found to be necessary or sufficient by themselves and there are no less than 
five different pathways to failure represented here.  
 
That there are five main types of failed de facto-states identified shows that these entities are 
more heterogeneous than the successful ones. This is not surprising, as it has been shown 
multiple times throughout this analysis that de facto-states come from a vast variety of 
backgrounds and have had diverging developments since their creation. But despite their 
particularities, there are still some commonalities that can be identified.  
 
The most frequent causal condition to have, is E, different economic level than the parent 
state. Hypothesis H5 is apparently weakened. Its near constant presence is similar to the 
successful entities, but this category also includes combinations where this condition is 
absent. Having the presence of the condition in both the category for successful and failed de 
facto-states indicate that merely being economically different is not enough to predict the 
direction of the outcome. If anything is to be deduced, it is thus that economic difference is 
not by itself enough to predict the outcomes.  
 
The presence of an economically different level is here combined with any of the causal 
conditions except D, support from a UN veto holder. The one incident where veto support is 
coupled with a different level of economy, experienced by Iraqi-Kurdistan, has been logically 
reduced from the final equation. This is interesting, considering the fifty-fifty spread of 
support present in the successful group. However, it is important not to draw hasted 
conclusions regarding the effects of external aid. Veto support was one of the conditions 
removed from the analysis of successes, as it was deemed logically irrelevant. What appears 
to be the case is that for failed de facto-states, international support has been absent. This, 
combined with a different economic level, is common for the combinations in this category 
except for the one where veto support was removed. Hence, hypothesis H4 can be argued to 
be strengthened, as UN veto support has been absent for the failing entities.  
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For the other causal conditions, patterns are harder to come by. Neither A, an ethnically 
distinct base, B, higher level of democracy, or C, veto opposition, display any clear trends and 
the variety shown by the causal combinations present makes it near impossible to give any 
clear conclusions as to which entities fail.  Thus, hypotheses H1, H2 and H 3 are neither 
weakened nor strengthened. 
 
To summarise, failed de facto-states portray a wide range of different traits, but they generally 
have a different level of economy than their parent and they are not supported by a UN veto 
holder. Hypothesis H5 is somewhat weakened as three of the five causal trajectories display 
having a different level of economy than the parent state.  Hypothesis H4 is strengthened, as 
UN veto support has not been given to these entities. Hypotheses 1-3 are not supported or 
weakened to any large degree. It thus appears that while they might provide an aid for 
understanding success they contribute little to grasping what lies behind failure. It is clear that 
here, the path to failure is not the opposite of the path to success. 
5.3 Second analysis: Descriptive analyses 
After having utilised cs/QCA to identify the causal combinations leading to success and 
failure, two formulas have been identified. Successful entities follow the trajectory O = 
E(BC+bc+Bc)and failures follow o = E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD). Those are the 
logical formulas, and were found through Boolean minimisation. They describe what logical 
combinations are found within the different entities leading up to the two different outcomes 
success and failure. This section will examine the distribution of the causal conditions. It is 
done to seek the typical success and failure. This part of the analysis is descriptive, and 
examines the distribution of the different causal conditions. Having so few of them in each 
category, one diverging entity could influence the resulting logical combination greatly. This 
additional analysis is included to support the results of the cs/QCA-based main analysis by 
providing an extra layer to the model. Including researcher evaluations follows the 
recommendations made by Coverdill and Finlay (1995, 461-466) and Ragin (1987). 
5.3.1 - Step three - Distribution: identifying the typical causal combination for success 
and failure 
 In order to evaluate the future of those de facto-states whose final outcomes are still 
unknown, it would be practical having a more  clear foundation for the analysis than what is 
possible now. Since the different combinations are discussed in the previous section, this will 
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focus on the distribution of single causal conditions in order to gauge whether there are 
factors that are more common in each category despite there being little consistency in the 
combinations discovered. This section will point out major differences and similarities 
between the two categories, and try making the results more comprehensive.  
 
Causal condition A, having a distinct ethnic base, does not show any clear tendencies. Half of 
the successful combinations have this condition present, as do two-thirds of the failed ones. 
This is in contrast with the expected effect stated in hypothesis H1. What appears to be the 
case is that the ethnic foundation for secession does not have any clear effect on the outcome, 
as the spread is fairly equal. But this picture is not necessarily that clear. As shown in Table 4 
on page 67, the vast majority of de facto-states have had a distinct ethnic foundation. When 
evaluation the combinations leading up to recognition, it is notable that there is a 
disproportionally large amount of those who have become UN members who do not fit into 
this category. This discrepancy corresponds with the conservative attitude of the UN 
discussed in the Theory chapter, discouraging the creation of new states apart from the periods 
of decolonisation and the break-down of the communist unions USSR and Yugoslavia. It 
might seem that while it is more likely that de facto-states have distinct ethnic concentrations 
than not, they do not succeed. Thus, hypothesis H1is neither supported nor weakened.  
 
For those combinations that have led to UN membership, causal conditions B, a higher level 
of democracy, and C, UN veto opposition, are identical in three of the four possible cases. 
Having a higher level of democracy and lacking veto opposition is the most common 
combination, but it only holds true for two of the four combinations. The other two have 
contrasting scores. Still, there are contrasts between the two groups. For the failed 
combinations, a higher level of democracy is only present in two of six, indicating that similar 
or lower democratic levels can be associated with failure. This supports hypothesis H2 and 
can serve as a nod to the statements from the president of Nagorno-Karabakh who argued that 
those states recognising Kosovo would find it hard to explain why they do not recognise 
Nagorno-Karabakh (Caspersen 2012b, 2). The distribution of UN veto opposition is nearly 
identical for both the failed and the successful de facto-states, but the successes have faced 
this hinder most rarely. H3 therefore appears supported. What lies behind the decision to 
discourage the creation of new states by the veto powers is unclear141, but it appears that when 
                                                 
141
 See a discussion in Haugland (2008, 61-62) on intervening causes on the many reasons behind states’ 
decisions in these manners. 
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these decisions have been made it has the desired effect of denying statehood to the hopeful 
entity.   
 
Though D, veto support, was removed from the analysis of the successful combinations, it is 
apparent that having such support is far more common for those who succeed than for those 
who fail. This supports H4and indicates that while de facto-states might survive by 
themselves, they seem more likely to be unable to gain acceptance without a powerful friend.  
An absence of this is one of the most visible factors the failed de facto-states have in 
common, combined with a different level of economy. Seeing that half the successful 
combinations also lack this support, this is not enough to explain the outcomes by itself.  
 
As stated above, both categories show that having a different economical level from your 
parent is beneficial in order to gain both outcomes, as seen by analysing causal condition E. 
This can indicate a number of things. Firstly, it supports the choice of cs/QCA as the correct 
method to use for this type of analysis, since it appears that there are more factors working 
together for the different outcomes. Secondly, it opens for a further refinement of the 
operationalization. Though the theories that created the basis for H5 do not point in any clear 
direction, the best understanding of this might be different from the one analysed here. It 
appears that the existence of economic differences matters. However, a further analysis could 
prove interesting in later works.  H5 is unaffected by this analysis. 
 
Despite the heterogeneity of the analysed entities being clearly visible in the causal 
combinations, the descriptive analysis has shown that some indicators of what typically has 
led to success and failure can be found. The typical successful de facto-state does not have A, 
a distinct ethnic population, nor is it C, opposed by a UN veto power. It has B, a higher level 
of democracy than its parent, and is often D, supported by a UN veto holder. Its economic 
situation, E, is different from its parent. The causal combination would be aBcDE, which 
corresponds to that of South Sudan. If the previous discussion is considered and the 
conditions A and D are removed, it is found that Eritrea (aBcdE) also matches this category.  
 
The typical failed de facto-state has a distinct ethnic population, A, but a similar or lower 
level of democracy, B, than its parent. It is generally opposed by a UN veto power, C, and 
lacks veto support, D. It also has a different economic level, E, than its parent. The typical 
combination for failed entities is, apart from for the economic indicator, diametrically 
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contrasting with that for success. It reads AbCdE, which corresponds to both Biafra and 
Chechnya. 
5.3.2 - Step four - Including the time aspect 
Since the entities examined are very different from one another in both origins, outcome and 
development trajectories, examining them using more factors than only those that become 
clear in the first Truth table can be useful. It is clear that combinations of causal conditions 
matter for their developmental trajectories, but it is equally clear that there are more factors 
influencing the outcomes than what is found so far. When studying the descriptive tables in 
the first section of this investigation, as presented in the Theory and Data chapters, one pattern 
stands out from the rest. Table 6 below presents what appears to be a correlation between the 
wave of state creation the entity corresponds to and its outcome.  
 
Rihoux and Ragin (2009, 20-22) demonstrate the difficulties of including temporal aspects 
when using QCA. Here, the time aspect will not form part of the QCA-analysis as such, but 
will serve as part of a descriptive analysis complimenting the main investigation. A cross table 
is created, displaying the de facto-states by outcome and creation wave. For illustrative 
purposes, this table will also include the entities whose end has yet to be determined. A time 
dimension is a kind of condition which is bound to have other, underlying factors influencing 
the outcomes. For that reason, the discussion will include attempts at analysing developments 
in the political climate regarding state creation in each wave.  
Table 6- Cross table with time of creation and outcome of de facto-states 
 Recognised Undetermined Disappeared Total 
First wave 0 (-/-) 0 (-/-) 3 (30/100) N = 3 
Second Wave 0 (-/-) 5 (55/55) 4 (40/45) N = 9 
Third Wave 4 (100/36) 4 (45/36) 3 (30/27) N =11 
Total N = 4  N = 9  N = 10   
N = 23. Percentage of total for each outcome category in parentheses. Right side = share in outcome category, 
left side = share in wave category. 
 
The cross table shows the point of creation and end result for the de facto-states with clear 
outcomes. It serves as a clear indication that there is more behind state recognition than 
merely endogenous factors within each entity. The most obvious one regards those de facto-
states that have become UN members. Not a single one of these has come from the first or 
second state creation wave. Every entity from the first wave has disappeared. This very clear-
cut distribution corresponds with the expressed desire of the UN to not accept state creation 
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outside of the specified allowance for decolonisation. The entities with undetermined status 
are more or less evenly shared between the first and second wave. A less strict application of 
the discouragement of new state creation could lead to this outcome. Similarly, the 
disappeared de facto-states are distributed nearly equally between the three waves. This could 
indicate that failure is not reliant on timing.  
 
The second wave presents a less clear result. Out of nine entities created, five are without a 
conclusion per 2013, and four have disappeared. Of the five incomplete, three are supported 
by Russia and one by the European Union142. It thus appears that it is not necessarily so that 
these have managed to survive simply by their own abilities. Nagorno-Karabakh, the only one 
not receiving support by the EU and being the least connected with Russia of all entities 
supported by the latter, has a strong and close relationship with Armenia and can thus also be 
claimed to not necessarily manage by itself.  The status of the second wave- entities indicate a 
potential change in the international climate after the fall of the communist unions, where 
other states apparently felt able to support entities whose dreams of sovereignty were 
benefitting themselves.  
 
The third wave, including entities that are neither of the decolonisation or post-union group, is 
even less clear-cut in its outcomes. All the recognised entities are found here. Of the 
remaining seven, only three of the de facto-states have disappeared. Of those yet to be 
completed everyone but Northern Cyprus are without significant aid from other states143. 
They are thus believed to being able to support themselves to a higher degree than those of the 
same status from the second wave, and further analysis could prove interesting though this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
It is clear that there is a pattern discernible from the cross table. All the successful entities are 
neither from the decolonisation nor post-communist union waves. Rather, they are distinct 
entities who have managed to gain acceptance independently. The undetermined entities were 
created in the second and third wave, with no major distribution difference. The creation of 
the failures is evenly spread between the waves. The scope of action appears changed, and 
over time a broader range of outcomes has developed. Therefore, it seems that something has 
happened over time that has led to a change in the international reaction to these entities. 
                                                 
142
 See the Raw data table in Appendix 4. 
143
 For more on this, see the Raw Table in appendix 4. 
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What that is cannot be thoroughly examined here, but one potential reason does present itself: 
less perceived reason to fear a domino-effect.  
 
As is discussed in the theory chapter, the UN does not in general encourage the creation of 
new states except from when it is part of decolonisation or the dissolution of unions. Even 
then, the new states should maintain its original borders. One argument for this has been the 
desire to avoid a domino-effect. The fear is that secessionist ideas should spread and create 
aggressive separatism in many new areas. At the time of decolonisation and directly after the 
fall of the communist unions, this fear was arguably much more legit than per 2012. The 
sudden independence of many states, with many political entities holding several ethnic 
groups that potentially were or could become secessionist, provides good reason to wish to 
hold the reins and not allow more break ups than are absolutely necessary.  
 
This fear is less relevant now, seeing as there are no similar dissolutions taking place. 
Similarly, the end of the Cold War might have contributed to a diminishment of international 
tension so that it is now possible to alter borders and other international questions without 
considering its effects on the relationship between the sides in the conflict. It therefore seems 
understandable that de facto-states are received differently now than before. This is also 
apparent when examining those entities that were created more or less at the same time as the 
first and second waves, but are not part of them. An example of this can be Taiwan. The entity 
was created as a de facto-state more or less in parallel with the decolonisation wave, but it is 
not the same type of entity nor has it faced the same kinds of reactions from the international 
society as those forming part of the waves144. 
 
Summarising the discussion, it is clear that the timing of the creation of de facto-states 
matters. The three state creation waves discussed in the theory chapter displays three different 
distributions of outcomes. Though impossible to verify through this analysis, it can seem 
logical that de facto-states created with no or only a time relation to the two first waves are 
received and treated differently from the others as a result of a diminished fear of a domino-
effect. The timing element will have to be brought into the analysis of the undetermined cases 
along with the results of the discussions of the successful and failed entities. 
                                                 
144
 More information about Taiwan can be found here: Roberge and Lee (2009), Freedomhouse (2012m), Chiang 
(1999). 
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5.3.3 Step five- A closer look at particular patterns identified through analysis 
As has already been mentioned, there appears to be certain particularities with the entities 
supported by Russia. None of them have been recognised as UN member states, yet none of 
them have disappeared. No other patterns between specific veto power support and outcome 
is this clear. This section aims to take a closer look at what the reasons for this might be.  
 
The de facto-states supported by Russia are Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South-Ossetia and 
Transnistria.  Russia has also been involved as an opposing part in in Chechnya, which has 
later disappeared, and Kosovo, which still exists but is not a UN member. They have not been 
opposing any of the recognised entities145. As the USSR146, it opposed Biafra, and followed 
the UN recommendations of denying recognition to the now disappeared de facto-states 
Katanga and Rhodesia147. Lynch (2002, 843-846) states that Russian support has played a 
vital role in the survival of the Caucasus de facto-states. It appears that while negative 
Russian involvement can coincide with failure, positive involvement does not lead to 
recognition. That de facto-states opposed by a veto power are not recognised is not surprising. 
But it is interesting to note that none of the supported entities are recognised in the UN.  
 
The Cold War is distinguished by a tense relationship between USA and the Soviet Union. 
One potential reason for the lack of acceptance or Russia’s favourites could be that there is 
some spill-over effect still in place.  Babynina (2013) describes a conflict of interest between 
the EU and Russia regarding the Post-Soviet territory. Similarly Trenin (2006) describes the 
weakening ties between Russia and the West. Tsygankov (2003) provides a comprehensive 
systematisation of the different relations between Russia and its various neighbours, 
demonstrating an all generally tense status. When considering the de facto-states investigated, 
it is noticeable the two have never supported the same de facto-states. In fact, apart from 
Nagorno-Karabakh, entities supported by Russia are not supported by anyone else. If some 
level of distrust till exists between the USA and the West one the one hand and Russia on the 
other, this could help explain the constant limbo these particular entities are in. It could be 
possible to believe that the Western states do not wish that Russia should become more 
powerful than it is, and thus declines to accept Russian-supported new states for fear that it 
                                                 
145
 For more on which states support or oppose which entities, see the Raw tables in Appendices 3 and 4. 
146
 The membership of the Soviet Union in the United Nations was continued by the Russian Federation in 
1991(The United Nations 07.12.2012a). It is thus assumed to also continue the relations, though potentially 
modified, that the USSR had with the other members.  
147
 Sources for the involvement in each one can be seen in Appendix 3.  
80 
 
might increase Russian leverage on its neighbours. Similarly, one might expect the US-
supported entities to be opposed by Russia. This is not the case. The USA supports Taiwan, 
South Sudan and Iraqi-Kurdistan, none of which Russia was involved in. However, it does 
appear that realpolitical issues play a definite role in the handling of these entities.  
 
Another possible reason why the entities supported by Russia do not get recognised is the 
manner in which Russia relates to its neighbours. While the previous discussion demonstrates 
that the tension between Russia and the West has been noticeable ever since the fall of the 
Soviet Union, the Russian--Georgian war148 in 2008 has not calmed the situation.  This is 
particularly interesting, considering Georgia’s status as an aspiring NATO-member (NATO 
2013). Markedonov (2007) argues that the relations with Georgia were tense even before the 
war. Mikhelidze (2009) describes how this event has demonstrated not only that the conflicts 
in the Caucasus are far from frozen, but that the West could not act when Russia asserted its 
dominance in the post-Soviet sphere. The tensions in the neighbouring areas is reported to 
have increased (Mikhelidze 2009, 30-32). This could have an effect on Transnistria and 
Nagorno-Karabakh as well, despite them not being directly involved in this particular 
situation. Pashayeva (2009, 68-69) claims that the Russia-Georgia conflict has led to a 
favourable situation for the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh question. But, this does not 
necessarily entail recognition - any solution argued to be better than a continuation of the 
present situation.  
 
Summarising the discussion, two things are clear. The first is that realpolitical situations 
appear to influence the reception and treatment of the de facto-states. The second is that it 
does indeed appear that there is something particular with Russia. The entities they support do 
not become recognised nor do they disappear. While no clear reason for this has been 
identified here, two potential contributing factors are shown. The first is a possible spill-over 
from the Cold War, where Russia and the Westerns states compete for influence in the 
Caucasus region. The specificities of this situation are impossible to discern here, and the 
reasons behind each action is unclear. The second relates to the Russian-Georgian war of 
2008, and the consequences of it. An intensification of the conflict has not generated support 
for the state status claims of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia. There is no apparent reason to 
believe the outcome to be different for Transnistria. It has, however, seemingly led to an 
increase in the diplomatic work of finding a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh situation.   
                                                 
148
 For more about the war, see Mikhelidze (2009), Economist (2008), BBC (2009) and Nichol (2008). 
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5.4 Third analysis: Using analyses one and two to evaluate the undetermined 
entities 
 In this section, the results identified through cs/QCA and descriptive analyses will be 
discussed and compared. 
5.4.1 Step six - Analyses one and two applied to the entities with undetermined outcomes 
An attempt at analysing the positions of the entities with undetermined outcomes will be 
performed based on the analyses of the successful and failed de facto-states. The time aspect 
discussed above will be used as a complimentary factor in the analyses. The purpose is to use 
the information gathered in the examinations of which causal combinations lead to which 
outcomes and attempting to discover which of the still incomplete entities that matches. If 
they match the developmental trajectories identified as leading to success or failure, it could 
be logically expected that they will experience the same outcome.  
 
The same truth table used in the main analysis will be used in this section. The combinations 
will be sorted into the categories “strong” for those matching the successes, and “weak” for 
those matching the failures. Those entities with causal combinations not matching the reduced 
formula from the main analysis will be evaluated with the knowledge from the expanded 
discussion of the typical success and failure. 
Table 7- Truth table with the original causal conditions for the entities with 
undetermined outcomes 
De facto-
state 
A B C t D E Form
ula 
Abkhazia 1 0 0 1 0 AbcD
e 
Kosovo 1 0 1 1 1 AbC
DE 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
1 1 0 1 0 ABc
De 
North-
Cyprus 
1 0 0 0 1 Abcd
E 
Puntland,  
Somaliland 
0 1 0 0 1 aBcd
E 
Taiwan  0 1 1 1 0 aBC
De 
Transnistri
a 
0 0 0 1 1 abcD
E 
South-
Ossetia 
1 0 0 1 1 AbcD
E 
N = 8. Sources: see Appendix 3.  
 
The de facto-states with no clear outcome match their finished brethren by virtue of being 
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very heterogeneous. Only one of the causal combinations displays more than one matching 
entity, namely Somaliland and Puntland. This part of the analysis is descriptive. It does not 
have as its purpose finding a typical causal combination, so a reduction of the terms into a 
minimal formula is not necessary.  Likewise, no consideration of relevant and irrelevant 
causal conditions or thresholds need be considered. Still, a brief discussion of commonalities 
can be fruitful for the evaluation of their standing further down the line.  
An overview of the de facto-states with undetermined outcomes 
Most of the causal combinations display entities with a distinct ethnic foundation, A. 
Comparing them with those with final outcomes, it is clear that most of the ethnically 
heterogeneous entities are found here.  
 
Causal condition B, democratic level, shows that only slightly more than a third of the 
combinations display a higher level of democracy than the parent state. This is much lower 
than the corresponding frequency amongst successful combinations, but holds an identical 
level as the failures. 
 
 C, veto opposition, is present in only two combinations and not by the same power. China is 
against Taiwan, and Russia is negative to Kosovo’s independence149.  
 
Causal condition D, veto support, is particularly fascinating. Nearly all combinations include 
this, with only two missing. Compared with the successful and failed combinations, this is 
very much. Only one of the failures - Iraqi-Kurdistan - has had veto support. Even amongst 
the successful entities the level does not reach more than half, and the causal condition has 
been excluded due to irrelevance for the outcome. The Raw table in Appendix 3 demonstrates 
that this is due to Russia supporting nearly every post-USSR-entity. This particular kind of de 
facto-state is overrepresented in the category without clear outcomes. Apart from these 
entities, only Taiwan and Kosovo receives veto support, from USA, and the NATO- and EU-
member states, respectively. Whether this is due to a large number of post-USSR de facto-
states, or a disability of resolving this particular type of entity is unclear.  
 
The economic factor, E, is more evenly distributed and has a near fifty-fifty-spread. 
Comparing with the resolved secessionist conflicts, it is notable that the majority of the 
                                                 
149
 The details can be seen in Appendix 3. 
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combinations including entities with a similar economic level as its parent are found here. In 
fact, only one other example can be found: the failed combination including the two Serb 
republics and Rhodesia.  
 
Table 6 on page 76 demonstrate that all of the entities are from either the second or third state 
creation wave, with five from the former and four from the latter. None of the combinations 
include entities from both waves. 
Identifying de facto-states in weak positions. 
The logical formula identified through Boolean minimisation for failure is demonstrated 
above to be E(abcd+bCd+ABc) + bce(Ad+aD). None of the undetermined combinations 
display any of these trajectories. Seeing that the failed entities have shown themselves even 
more heterogeneous than the successes, it is not surprising to experience this kind of situation. 
The same is the result for normal formula AbCdE, which was found after analysing the 
distribution of causal conditions in general rather than case by case. This formula does not 
correspond to any of the combinations.  
 
None of the entities who have been recognised have been post-USSR-entities, and only two of 
the failed ones have been. This indicates that there is something about them that makes their 
situations difficult to resolve. What that is, is unfeasible to identify here150, but it appears that 
it matters for the outcome which UN veto power that gets involved in the de facto-states.. 
 
The fact that all accepted UN members stem from the third wave makes it tempting to assume 
that those belonging to the same group are in a stronger position than the others. Whereas that 
might be true, such an assumption is not supported by any other trends, and should not be too 
heavily relied on in this case. As has been discussed in the theory chapter, the UN is generally 
not in favour of creating new states. Hence, it is highly unlikely for any entity to become a 
member. One must therefore assume that all de facto-states are in a weak position until proven 
otherwise. 
Identifying de facto-states in strong positions. 
As discussed above, the formula for successful de facto-states is found through Boolean 
minimisation to be O = E(BC+bc+Bc). This reads as a combination of E, different economic 
level, and one of the three following combinations: either the presence or absence of BC, 
                                                 
150
 To learn more on the second wave de facto-states, a good starting point is the works by Caspersen (2007, 
2008a, 2011, 2003a, 2008b, 2010a, b, 2012a, 2008c, 2003b, 2012b) and Kolstø (2012, 2006). 
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higher level of democracy than the parent and veto opposition, or the combination higher 
level of economy and no veto opposition. In addition, the typical success was identified after a 
discussion on the distribution of causal conditions.  The normal successful de facto-state has 
the combination aBcDE¸ which does not have any matching entities in this category. The 
formula becomes BcE after allowing for the removal of the logically irrelevant conditions A 
and D, but it is assumed that any evaluations of entities only matching the smaller formula 
will be more difficult to make with certainty. In this case, the typical formula is the same as 
one of the three logical ones. 
 
While it could be possible to include partially matching combinations into this evaluation, this 
is not done. What is theoretically interesting is first and foremost the effects of combinations 
of causal conditions. In addition, it is clear from the Truth table above that the empirical 
evidence supports this logic. Partial combinations are found in entities with different 
outcomes, and it is therefore not logical to assume that a mere addition of conditions will lead 
only one direction here either. 
 
When applying the minimised formula, the following combinations and entities are identified. 
The combination BCE is not present, but three entities have the causal combination bcE. 
These are South-Ossetia (AbcDE), Transnistria (abcDE) and North-Cyprus (AbcdE). The 
causal conditions A and D are evenly distributed amongst the three, thus matching the 
trajectory forming the logic behind the removal of these as irrelevant for success as the final 
outcome. These three match those entities that have been recognised, and it could be logical to 
therefore assume that they are in a strong position to be recognised themselves. Whether this 
theoretical evaluation is mirrored empirically is another matter. The three conflicts have lasted 
for decades, and no articles or comments on a thawing between them and their parents have 
been found. Similarly, no other states have shown an interest in increased cooperation or 
recognition. North-Cyprus is potentially different in this aspect, but apparently not to a large 
degree151. Again, the entities are dissimilar to each other and general trends are hard to find.  
 
When applying the last logical formula - which is also the normal formula - it is found that the 
combination BcE is only present once, and is matching the two entities Puntland and 
Somaliland (aBcdE). Because of the removal of two of the causal conditions due to 
                                                 
151
 See for instanceGosh and Aker (2006), Altinay (2000),  and Bahcheli (2004) for a discussion on North 
Cyprus’ international contact. 
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irrelevance, this could seem as a weaker find. However, them being identified as strong by 
both the cs/QCA and the descriptive normal analysis, is seen as confirming that their position 
is indeed well supported. In contrast with the three former entities, these two enjoy a certain 
level of involvement and support from other states152. That is not to say that the contact is 
done with the hopes of the two gaining independence, but it can be seen as participating in the 
normalisation of their existence.  
 
As mentioned above, South-Ossetia and Transnistria were created through the dissolution of 
the communist unions and thus belong in the second state creation wave. North-Cyprus, 
Somaliland and Puntland all stem from the third wave. When considering how every 
successful entity has been part of the third wave, it appears more probable that the latter three 
holds a strong position and are likely to be recognised than the first two. Why is it that some 
entities have been recognised while others have not, even when they share the same 
developmental trajectory? This contradiction is a clear hint to an omission of important 
factors.  
Step seven - Adding extra causal conditions 
This section will provide a further discussion of the five de facto-states that match the 
combination identified as fitting those with success. Since some of the unresolved cases share 
this trajectory without receiving recognition, it could appear that some important factors have 
been omitted.  In order to identify what causes recognition in some entities but not others, the 
five entities will be more closely examined and compared with the four successful entities. A 
Raw table consisting of the successful entities and the five identified as in a strong position 
will be presented, in hope of finding a cause for the different outcomes. This part of the 
investigation will not develop a minimal formula, but rather seek to identify differences and 
similarities of distributions by descriptive analysis.  
 
The second truth table, Error! Reference source not found. below, for the additional causal 
conditions includes both the causal conditions from the main analysis and factors that are 
identified in the literature by others but that has not been included until now153. This is done 
in the hope of finding results that can help shed light on why some entities with the same 
causal combination as the successes has not been recognised and further elaborate on them. In 
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 For more on Somaliland and Puntland’s international contact, see for instanceArieff (2008), Mesfin (2009), 
UNHCR (1999),  and Huliaras (2010). 
153
 A complete oversight of these factors for all of the 23 de facto-states can be found Appendix 4. 
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total, thirteen factors are considered. They are: 
- Support (F) and opposition (G) by any recognised state, not only UN veto powers. 
This is done because other states than only veto states can hold important sway over 
the international climate. As such, the two are expansions of the logic underlying 
hypotheses H3 and H4. By this is meant active involvement, such as for instance 
military intervention, economic aid, having diplomatic relations, et cetera.  
- The original economic causal condition (E) has been split in two, showing those 
entities with a higher (H) and lower (I) economic level than their parent.  
- Gross human rights violations (J) has been included, based on the arguments 
presented in Islam (1985) and Haugland (2008) and discussed previously in this 
chapter. The violence must be done by the parent state to the secessionist entity, but it 
may also be returned. Non-state-abuse by civilian groups is not included, though the 
state can be seen as a part in this by not stopping it.  
- Federal status (K) has been found to be important for recognition of new states by 
Haugland (2008) and is thus included here. Other types of polities are ignored. 
- Islam (1985) argues that one of the factors important for the recognition of Bangladesh 
is its geographical separateness from its parent (L). The lack of difficulty in drawing 
the new border is seen as important. This means that there is something separating the 
entity from its parent, be it another state, a large river, or similar. That the de facto-
state is placed by the parent’s border is not sufficient. 
- Lastly, whether or not the entity is part of the third wave (M) is included. This is based 
on the arguments above.  
 
Causal conditions displaying the same values for both the successful and the undetermined 
conditions are removed from the table. The following are excluded: C, UN veto power 
opposition, has the value 0 for all combinations but the one describing Bangladesh. Different 
economic level, E, shows the value 1 for every combination. Every entity but Somaliland has 
support by at least one state (F). Only Eritrea has been a federal unit (K). Only Bangladesh 
and - arguably - Transnistria154 are geographically separate from their parents (L), and they 
diverge in outcome. After removing these, eight causal conditions are left, namely A, B, D, G, 
H, I, J and M. 
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 Transnistria is on the other side of the river Dniester from the rest of Moldova. This is far from the same 
degree of geographical separateness as was between East- and West-Pakistan. 
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Table 8- Adding extra causal conditions 
De facto-state F G H I J K L M O 
Successes 
Bangladesh 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
East-Timor 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Eritrea 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
South Sudan 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Selected, undetermined entities 
North-Cyprus 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Puntland   1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Somaliland 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
South-Ossetia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Transnistria 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
N= 9. Sources in Appendix 4.  
 
None of the entities have the same causal combination, which is to be expected when 
including such a high amount of causal conditions in relation to entities as is done here.  No 
clear pattern is found for A, ethnic composition. There is a nearly equal spread for both the 
successes and undetermined entities. What is worth noting, however, is the perfect fit for the 
undetermined entities between A, H and I. There is no apparent connection between these 
three and the outcomes, but it is a hint that there is a link between ethnicity and economy that 
could prove interesting to analyse further. In addition, no entity with the score 1 for condition 
A has a higher level of democracy than its parent (B).  
 
Condition B, level of democracy, shows a higher level in all recognised entities but East-
Timor. For the yet undecided, the pattern is nearly the opposite. Only Somaliland and 
Puntland shows a higher level of democracy than their parent. Considering that Somalia itself 
shows only weak governmental control of its territory155, this is not surprising. Seeing that 
having a higher level of democracy appears to be beneficial in the discussion above, this 
could show beneficial for the two.  
 
Veto support, D, has earlier been removed for irrelevance for successful outcomes, but a 
pattern is clear for the yet undecided. Only the post-USSR-entities have veto support, both by 
Russia. As is discussed above, nearly all the entities without a conclusion are supported by 
Russia, yet none of the now recognised states are. It could turn out that there is something 
special with these entities preventing their recognition, but exactly what is unclear.  
 
The distribution of opposition (G) is nearly identical between the recognised and unfinished 
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 For more on the government in Somalia, see for instance Failed States Index (2012), Amnesty International 
(2012a), Gikes (1999), Freedomhouse (2012h, 1999f) and CIA World Factbook (04.04.2013). 
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entities, and this condition does not correspond with others.  By reviewing conditions H and I, 
it is noticeable that no entity is at a similar economic level as its parent despite the Raw table 
demonstrating that nearly one third of the included entities are in this situation. This could 
implicate a connection between a difference in resources and the likelihood of gaining 
recognition and would be worthwhile analysing further. The perfect correspondence between 
ethnicity (A) and having less resources than the parent (I) is interesting, but does not appear to 
have any connection with the patterns for the successful entities.  
 
Gross human rights violations (J), is present in all the recognised states and in the majority of 
the undecided included here.  Two of them, namely South-Ossetia and Transnistria, are the 
only ones scoring 0. That every single recognised entity scores 1 makes it appear that this 
could be important. This is in line with the arguments by Islam (1985) and Haugland (2008), 
and would indicate that South Ossetia and Transnistria are in a weaker position than the 
others. The idea that these two are less likely to be recognised is further strengthened when 
realising that they are the only ones of both the recognised and undecided entities that are not 
part of the third wave (M). 
 
Summing up, there are no obvious differences between those entities that have been 
recognised and the five entities that match their developmental trajectories. This indicates that 
whatever is influencing the development of the entities, giving some recognition and others 
not, the omitted factors have not been identified here. Still, some weak connections have been 
identified. The level of democracy in comparison with the parent is markedly higher for the 
recognised entities, placing Puntland and Somaliland in a strong position. No recognised 
entity has been supported by Russia, like South Ossetia and Transnistria are. This in itself is 
interesting. Considering that these two are the only ones without gross human rights 
violations and the only ones formed outside of the third wave, a trend is spotted. It appears 
that Puntland and Somaliland have the strongest positions, and south Ossetia and Transnistria 
the weakest of the strong. North Cyprus displays no particular reason for it to be considered 
either one of the two.   
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6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this analysis has been to seek patterns in which de facto-states who gain 
recognition through UN membership and which do not. These entities constitute a rare 
juridical and political anomaly as they are states in all but recognition. This is particularly 
fascinating when considering that some UN members are not states in anything but precisely 
name. The conclusion provides a summary and evaluation of the analyses. Caveats to the 
results are explained, together with suggestions to further research. 
 
The research question was «Why are some secessionist entities successful in becoming 
recognised as states though United Nations membership status while others fail? » . As no 
corresponding analysis of all the de facto-states that have existed during this period of time 
has been made, this is an explorative study156.  
 
The included entities are all that fit the list of criteria as specified in the data chapter, from the 
creation of the UN until and including 2012. In total, twenty-three entities were analysed 
through crisp set QCA and descriptive analyses.   
 
The causal conditions were: 
Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation; B: Level of democratic institutions as 
compared with the parent state; C: UN veto power opposition; D: UN veto power support and 
E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state. 
 
The hypotheses have been as follows: 
H1: Having an ethnic base increases the chances of international recognition 
H2: Having a higher level of democratic institutions than the parent state increases the  
H3: Opposition from a UN veto power decreases the chances of recognition 
H4: Support from a UN veto power increases the chances of recognition 
H5: A different economic level than the parent state increases the chances of recognition 
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 A closer description of explorative studies can be found in Yin (2008).  
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6. 1- Evaluating the analyses  
Two analyses of the entities with clear outcomes as either success or failure have been 
performed. Then, the results of these analyses have been compared and applied to the yet 
uncompleted de facto-states. The purpose has been twofold. First, developmental trajectories 
leading to the different outcomes have been sought. Second, the knowledge from the first 
analyses has been applied to the remaining entities in order to evaluate them and attempt 
discovering if anyone can be considered as theoretically more likely to become recognised or 
disappear than the rest. Despite the high level of diversity in both origin, history, reception et 
cetera for the included de facto-states, it has proven possible to identify patterns. 
First analysis: cs/QCA 
The formula for successful entities is O = E(BC+bc+Bc) and for failures it is o = 
E(abcd+bCd+ABc)+bce(Ad+aD). This model has been further detailed by a descriptive 
analysis of the typical causal distribution for the two categories. The result of this shows that 
aBcDE or BcE is the most typical distribution of the causal conditions for successful entities. 
BcE also matches one of the logical formulas identified, providing this with added empirical 
strength. AbCdE described the typical failure and does not correspond with any of the logical 
formulas.  
 
Using cs/QCA, the hypotheses are seen to be influenced in the following manner: The 
successful entities demonstrate support for hypothesis H5, while H1 and H4 are weakened. 
H2 and H3 are unaffected. Successful entities display the combination of having a different 
level of economy than their parents, combined with a higher level of democracy and lack of 
UN veto opposition. The failed entities do not provide a corresponding pattern, demonstrating 
that these entities are more than merely the direct opposites of their successful counterparts. In 
these situations, H4 is strengthened while H5 is weakened. For H 1-3, no influence is found. 
Failed entities display the combination of having a different level of economy than their 
parents and lacking UN veto support.  
Second analysis: Description 
There were three joints in the descriptive link: analysing the distribution of the values, and 
investigating the effects of waves and Russian support.  
 
In the distributional analysis, the following was discovered. Support for hypotheses H2-4 is 
shown, while H1 and H5 are unaffected. Thus this and the cs/QCA-results do not provide 
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similar results for any of the five hypotheses. Here, the typical success is mirrored in South 
Sudan (aBcDE ) and displays the combination of having B, a higher level of democracy than 
the parent, D, UN veto support and E, a different level of economy while lacking A, a distinct 
ethnic foundation and C, UN veto opposition. If allowing for the removal of conditions A and 
D, the resulting formula reflects that of Eritrea (BcE). The typical failure reads AbCdE, 
represented by Biafra and Chechnya. They have A, a distinct ethnic foundation, , UN veto 
opposition and E, a different level of economy while lacking B, a higher level of democracy 
and D, UN veto support. 
 
Including the analysis of waves demonstrates that none of the entities created as parts of the 
decolonisation or post-union waves are recognised. All de facto-states becoming UN member 
states have other backgrounds, and thus belong to the third wave. Though these entities have 
been present from the earliest part of the analysed time period, their recognition frequency 
appears to be accelerating as the distance to the two main state creation periods is increasing. 
It seems clear that something is changing as regarding state recognition, but this analysis 
cannot identify what it is.  A factor that seems likely is that the fear of a domino-effect 
weakens when there is little realistic need to fear a landslide of new secessions - as was 
arguably the situation at the time of decolonisation and the fall of the communist unions.  
 
It has been found that there is something special with the entities supported by Russia. None 
of them have become recognised or disappeared. Thus, Russian support seems to stop the 
entities from failing, but it cannot bring them further than a situation of limbo. It has not been 
possible to assess why this is the case, but two suggestions have been made. The first is that 
there is some kind of spill-over effect from the Cold War making Russia and the Western 
states competing for influence in the afflicted regions. Second, that the Russian-Georgian war 
in 2008 has contributed to a disinterest in recognising the Russian-favoured entities - 
particularly amongst the NATO member states.  
Third analysis: assessing the entities still in limbo 
Utilising the formulas to evaluate the entities with no clear outcome as of 2012, the following 
was found. None of the failed de facto-states had matching causal combinations with any of 
the undetermined. This was the case for both the formula identifies through cs/QCA and the 
one found by descriptive analysis. For the successful entities, the picture was slightly 
different. The logical formula bcE identified three entities with no clear outcome. These are 
South-Ossetia (AbcDE), Transnistria (abcDE) and North-Cyprus (AbcdE). The formula 
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BcE, which is identified in both the cs/QCA and the descriptive analysis, identifies two 
entities: Puntland and Somaliland (aBcdE). The position of the latter two as likely candidates 
for recognition seems strengthened by the fact that they are both from the third wave and that 
Russia is not involved in them.  
 
A large number of potentially important yet omitted causal conditions were considered 
through descriptive analysis. The hope was to identify whether any single or combination of 
them could explain why the de facto-states in limbo with matching causal combinations as the 
now UN member states were not recognised. A total of thirteen causal conditions were used to 
find the difference between the recognised and undetermined entities. None were found, 
neither for one single nor combinations of factors. Despite no clear solution, some trends were 
identified, further adding to the analyses of the selected entities. The analyses collectively 
demonstrate that Puntland and Somaliland stand out as those de facto-states with the strongest 
likelihood for future success.   
Summarising the analyses 
Summarising, the following can be stated. The included de facto-states have consistently 
demonstrated their heterogeneous nature and consistent patterns have thus been hard to come 
by. The cs/QCA-analysis has been improved by adding descriptive analyses, as it has been 
demonstrated that the results of the two sets of analyses do not show as thorough or consistent 
results by themselves as they do collectively.  
 
There are two clear findings. The first is that which wave the entity belongs to is more 
important than the presence or absence of any of the causal conditions or combinations 
thereof that are identified. Why this is so has not been possible to point out, other than by 
hinting at a decrease in the fear of domino-effects. Using the analysis of the entities with 
determined outcomes to evaluate those still unclear has demonstrated Somaliland and 
Puntland to be the strongest candidates for success. Of these two, Somaliland is the only one 
having declared independence, as is thus assumed to have come further in the process than 
Puntland. 
 
The second is that it appears that which UN veto power that supports or opposes the de facto-
state can matter. As is shown, entities supported by Russia neither fail nor succeed. This is a 
clear indication that it is not necessarily whether the entity meets involvement, but by whom 
that matters. 
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6.2- Caveats to the results  
Haugland (2008, 69-71) discusses two main caveats that are also important for this analysis. 
The first is that of 1) limited generalizability. The limited number of entities and empirical 
variation included means that the results are only applicable to the analyses entities. 
Generalizability can thus not be assumed, and it is by no means certain that these results can 
be used to for instance predict the outcome of the newest bud on the secession tree: Azawad. 
Still, this is the most extensive study performed, and it has shown interesting results that 
might be usable for further analysis.  
 
Haugland further points out that Boolean analysis is vulnerable due to the potentially large 
output-effects of small variations on the input-side. This is a point recognised from the debate 
on the potential data loss and misinterpretation resulting from data loss when utilising 
dichotomous data. This particular problem is countered in the re-coding by externals of three 
random entities157. Clearly, this is no guarantee that all the data is correctly coded. But the 
perfect correspondence between these codes and the researcher’s imply a general 
trustworthiness in the evaluations behind the different codes. 
 
The second caveat is that of 2) context. The results can only be seen as valid for the included 
entities and causal conditions.  Changing them in any manner, whether to add, remove or 
replace them could lead to changes in the results.  
 
Additionally, a third caveat ought to be addressed. The causal conditions included might 
themselves be dependent on other, background factors that are not identified. The decisions of 
UN veto powers to get actively involved in any way in the struggle for recognition by a de 
facto-state is assumed to hinge on factors not detected here. Similarly, having a higher level of 
democracy than the parent is by needs dependent on a plethora of causes, none of which are 
clarified here. For example, the question regarding what promotes high levels of democracy is 
still unclear. The strongest finding is that which wave the entity belongs to correlates with its 
outcome. This is obviously dependent on factors unidentified in this analysis.  
  
                                                 
157
 The recoded entities are Anjouan, Gagauzia and Somaliland. 
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6.3- Implications for further research 
This analysis provides both theoretical and methodological implications for further 
development.  
 
Theoretically, as the third caveat above implies, there is much potential for further analysis.  
Three things seem particularly relevant to mention. First comes the matter of money and 
resources. This has proved to be largely present for both the successes and failures. It thus 
appears that conflicts where economy is an important factor tend to be resolved. Most of the 
situations where resources did not play an important role are still undetermined. It is thus 
interesting to elaborate on what kinds of specific resources and resource levels that matter.  
 
Second is the aspect of timing. Though it is clear that all the recognised entities come from 
the third wave, it is not so obvious why this is so. It could be imagined that the end of the 
Cold war might have made it less complicated to alter existing borders. Similarly, that the UN 
does not now face the same legitimate fear of a domino effect could potentially contribute to 
the entities being considered in a different light from before. However, more precise 
investigation is clearly desirable. 
 
Third is the matter of which recognised state involves itself in the de facto-state. The analysis 
demonstrates that here is indeed an aspect of realpolitik that needs to be considered to 
understand which entities become recognised. All the entities Russia support remains in 
limbo, but why is unclear. The two undetermined entities found to be the most likely to be 
recognised (Somaliland and Puntland) are situations in which no UN veto power has been 
involved. It might seem counter-intuitive that Kosovo is not even on the list of those that 
could be expected to be recognised. Particularly when considering the agreement between the 
two on April 19th 2013(The Economist 2013, Smolar 2013, BBC 2013h, UN News Centre 
2013). This can serve as a good illustration that who are involved might have as much if not 
more of an effect than why and where. Clearly, it could prove interesting to analyse the de 
facto-states by which external actors that are involved. Kosovo and Serbia are encouraged to 
find a solution to their conflict via the possibility of European Union membership, but nothing 
of the sort exists for Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia. It could be interesting to perform an 
analysis of which metaphorical carrots the entities and their parent could gain by solving their 
dispute, and whether they resolve it or not. 
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Methodologically, much can be done. QCA has proven itself a suitable method for this 
analysis, but it is not the only alternative. The benefits gained by the large level of descriptive 
analysis imply that this is a strategy that holds much potential.  Closer analyses of groups of 
entities seem like a fruitful way forward. A suggestion could be to analyse entities by 
geography, year of creation or length of existence. Analysing the entities in light of one or a 
select few of the causal conditions could shed light on the contributing factors behind their 
presence or absence. A closer look on the details of specific causal conditions could bring 
much to this field of analysis. Similarly, a larger study using more detailed data through 
fs/QCA or mv/QCA could identify a more nuanced picture of the effects of the different 
conditions. 
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Appendix 1: Permissions from Pål Kolstø and Scott Pegg to quote 
their works 
Figure 1- Permission from Pål Kolstø 
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Figure 2- Permission from Scott Pegg 
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Appendix 2: Small tables 
 
Table 9- Entities considered but dismissed 
Aceh (stopped at limited autonomy)  (Hillman 2012)  
Adjaria (lacks government) (Ciobanu 2008, 128-131), 
Afghanistan under Taliban (a matter of leadership succession, not a new political entity) (Bajoria 2011, 
Owtram 2011, 120)  
Azawad (does not yet meet the time criterion) (Acherif 2012) 
Bougainville (too ephemeral) (Regan 2008, Ghai and Regan 2006, Cornish 2010, Laracy 1991, Islam 1991)   
Catalonia (stopped at limited autonomy) (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006, 1979) 
China (the People’s Republic) (a matter of leadership succession, not a new political entity) (The United 
Nations General Assembly 1971, Encyclopædia Britannica 2013e) 
Galicia (stopped at limited autonomy) (Xunta de Galicia 1981)  
Gorno-Badakhshan  (lack of territorial control)  (Davlatshoev 2006) 
Herzeg-Bosna and Western Bosnia (lack of territorial control and too ephemeral) (ICTY 05.05.2013)   
Manchukuo (too early and a puppet-state) (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013j, Duara 2004) 
Moheli (too ephemeral) (Cornwell 2010), 
Mongolia (if concidering PR China a matter of succession, Mongolia is eliminated as it was recognised by its 
potential parent PR China without delay in 1945 though not joining the UN until 1961) (The United Nations 
Security Council 1961b, BBC 2013e, Factbook 02.06.2013) 
Montenegro (peaceful separation rather than conflicted secession) (Caspersen 2003a), 
North Korea (too dependent on USSR) (Global Security 2011a) 
Palestine (lack of territorial control)  (Black and Tran 2007), 
Scotland (has not broken loose from the United Kingdom) (Carrell 2013) 
South African Bantustans (not by own initiative) (Encyclopædia Britannica 2013d)  
Switzerland (its statehood was not contested, it did not secede from anyone and it was by its own choice it did 
not join the UN until 2002) (The Swiss Confederation Federal Department of Foreign Affairs 2012, Swiss Info 
2007, The United Nations General Assembly 2002a, b) 
The Basque Republic (lack of territorial control in Spain and France) (section 169 Gobierno de España 1978)  
Tibet (lack of territorial control) (Kolstø 2006, 726), 
West Papua (lack of territorial control) (Scott and Tebay 2006)  
Western Sahara  (lack of territorial control) (Kolstø 2006, 726) 
Note: This is not a complete list of all potential entities, but those that were considered and rejected for this 
particular thesis. 
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Table 10- List of entities with sources and reasons for time 
Recognised Undecided Disappeared 
Bangladesh (1971-1974) 
East-Timor158) (1999-2002) 
Eritrea (1991-1993)159 
South Sudan160 (2005 - 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abkhazia (1992 -)161 
Kosovo (1990-) 
Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-) 
North-Cyprus (1983 - )162 
Puntland  (1998 -)163  
Somaliland  (1991-) 
South-Ossetia (1992-)164 
Taiwan (1949 - )165 
Transnistria (1990-) 
Anjouan  (1997-2008) 
Biafra (1967-1970) 
Chechnya (1991-1994, 1996-1999) 
Gagauzia (1991 - 1994) 
Iraqi-Kurdistan (1991-1994)166 
Katanga (1960-1963) 
Republika Srpska (1992-1995) 
Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995) 
Rhodesia (1970-1989)167 
Tamil Eelam (1986-2009)168 
 
N = 4 N = 9 N = 10 
N = 23.Years as de facto-state in parentheses. Source for year (Anderson 2011, 185) unless otherwise stated. All 
dates are subject to discussion, as seen for instance by the alternative starting points presented in   (Bakke, 
                                                 
158 East Timor first declared independence from Portugal on November 28th 1975, but lost its self-determination 
and territorial control after it was invaded by Indonesia in Operation Komodo shortly afterwards (CJA 
16.04.2013). For this reason, I consider the beginning of East Timor’s existence as a non-recognized state to be 
its independence referendum (WIPO 2002). The end of East Timor’s de facto-state status is its accession date the 
27.09.2002 as a member of the UN (The United Nations 07.12.2012a, The United Nations Security Council 
2002).  
159 See (Caspersen 2012b, 9). Eritrea became a UN member state in 1993 (United Nations Security Council 
1993). 
160 It can be difficult to discern when South Sudan functioned as a de facto-state as it never unanimously 
declared independence until it was recognised in 2011. (Freedomhouse 2012k) Freedomhouse (2012k)and 
Global Security (07.04.2013) points out its high degree of autonomy in the hiatus (1972-’83) between its two 
civil wars. Additionally, the political centre in Khartoum cannot be said to have held control over the South for 
much of the existence of Sudan, due to the frequent outbreaks of war and rebel fighting. Dean (2007) describes 
the SPLA as the de facto-government of South Sudan even before 2005. However, to maintain strictness in the 
data selection, I have chosen to treat South Sudan as a de facto-state during its period of autonomous rule 
between the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA 2005) and the admittance as a UN member state in 2011 
(The United Nations General Assembly 2011, The United Nations Security Council 2011) . 
161 Anderson (2011, 185) states 1990 as the starting year, while Freedomhouse (1998a) uses 1992. I have 
chosen the more conservative view. 
162 The Turkish Federate State of Cyprus was declared February 13th 1975, and the Turkish Republic of North 
Cyprus on November 15th, 1983 (Cyprus History 15.04.2013, TRNC 1983). 
163 It is difficult to establish when Puntland slipped away from Mogadishu’s control, but I have chosen to use 
1998 as a starting point because it appears accepted in the literature and is the year mentioned in their 
constitution (BBC 2012b, Mesfin 2009, The House of Representatives 2001). 
164 Anderson (2011, 185) claims their starting year is 1990, but I argue that they got full territorial control with 
the June 24, 1992, Sochi Agreement (Global Security 2011b, The United Nations Peacemaker 1992). Regardless 
of which of these start dates are used, the entity falls within the two-year criterion for inclusion.  
165 Since the creation of People’s Republic of China (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013a, Encyclopædia 
Britannica 2013e). 
166 Though Anderson (2011, 185) claims that Iraqi-Kurdistan still was a de facto-state in 2011, I argue that 
Iraqi-Kurdistan as a de facto state ended in 1994 due to a loss of territorial control after the commencement of 
the civil war between PUK and KDP (Lortz 2005, 63-64, Minorities at Risk (MAR) 01.04.2013, Gunter 1996).  
§141 in the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq (2005) states Kurdistan as an autonomous region, signifying - 
for now - the end of the road for the fight for recognition of the entity (Minorities at Risk (MAR) 01.04.2013).  
167 Though the Rhodesian UDI was proclaimed in 1965, it was in 1970 they declared themselves an 
independent state. In 1979, they again became a British territory, until the independence of Zimbabwe in 1980 
(BBC 1970, The United Nations General Assembly 1968, Harris 1969, Hergum 22.04.2013). 
168 See Pegg (1998, 77).Anderson (2011, 185) claims the de facto-state came into existence in 1975, but I use 
Pegg’s starting point as this is when they announced their ruling of the Jaffna Peninsula and had an effective 
administration in place. These dates are clearly debatable, as is for how long the entity maintained territorial 
control. However, whether the de facto-state lasted until 1995, as can be read from Pegg (1998, 77-78) or to 
2009 as Anderson (2011, 182) claims, it still fulfils the two-year criterion for inclusion.  
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O’Loughlin, and Ward 2011, 5). 
Table 11- Raw data table without sources for causal conditions A-E 
De facto-
state 
A 
Ethnicity 
B 
Democracy 
C 
Veto  
opposition 
D 
Veto 
support 
 
E 
Economy 
O 
Outcome 
Abkhazia  1 0 0 1 0 0 
Anjouan 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Bangladesh 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Biafra 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Chechnya 1 0 1 0 1 0 
East-Timor 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Eritrea 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Gagauzia 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Iraqi-
Kurdistan  
1 1 0 1 1 0 
Katanga 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Kosovo 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
1 1 0 1 0 0 
North-
Cyprus 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
Puntland   0 1 0 0 1 0 
Republika 
Srpska 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
Republika 
Srpska 
Krajina 
1 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhodesia  0 0 1 0 1 0 
Somaliland 0 1 0 0 1 0 
South Sudan 1 1 0 1 1 1 
South-
Ossetia 
1 0 0 1 1 0 
Taiwan  0 1 1 1 0 0 
Tamil Eelam 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Transnistria 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Sources: See Appendices 3 and 4. Operationalization, see 4.3 on page 58 
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Table 12- Raw data table without sources for causal conditions F-M 
De facto-
state 
F 
Support 
G 
Opposition 
H 
+  
Economy 
I 
-  
Economy 
J 
HR-
violation 
K 
Federal 
L 
Geography 
M 
3rd 
wave 
O 
Outcome 
Abkhazia  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anjouan 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Bangladesh 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Biafra 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Chechnya 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 
East-Timor 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
Eritrea 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Gagauzia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Iraqi-
Kurdistan  
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Katanga 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Kosovo 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Nagorno-
Karabakh 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North-
Cyprus 
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Puntland   1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Republika 
Srpska 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Republika 
Srpska 
Krajina 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rhodesia  1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Somaliland 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
South 
Sudan 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 
South-
Ossetia 
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan  1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Tamil 
Eelam 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Transnistria 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Sources: See Appendices 3 and 4. Operationalization, see 4.3 on page 58 
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Appendix 3: Raw table with sources for causal conditions A-E 
Outcome (O): UN members hold the value 1, non-members hold 0. 
Causal condition A: Ethnicity as state foundation  
If the de facto- state is ethnically homogenous, it will be coded 1, if it is heterogeneous, it will be coded 0. 
Causal condition B: Level of democratic institutions as compared with the parent state 
Having a higher level of democratic institutions will be coded as 1, otherwise the value given is 0. 
Causal condition C: UN veto power opposition  
Having UN veto power opposition will be coded as 1; not having international opposition will be coded as 0. 
Causal condition D: UN veto power support  
Having UN veto power support will be coded as 1; the lack thereof will be coded as 0. 
Causal condition E: Economic level significantly different from the parent state  
Having either a higher or lower level or resources than the parent state will be coded as 1. Having approximately 
the same level gives the value 0. 
Entities with support or opposition from non-veto-states can be seen in Appendix 4. 
Table 13- Raw table with sources and explanations for causal conditions A-E 
De facto-
state 
A B C D E O 
Abkhazia  1169 
(Arutiunov 
1996, Hughes 
2001, 16-17, 
BBC 2012a, 
Slomanson 
2009, 5-6, 
Fawn 2008, 
273-274, 
Pavkovic 
2011, 3014-
302, Ciobanu 
2008, 118, 
Kolstø 2012, 
149) 
0 (lower) 
(Freedomhouse 
1998a, j, 
2012a, d, von 
Steinsdorff 
2012, 204, 
Haugland 2008, 
75, Rich 1993) 
0 1 (Russia) 
(Fawn 2008, 
274, UNPO 
2009, Ciobanu 
2008, 121) 
0 (A suffer 
from 
destruction of 
infrastructure 
and an 
embargo, but is 
supported by 
Russia. Georgia 
is poor, but has 
relations with 
others. 
Abkhazia 
contributed 
average to 
Georgia’s 
economy) 
(Clogg 2001, 
UNPO 2009, 
Ciobanu 2008, 
122-124) 
0 
Anjouan 0 (Ayangafac 
2008, 4, 
Ottenheimer 
and 
Ottenheimer 
1976, 408-
0 (chaotic 
management in 
both entities) 
(Ayangafac 
2008, 2, 
Cornwell 2010, 
0 0170 1171(higher)  
(Ayangafac 
2008, 3-5, 
Cornwell 2010, 
55-56) 
0 
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 The size of the Abkhaz population in the area has differed with time. I include them in the category for 
ethnically based de facto-states because it is clear that the matter is one of ethnicity rather than geography. For 
example, the Abkhaz have attempted removing the other ethnic groups in the area. See for instance (UNPO 
2009, Clogg 2001, Ciobanu 2008, 118-121, Beachain 2012). 
170
 France has been accused of supporting Anjouan’s bid for independence, but the relationship between the two 
is unclear. See for instance Cornwell (2010, 51), Ayangafac (2008, 7-8), IRIN (05.04.2013), Svensson (2008, 
15). 
171
 The reports on Anjouan’s relative economic strength as compared to the rest of Comoros is varying, but as it 
seems to be that while Anjouan suffers from an uneven redistribution of values by the political centre in Grand 
Comore, it holds the most natural resources and is thus considered in a (marginally) superior situation regarding 
resource level. Naldi (1998, 248) , claims that Anjouan complained of unjust distribution of aid in the Comoros 
and that they received less that the political centre in Grand Comore. 
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USA) (Islam 
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97, 105) 
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(Islam 1985, 
213-214, Post 
1968, 33, 
Nafziger and 
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1997, 198-
199, 
Arutiunov 
1996, Nichols 
1995, Hughes 
2001, 16-17, 
Charney 
2001, 459-
461) 
0 (lower) 
(Freedomhouse 
1999e, 1998d, 
Hughes 2001, 
27-29, Charney 
2001, 458-459) 
0 0 1174 (oil 
infrastructure) 
(Walker 1998, 
3-4, Hughes 
2001, 24-25, 
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Vatchagaev 
2008) 
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East-Timor 1 (CIA World 
Factbook 
0175 (Pedersen 
and Arneberg 
0 1 (UN Security 
Council) (The 
1176(higher) 
(Pedersen and 
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 (Nafziger and Richter 1976, 97) claims the US supported West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in the beginning of 
the secessionist conflict. This is supported by (Akram 2006, 23), who points out that the U.S. did not involve 
itself otherwise. Similarly, China vetoed Bangladesh’s admission to the UN in 1972, but later changed its stand 
(USUN 13.05.2013, The United Nations General Assembly 1974).  
173
 Though the region of Biafra is described as «well off economically» (Pegg 1998, 239),  Islam (1985, 217) 
claims that Nigeria has a so high level of natural resources even without Biafra that one should not consider the 
situation as very uneven. During the Nigerian blockade, Biafra was unable to utilize these resources, and the 
inhabitants starved. Nayar (1975, 325) describes the Eastern region (i.e. Biafra) as Nigeria’s most prosperous and 
Post (1968, 26) claims that two-thirds of Nigeria’s natural resources are to be found there.s. 
174
 Hughes (2001, 24-25) points out that though  Chechnya does not have  large oil reserves per se in comparison 
with Russia, a large part of Russian oil goes through the region.   
175
 East Timor continued with the same governmental organisational structure as it had had under Indonesia, and 
tried to evolve their own system from there (Pedersen and Arneberg 1999b, 116-118). Hence, though the UN 
assisted in the matter, East Timor will be assumed to have had a similar level of democratic organisations as 
Indonesia at the time of its de facto independence in 1999. 
ix 
 
12.02.2013, 
16.04.2013b, 
a, Charney 
2001, 465) 
1999b, 116-
118, Chopra 
2000, 
Freedomhouse 
1999b, 1998g, 
1999c) 
United Nations 
Security 
Council 1975, 
1999) 
Arneberg 
1999a, vii, 
Pedersen and 
Arneberg 
1999c, 3-23) 
Eritrea 0 (Lloyd 
1994-1995, 
418-419, 
Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002, 
20-22, CIA 
World 
Factbook 
12.02.2013, 
Encyclopædia 
Britannica 
2013i) 
1177 (The 
Government of 
Eritrea 1993, 
CIA World 
Factbook 
03.05.2013, 
Boddy-Evans 
2013, 
Freedomhouse 
1998h, i) 
0 0 1 (Higher, and 
coast line) 
(Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002, 
20, The 
Government of 
Eritrea 1993, 
Encyclopædia 
Britannica 
2013i, Federal 
Research 
Division 2005, 
7-8) 
1 
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0 
                                                                                                                                                        
176
 Though East Timor’s oil and gas-resources  were undeveloped and untapped, (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 19-
20) claims that the potential riches were enough for East Timor to be classified as being better off than Indonesia.  
177
 This has changed post-1993 (CIA World Factbook 03.05.2013). 
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 Though Kosovo was hailed for having achieved the standards set out by The United Nation Interim 
Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) (2003), their level of democracy was - at the time of their independence 
declaration in 2008 - lower than in Serbia. 
179
 The island of Cyprus did not have such a sharply separated geographical ethnic division as it does in 2013 
before the Greek Cypriots moved south and the Turkish Cypriots moved north after the war in 1974. That the 
matter has an ethnical background does seem to be clear (Feridun, Sawhney, and Shahbaz 2011, 556, Bahcheli 
2004, 168).  
180
 Ioannides and Apostolopoulos (1999, 54) argues that the northern parts of the island held most of the tourist 
facilities at the time of the commencement of the war in 1974. However, Northern Cyprus is here evaluated as 
having fewer resources because many of these facilities were destroyed without being rebuilt. In addition, the 
international sanctions imposed of the region has led to a rapid economic deterioration  (see for instance Sonmez 
and Apostolopoulos 2008, 40). 
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0184 (lower) 
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1-7, The United 
Nations 
Security 
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b, Fraser 1918) 
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Security 
Council) 
(Pinkston 2005, 
7, The United 
Nations 
Security 
Council 1965a, 
b, Cockram 
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0 1185 (lower) 
(USDA 
05.04.2013, 
Global Edge 
25.02.2013) 
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 Somalia, including both Somaliland, Puntland, has a multitude of clans, but they are considered as part of the 
overarching group “Somali”. Thus, the same ethnic group dominates in all three entities, however their borders 
are defined. A potential reason to evaluate the regions as homogenous is that in both Somaliland and Puntland, 
one clan dominates (Mesfin 2009, 10, Arieff 2008, 65, CIA World Factbook 12.02.2013). 
182
 Hesse (2010, 78-80) points our attention towards rampant corruption and Puntland, and an unfortunate 
development of piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The region is, nevertheless, still considered more democratically and 
institutionally stable than the republic of Somalia, though how the development evolves is difficult to predict. 
183
 Though Rhodesia did in fact have a clear majority of Bantu Mashona (Global Edge 05.04.2013, McDougal 
and Reisman 1968, 1), the institutionalising of the gross disproportion of power between the groups and hence an 
increased focus on the differences between groups has here led to it being considered a non-homogenous society. 
184
 I consider the UK as a democracy from 1918 onwards, after the introduction on universal suffrage (Fraser 
1918). 
185
 Even without adding the revenue from the British Commonwealth, Great Britain had a vastly stronger 
economy than Rhodesia for all the years of its existence (1970-1989), regardless of how the economic situation 
in Rhodesia developed (Ramsay 1978). 
186
 See footnote 170 on page 1.  
187
 Huliaras (2010, 6) describes the fall in revenue in the late nineties and early 2000’s after Saudi-Arabia’s ban 
on livestock import, and concludes that the economy did surprisingly well and that the ban is not expected to last 
long. More information on the economy of Somaliland and Puntland can be found at The World Bank (2002) -
report in Somali. 
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0 
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 Though (The World Bank 07.04.2013a, b) lists Sudan as having a higher GDP, South Sudan holds most of the 
natural resources and is therefore given the value 1. 
189
 Note: Taiwan and China are not on identical economic levels, but both are very rich (CIA World Factbook 
26.03.2013b, a). 
190
 Taiwan was a UN member until 1971, when the seat was transferred to the People’s Republic of China (The 
United Nations General Assembly 1971).  
191
 Though the Tamil group  on Sri Lanka includes many subgroups, it is different from the Sinhalese group that 
constitutes the majority on the island (Pegg 1998, 67-71). 
192
 Tamil Eelam constitutes most of the Sri Lankan coastline, but has not by itself been able to accumulate or 
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1998, 80-81, 
Pfaffenberger 
1987, 115, 161-
162, Bandara 
2007, 269, 272-
275, 278) 
Transnistria 0 (united by  
geography 
and language, 
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ethnicity) 
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2012, 202)  
0 (Lower. PMR 
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a soviet-style 
totalitarian 
regime)(Cioban
u 2008, 71-80, 
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Freedomhouse 
1998o, 2012n, 
1999d, 2012e, 
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2012, 204, 
Haugland 2008, 
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0 1 (Russia)  
(Hughes 2001, 
14, Berg 2005, 
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2012, 202) 
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(Berg 2005, 
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107, 113, BBC 
2012e)  
0 
                                                                                                                                                        
access revenue to any large degree. I therefore argue that it evens out: Tamil Eelam had the coast, but the interior 
was similar to that of the rest of Sri Lanka. The latter had the least of the coast, but the most of the other territory. 
In addition, Sri Lanka, while itself poor  could do trade with other states, whereas Tamil Eelam were dependent 
on subsidies (Jayasinghe 2006, Pegg 1998, 80-81).  
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Appendix 4: Raw table with sources and for causal conditions F-M 
F: Support by any recognised state. Support gives that value 1, no support gives 0. 
G: Opposition by any recognised state. Opposition gives that value 1, none give 0. 
H: Higher economic level than the parent. Higher level gives 1, not higher level gives 0. 
I: Lower economic level than the parent. Lower level gives 1. Not lower level gives 0. Note: the sources for H and I are the same and only mentioned in one of them.  
J: Gross human rights violations193. Gross violations by the parent state to the de facto-state shortly before secession gives 1, otherwise the result is 0.   
K: Federal status. De facto- states that were federal entities within their parent gets 1, the rest gets 0. 
L: Geographical separateness from its parent. Entities geographically separated from their parent scores 1, the rest scores 0.  
M: Third wave. Entities in the third wave score 1, the rest score 0. Sources: see Table 2.5 
O: Outcome. UN member states are coded as 1, the rest as 0. 
 
Table 14- Raw table with sources and explanations for causal conditions F-M 
De facto-
state 
F G H I J K L M O 
Abkhazia  1 (Russia) 
(Fawn 2008, 
274, UNPO 
2009, Ciobanu 
2008, 121) 
0 (Fawn 2008, 
284-286) 
0 (A suffer 
from 
destruction of 
infrastructure 
and an 
embargo, but 
is supported 
by Russia. 
Georgia is 
poor, but has 
relations with 
others. 
Abkhazia 
contributed 
average to 
Georgia’s 
economy) 
(Clogg 2001, 
0 0194 (Fawn 
2008, 274, 
Pavkovic 
2011, 313-
315, Haugland 
2008, 75) 
0 
(autonomous 
region) 
(Global 
Security 
2011b, BBC 
2012a, 
Haugland 
2008) 
0 0 0 
                                                 
193
 The concept of human rights violations is based on the definition and discussion as presented in (Chernichenko 1999). 
194
 Georgia accuses Abkhazia of ethnic cleansing (Fawn 2008, 274), but it does not appear that that Abkhaz were the victims of gross human rights violations leading up to 
their declaration of independence  and they are thus given the value 0. 
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UNPO 2009, 
Ciobanu 2008, 
122-124) 
Anjouan 0195 1 (OAU196) 
(Cornwell 
2010, 57, 
Svensson 
2008, Naldi 
1998, 249) 
1197(higher)  
(Ayangafac 
2008, 3-5, 
Cornwell 
2010, 55-56) 
0 0198 0 1 1 0 
Bangladesh 1 (India) 
(Islam 1985, 
218, Akram 
2006, 29, The 
United 
Nations 
General 
Assembly 
2004, 15, 
USUN 
13.05.2013) 
1199(China, 
USA) (Islam 
1985, 217-
219, Akram 
2006, 20-22, 
Harris 1971, 
USUN 
13.05.2013) 
0 1 (lower) 
(Islam 1985, 
214-215, 
Nafziger and 
Richter 1976, 
98, 103-104, 
Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002, 
22-23, Brown 
2012, 2-3, 
Akram 2006, 
7) 
1200 (Islam 
1985, 217, 
Bose 2005, 
Brown 2012, 
Akram 2006, 
1-2) 
0 (major parts 
of former 
Bengal) 
(Nafziger and 
Richter 1976, 
92) 
1 (Islam 1985, 
212) 
1 1 
Biafra 1(Portugal201) 
(Islam 1985, 
1 (UK, USSR, 
USA) (Islam 
1202 (higher) 
(Islam 1985, 
0 1 (Islam 1985, 
217) 
0 (the eastern 
region) 
0 0 0 
                                                 
195
 See Footnote 170 on page vii for an elaboration on France’s relationship with Anjouan. 
196
 The African Union (AU) succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 (The African Union 2002) 
197
 The reports on Anjouan’s relative economic strength as compared to the rest of Comoros is varying, but as it seems to be that while Anjouan suffers from an uneven 
redistribution of values by the political centre in Grand Comore, it holds the most natural resources and is thus considered in a (marginally) superior situation regarding 
resource level. Naldi (1998, 248) , claims that Anjouan complained of unjust distribution of aid in the Comoros and that they received less that the political centre in Grand 
Comore. 
198
 Though some violence has occurred, it appears in the literature that this is not from the state of Comoros itself, nor sufficiently serious as to constitute gross human rights 
violations (Ayangafac 2008, 10, U.S. Department of State 2000). The conflict is classified as “minor armed conflict” by (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1999, 602). 
199
 (Nafziger and Richter 1976, 97) claims the US supported West Pakistan (now Pakistan) in the beginning of the secessionist conflict. This is supported by (Akram 2006, 
23), who points out that the U.S. did not involve itself otherwise. Similarly, China vetoed Bangladesh’s admission to the UN in 1972, but later changed its stand (USUN 
13.05.2013, The United Nations General Assembly 1974).  
200
 The separation process of Bangladesh was a bloody one, but it appears that the situation has been calm after that. It is potentially difficult to determine the level of human 
rights violations that occurred before the war of separation, but I have chosen to give Bangladesh the value 1 following the explicit argument in (Islam 1985, 217) and the 
general claims made by for instance (Brown 2012).  
201
 The support of Portugal is described by Islam (1985, 217) as ineffective and wavering. Pegg (1998, 218, 226)  and (Islam 1985, 212)discusses whether France supported 
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(Anderson 
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201, Hughes 
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Anderson 
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(Walker 1998, 
3-4, Hughes 
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0 1 (MAR 2004, 
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International 
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1 (republic) 
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Security 
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Eritrea 1 (Egypt) 0 (Haugland 1 (Higher, and 0 1 (Lloyd 1 (and 0 1 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Biafra’s case but appear to not have a clear conclusion. As an example, Pegg (1998, 218,226)claims first that France’s support was important for Biafra, but then later states 
that Biafra had no significant support from other states.  
202
 Though the region of Biafra is described as «well off economically» (Pegg 1998, 239),  Islam (1985, 217) claims that Nigeria has a so high level of natural resources even 
without Biafra that one should not consider the situation as very uneven. During the Nigerian blockade, Biafra was unable to utilize these resources, and the inhabitants 
starved. Nayar (1975, 325) describes the Eastern region (i.e. Biafra) as Nigeria’s most prosperous and Post (1968, 26) claims that two-thirds of Nigeria’s natural resources are 
to be found there. 
203
 Georgia recognised Chechnya and was friendly to their aspirations, but whether this was noted within Chechnya is an open question(Hughes 2001, 15). 
204
 Hughes (2001, 24-25) points out that though  Chechnya does not have  large oil reserves per se in comparison with Russia, a large part of Russian oil goes through the 
region.   
205
 Though not actively opposing the independence of East Timor, Australia has been involved in a dispute over the petroleum resources of the area and appears to have an 
inconsistent relationship to the issue. For more on this, see e.g. Marks (2004) and ICJ (1995). Opposition and support of the independence declaration in 1975 I not considered 
here. 
206
 Though East Timor’s oil and gas-resources  were undeveloped and untapped, (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 19-20) claims that the potential riches were enough for East 
Timor to be classified as being better off than Indonesia.  
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 Belgium initially aided by sending troops to support Katanga, but withdrew them at the insistence of the UN (The United Nations Security Council 1960, Council 1960, 
McNemar 1967, 14). In addition, there were a number of Belgian mercenaries present, fighting for the Katangan side (Hughes 2010, 603). The Central African Federation and 
Rhodesia are described by Hughes (2010, 611-613) as willing but unable to assist Katanga. 
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 Violence occurred in the process of separation, but the situation was fairly calm before that point. Since then it appears that the region’s conflict has become frozen 
(Ciobanu 2008, 104-106) (BBC 2013g) . 
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 (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos 1999, 54) argues that the northern parts of the island held most of the tourist facilities at the time of the commencement of the war in 1974. 
However, Northern Cyprus is here evaluated as having fewer resources because many of these facilities were destroyed without being rebuilt. In addition, the international 
sanctions imposed of the region has led to a rapid economic deterioration  (see for instance Sonmez and Apostolopoulos 2008, 40). 
210
 Though the Greek Cypriots committed human rights violations against the Turkish Cypriots, the latter responded with breaches of their own (The European Commission of 
Human Rights 1976, 160-163). 
211
 For a discussion of the relationship between Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, see Caspersen (2007). 
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 For a discussion of the relationship between Serbia, Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina, see Caspersen (2007). 
213
 Though the Serbs in Croatia were the victims of harsh human rights violation by the state during WW2, I consider this to be too far removed in time from the secession to 
give the value 1. This judgement is of course debatable. For more information, see Jasenovac Memorial Site (29.04.2013), Jasenovac Reasearch Institute (29.04.2013). They 
were also discriminated against after the reintegration of RSK (Caspersen 2003b, 19). 
214
 Until 1975 (Pinkston 2005, 5). 
215
 Even without adding the revenue from the British Commonwealth, Great Britain had a vastly stronger economy than Rhodesia for all the years of its existence (1970-
1989), regardless of how the economic situation in Rhodesia developed (Ramsay 1978). 
216
 There might not have been the same level of active abuse in Rhodesia as in for instance Bangladesh, the near complete lack of human rights for the vast majority of the 
population gives the value of 1. 
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 Ethiopia is «in favour of» Somaliland state status, but does not grant recognition (Arieff 2008, 70-71). 
218
 Huliaras (2010, 6) describes the fall in revenue in the late nineties and early 2000’s after Saudi-Arabia’s ban on livestock import, and concludes that the economy did 
surprisingly well and that the ban is not expected to last long. More information on the economy of Somaliland and Puntland can be found at The World Bank (2002) -report 
in Somali. 
219
 Though (The World Bank 07.04.2013a, b) lists Sudan as having a higher GDP, South Sudan holds most of the natural resources and is therefore given the value 1. 
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 The Russian intervention and subsequent war in 2008 is not here seen as gross human rights violations instigated by Georgia, however turbulent the experience was. After 
the war in 2008, the human rights situation has worsened, both from Russian and Georgian side(Freedomhouse 2009b, 2012j). 
221
 Note: Taiwan and China are not on identical economic levels, but both are very rich (CIA World Factbook 26.03.2013b, a). 
222
 Taiwan is a special case, and its status as a de facto-state has followed a unique trajectory. . Though no gross human rights violations occurred in Taiwan proper, the war in 
mainland China was intense. Read more about in Roberge and Lee (2009), Freedomhouse (2012m), Harrell and Huang (1994), Chiang (1999), CIA World Factbook 
(26.03.2013b) and DeLisle (2011). 
223
 Between 1983 and 1986, India unofficially aided the Tamils, but the tigers are seen as having relied primarily on the Tamil community for sustenance(Pegg 1998, 80). 
224
 Tamil Eelam constitutes most of the Sri Lankan coastline, but has not by itself been able to accumulate or access revenue to any large degree. I therefore argue that it evens 
out: Tamil Eelam had the coast, but the interior was similar to that of the rest of Sri Lanka. The latter had the least of the coast, but the most of the other territory. In addition, 
Sri Lanka, while itself poor  could do trade with other states, whereas Tamil Eelam were dependent on subsidies (Jayasinghe 2006, Pegg 1998, 80-81).  
225
 The Tamil Tigers are themselves accused of human rights violations (Pegg 1998, 73, Freedomhouse 1999h). 
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 Apart from the violence happening during the separation, the region appears to have avoided serious human rights violations (BBC 2012e). 
227
 Some Transnistrians live on the right bank, but the overwhelming majority reside on the left bank of the Dniester river (Kolstø and Malgin 2007, 104). 
xxiv 
 
Sources 
Abdallah, Foundi Ibrahim 1998. Constitution de l'Etat d'Anjouan adoptée suite au 
Référendum du 25 février 1998. edited by Gouvernorat d'Anjouan. 
Acemoglu, Daronand, and James A. Robinson. 2006. The Economic Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Acherif, Billal Ag 2012. Declaration d'Independance d'Azawad. edited by Mouvement 
National de liberation de l'Azawad MNLA. 
Ahmed, Mezbah Uddin 2010. Declaration of Bangladesh Indipendence (sic). 
Akram, Tanweer. The Bangladeshi Genocide of 1971  2006 [cited 03.05.2013. Available from 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=984686. 
Altinay, Levent. 2000. "Possible Impacts of a Federal Solution to th Cyprus Problem on the 
Tourism Industry of North Cyprus." Hospitality Management no. 19. 
Amnesty International. Human Rights in the Republic of Iraq  01.04.2013 [cited 01.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/iraq. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 1996: Annual Report Summaries 1996, A Summary of 
Amnesty International's Annual Report  1996 [cited 21.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/004/1996/en/0054c6fd-eb06-11dd-
aad1-ed57e7e5470b/pol100041996en.pdf. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 2007: Sudan  2007 [cited 04.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/sudan/report-2007. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 2011: Sudan  2011 [cited 04.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/sudan/report-2011. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 2012: Somalia  2012a [cited 04.04.2013. Available 
from http://amnesty.org/en/region/somalia/report-2012. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 2012: South Sudan  2012b [cited 04.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/south-sudan/report-2012. 
Amnesty International. Annual Report 2012: Taiwan  2012c [cited 04.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/taiwan/report-2012. 
Anderson, Liam. 2011. "Reintegrating Unrecognised States - Internationalizing Frozen 
Conflicts." In Unrecognized states in the International System, edited by Nina 
Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield. London and New York: Routledge. 
Anesi, Vincent. 2011. "Secessionism and minority protection in an uncertain world." Journal 
of public economics no. 96. 
Ardzinba, Vladislav. 1999. Act of State Independence of the Republic of Abkhazia. edited by 
The People's Assembly of the Republic of Abkhazia. 
Arieff, Alexis. 2008. "De facto Statehood? The Strange Case of Somaliland." Yale Journal of 
International Affairs no. Spring /Summer  
Arutiunov, Sergei. 1996. "Ethnicity and Conflict in the Caucasus." SRC Winter Symposium 
Socio-Cultural Dimensions of the Changes in the Slavic-Eurasian World. 
Atasoy, Seymen. 2003. "Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: The Need for a Gradual Approach." The 
Brown Journal of World Affairs no. 10 (1). 
Ayangafac, Chrysanthus. 2008. "Situation Critical: The Anjouan Political Crisis." Institute for 
Security Studies: Situation Report no. March. 
Babynina, Lyudmila The EU and Russia: Competing for the Post-Soviet Space?  2013 [cited 
11.06.2013. Available from http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=1912#top. 
Bahcheli, Tozun 2004. "Under Turkey's Wings: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the 
Struggle for International Acceptance." In De Facto States: The Quest for Soverignty, 
xxv 
 
edited by Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann and Henry Felix Srebrnik. New York: 
Routledge. 
Bajoria, Jayshree. 2011. "The Taliban in Afghanistan." Council on Foreign Relations. 
Bakke, Kristin M. , John O’Loughlin, and Michael D.  Ward. 2011. The Viability of de facto 
States: Post-War Developments and Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia. In The annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association. 
Bandara, Jayatilleke. 2007. "The Impact of the Civil War on Tourism and the Regional 
Economy." South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies no. 20 (1). 
Barnes, Ryan Catalonia and the Rise of Economic Separatism in Europe  2012 [cited 
27.05.2013. Available from http://www.europeaninstitute.org/EA-November-
2012/catalonia-and-the-rise-of-economic-separatism-in-europe.html. 
Baumann, Timothy. 2004. "Defining Ethnicity." The SAA Archaeological record no. 
September. 
BBC. Q&A: South Sudan independence. BBC News 04.07.2011 [cited 07.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12111730. 
BBC. 1970. "Ian Smith Declares Rhodesia a Republic." BBC News, 02.03.1970. 
BBC. 1999. "Chechnya discussion blocked at UN " BBC News, 12.11.1999. 
BBC. 2008. "Full text: Kosovo declaration." BBC News, 17.02.2008. 
BBC. 2009. "Q&A: Georgia conflict a year on." BBC News, 06.08.2009. 
BBC. 2010. "Q&A: Kosovo's future." BBC News. 
BBC. Regions and territories: Abkhazia. BBC News 2012a [cited 22.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18175030. 
BBC. Regions and territories: Puntland BBC News 2012b [cited 22.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14114727. 
BBC. Regions and territories: Somaliland BBC News 2012c [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14115069. 
BBC. Regions and territories: South Ossetia. BBC News 2012d [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/3797729.stm. 
BBC. Regions and territories: Trans-Dniester. BBC News 2012e [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18284837. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: Bangladesh BBC News 2013a [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12651483. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: East Timor BBC News 2013b [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14952883. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: Eritrea BBC News 2013c [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13349395. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: Kosovo BBC News 2013d [cited 22.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18328859. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: Mongolia. BBC News 2013e [cited 02.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15466133. 
BBC. BBC Country Profile: South Sudan BBC News 2013f [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14069082. 
BBC. Regions and territories: Nagorno-Karabakh BBC News 2013g [cited 22.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18270325. 
BBC. 2013h. "Serbia and Kosovo reach EU-brokered Landmark Accord." BBC Europe, 
19.04.2013. 
Beachain, Donnacha O. 2012. "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Abkhazia." Communist 
and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Beary, Brian. Separatist Movements  2008. Available from http://www.sagepub.com/upm-
data/36778_Chapter2.pdf. 
xxvi 
 
Belloni, Roberto. 2011. "The Birth of South Sudan and the Challenges of Statebuilding." 
Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics no. 10. 
Beran, Harry. 1984. "A Liberal theory of Secession." Political Studies no. 32. 
Berg, Eiki. 2005. "Pooling Sovereignity, Losing Territoriality? Making Peace in Cyprus and 
Moldova." Tijdsschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie no. 97 (3). 
Birch, Anthony H. 1984. "Another Liberal Theory of Secession." Political Studies no. 32. 
Black, Ian, and Mark Tran. 2007. "Hamas takes Control Over Gaza." The Guardian. 
Boczek, Boleslaw Adam 2005. International Law: A Dictionary. Maryland: Scarecrow Press. 
Boddy-Evans, Alistair A Brief History of Eritrea - Part 1  2013 [cited 03.05.2013. Available 
from http://africanhistory.about.com/od/eritrea/p/EritreaHist1.htm. 
Boole, George. 1854. "An Investigation of the Laws of Thought." In. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/15114. 
Bordignon, Massimo, and Sandro Brusco. 2001. "Optimal Secession Rules." European 
Economic Review no. 45. 
Bose, Sarmila. 2005. "Anatomy of Violence: Analysis of Civil War in East Pakistan in 1971." 
Economic and Political Weekly no. 40 (41). 
Brancati, Dawn  2006. "Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic 
Conflict and Secessionism?" International Organization no. 60 (3). 
Braumoeller, Bear. 1999. "Statistical Estimation in the Presence of Multiple Causal Paths." 
Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 
Chicago, IL., April 15-17, 1999. 
Brilmayer, Lea. 1991. "Secession and Self-Determination. A territorial Interpretation." Yale 
Journal of International Law no. 16. 
Brown, Kimberly Marie. Four Decades Later, Justice in Bangladesh  2012 [cited 03.05.2013. 
Available from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2055336. 
Buchanan, Allen. 1991. Secession: The Morality of Political Divorce from FOrt Sumter to 
Lithuania and Quebec. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Buchanan, Allen. 1992. "Self-Determination and the Right to Secede." Journal of 
International Affairs no. 45. 
Buchanan, Allen. 1995. "Federalism, Secession and the Morality of Inclusion." Arizona Law 
Review no. 37. 
Buchanan, Allen. 1997. "Theories of Secession." Philosophy and Public Affairs no. 26 (1). 
Buchheit, Lee. 1978. Secession: the Legitimacy of Self-Determination. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Byman, Daniel, and Charles King. 2012. "The Mystery of Phantom States." The Washington 
Quarterly no. 35 (3). 
Cahoon, Ben. Provinces and Regions of Nigeria  2002 [cited 01.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria_regions.html. 
Carrell, Severin. 2013. "Scottish independence: the Essential Guide." The Guardian. 
Carver, Natasha. 2002. "Is Iraq/Kurdistan a State Such that it can be Said to Operate State 
Systems ans thereby Offer Protection to its "Citizens"?" US State Department Country 
Reports on Human Right Practices  
Caspersen, Nina. 2003a. "Elite Interests and the Serbian-Montenegrin Conflict." Southeast 
European Politics no. 4 (2-3). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2003b. "The Thorny Issue of Ethnic Autonomy in Croatia: Serb Leaders and 
Proposals for Autonomy." Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe no. 
1. 
Caspersen, Nina. 2007. "Belgrade, Pale and Knin: Kin-State Control over Rebellious 
Puppets?" Europe-Asia Studies no. 59 (4). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2008a. "Between Puppets and independent Actors: Kin-state Involvment in 
xxvii 
 
the Conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia and Nagorno-Karabakh." Ethnopolitics: Formerly 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics no. 7 (4). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2008b. "From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto 
States." Südosteuropa no. 53 (1). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2008c. "Separatism and democracy in the Caucasus." Survival: Global 
Politics and Strategy no. 50 (4). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2010a. "Nagorno-Karabakh: Krig, Fred eller Status Quo?" Nordisk Østforum 
no. 3. 
Caspersen, Nina. 2010b. "Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto 
States." The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs no. 44 
(4). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2011. "Democracy, Nationalism and (lack of) Sovereignity: the Complex 
Dynamics of Democratization in Unrecognised States." Nations and Nationalism no. 
17 (2). 
Caspersen, Nina. 2012a. "Regimes and Peace Processes: Democratic (non)development in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and its impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh-conflict." 
Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Caspersen, Nina. 2012b. Unrecognised States. The Struggle for Sovereignity in the Modern 
International System. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Caspersen, Nina, and Gareth Stansfield. 2011. Unrecognised States in the International 
System. United Kingdom: Routledge. 
CAVR. 1999. Chega! The CAVR Report. edited by Verdade e Reconciliacao de Timor-Leste 
Comcao de Acolhimento. 
CBS. 2012. Sheik Mujibur Rahman declares region independent, CBS, Mar 26, 1971 - MMR  
Charney, Jonathan I. 2001. "Self-Determination: Chechnya, Kosovo, and East Timor." 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law no. 34. 
Chen, Yan, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1994. "Constitutional secession clauses." Constitutional 
Political Economy no. 5 (1). 
Chernichenko, Stanislav. 1999. Definition of gross and large-scale violations of human rights 
as an international crime. edited by United Nations Economic and Social Council 
Commission on Human Rights Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection and of Minorities. 
Chiang, Y. Frank. 1999. "State, Sovereignity and Taiwan." Fordham International Law 
Journal no. 23 (4). 
Chinn, Jeff, and Steven Roper. 1998. "Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia." Nationalities 
Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity no. 26 (1). 
Chopra, Jarat. 2000. "The UN's Kingdom of East TImor." Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy no. 42 (3). 
Christopher, Anthony. 2011. "Secession and South Sudan: an African Precedent for the 
Future?" South African Geographical Journal no. 93 (2). 
CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook: Eritrea  03.05.2013. Available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/er.html. 
CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook: Somalia  04.04.2013 [cited 04.04.2013. Available 
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. 
CIA World Factbook. Field Listing: Economy - overview  07.04.2013a [cited 07.04.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2116.html#su. 
CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook: South Sudan  07.04.2013b [cited 07.04.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/od.html. 
xxviii 
 
CIA World Factbook. Field Listings: Ethnic Groups  12.02.2013 [cited 12.02.2013. Available 
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html. 
CIA World Factbook. The  World Factbook: East Timor  16.04.2013a [cited 16.04.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tt.html. 
CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook: Indonesia  16.04.2013b [cited 16.04.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/id.html. 
CIA World Factbook. Country Comparison: Population  22.02.2013 [cited 22.02.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html. 
CIA World Factbook. China  26.03.2013a [cited 26.03.2013. Available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html. 
CIA World Factbook. Taiwan  26.03.2013b [cited 26.03.2013. Available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html. 
CiA World Factbook. CIA World Factbook: Serbia  30.04.2013a [cited 30.04.2013. Available 
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html. 
CIA World Factbook. The World Factbook: Kosovo  30.04.2013b [cited 30.04.2013. Available 
from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html. 
CIA World Factbook. 1992. Croatia - Economy. edited by Perry-Castañeda Library Map 
Collection. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. 
Ciobanu, Ceslav. 2008. Frozen and Forgotten Conflicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis, 
Political Economy and Prospects for Solution. Institute for Public Policy - Moldova. 
Civil Georgia. 2010. "EU Diplomat: Less Tensions, More Substance in Run Up to Elections." 
Civil Georgia. 
CJA, The Center for Justice and Accountability. East Timor: Crimes Against Humanity Under 
the Indonesian Occupation  16.04.2013 [cited 16.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.cja.org/article.php?list=type&type=198. 
Clogg, Rachel. 2001. Abkhazia: Ten Years on. In Conciliation Resources. 
Cockram, B. 1966. "Rhodesia Rides a Tiger." The South African Institute of International 
Affairs no. December. 
Collier, David, and James E. Mahon Junior. 1993. "Conceptual "Stretching" Revisited: 
Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis." The American Political Science 
Review no. 87 (4). 
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. "The Political Economy of Secession." The World 
Bank Development Research Group. 
Commision, Nigeria High. About Nigeria  2013 [cited 10.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.nigeriahc.org.uk/about-nigeria. 
Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. 2005. Constitution of the Republic of Iraq [Iraq]. 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. 1993. Constitution of the Russian Federation 
(Конституция Российской Федерации). 
Cornish, Michael. 2010. "The Bougainville Conflict: A Classic Outcome of the Resourse-
curse Effect?" Peace & conflict monitor (online forum for informed debate and peace 
journalism)  
Cornwell, Richard. 2010. "Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean." African Security Review no. 
7 (3). 
Council, The United Nations Security. Resolution 145: The Congo Question  1960 [cited 
01.04.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/34/IMG/NR015734.pdf?OpenElement. 
Council, The United Nations Security. Resolution 800: New member: Slovak Republic  1993a 
xxix 
 
[cited 03.06.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/012/23/IMG/N9301223.pdf?OpenElement. 
Council, United Nations Security. Resolution 801: New member: Czech Republic  1993b 
[cited 03.06.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/012/29/IMG/N9301229.pdf?OpenElement. 
Council, United Nations Security. Resolution 1199: The situation in Kosovo 1998 [cited 
11.06.2013. Available from http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f14f40. 
Coverdill, James, and William Finlay. 1995. "Understanding Mills via Mill-Type Methods: An 
Application of Qualitative Comparative Analysis to a Study of Labor Management in 
Southern Textile Manufactering." Qualitative Sociology no. 18 (4). 
CPA. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of the Republic of 
Sudan and The Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Sudan People's Liberation 
Army  2005 [cited 11.06.2013. 
Cronqvist, Lasse. 2003. "Using Multi-Value Logic in Social Science." Paper prepared for the 
2nd General COnference of the European Consortium for Political Research no. 
September. 
Cronqvist, Lasse. 2004. "Presentation of TOSMANA: Adding Multi-Value Variables and 
Visual Aids to QCA." Working Paper 2004 (20) of the Compass Research Group. 
Cronqvist, Lasse. 2005. "Intruduction to Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(MVQCA) " Didactical Paper 2005 (4) of the Compass Research Group. 
Crowley, Daniel. 1963. "Politics and Tribalism in the Katanga." The Western Political 
Quarterly no. 16 (1). 
Cyprus History. Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)  15.04.2013 [cited 15.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/1975.html. 
Dagne, Ted. 2011. "The Republic of South Sudan: Opportunities and Challenes for Africa's 
Newest Country." Congressional Research Service: CRS Report for Congress 
(October 18th, 2011). 
Davlatshoev, Suhrobsho 2006. The Formation and Consolidation of Pamiri Ethnic Identity in 
Tajikistan. Dissertation, School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical 
University, Middle East Technical University. 
Dean, Roger. 2007. "Rethinking the Civil War in Sudan." Civil Wars no. 3 (1). 
DeLisle, Jaques. 2011. "Taiwan: Sovereignity and Participation in International 
Organisations." Foreign Policy Research Institute. 
Demissie, Derege. 1996-1997. "Self-Determination Including Secession vs. The Territorial 
Integrity of Nation States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession." Suffolk Transnational 
Law Review no. 20. 
Dodd, Clement. 2009. "Solving the "Minority" Problem in Cyprus - a Historical Accord." 
Perceptions no. Autumn-Winter. 
Doorenspleet, Renke. 2004. "The Structural Context of Recent Transitions to Democracy." 
European Journal of Political Research no. 43. 
Duara, Prasenjit 2004. "Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern 
" Journal of Japanese Studies no. 30 (2). 
Dugard, John, and David Raic. 2006. "Recognition." In Secession - International Law 
Perspectives, edited by Marcelo G. Kohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Economist, The. 2008. "War erupts in Georgia." The Economist, 08.08.2008. 
Economist, The. 2012. "The Kurdish Opening." The Economist no. November. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. International Law  2013 [cited 10.02.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/291011/international-law/233494/The-
nature-and-development-of-international-law. 
xxx 
 
Encyclopædia Britannica. American civil rights movement  2013a [cited 27.05.2013. 
Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/119368/American-civil-
rights-movement. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Apartheid  2013b [cited 27.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/29332/apartheid. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Bangladesh  2013c [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/51736/Bangladesh. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Bantustan. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc 2013d [cited 05.05.2013. 
Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/68315/Bantustan. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. China  2013e [cited 01.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/111803/China/71842/Establishment-of-
the-Peoples-Republic. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Encyclopædia 
Britannica Inc., 2013f [cited 07.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/132363/Democratic-Republic-of-the-
Congo-DRC/129482/History. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. East Timor  2013g [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/596313/East-Timor. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Eritrea  2013h [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/191577/Eritrea. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Eritrea. Encyclopædia Britannica Inc. 2013i [cited 03.05.2013. 
Available from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/191577/Eritrea. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Manchukuo  2013j [cited 27.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1381991/Manchukuo. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Somalia  2013k [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/553877/Somalia. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Sri Lanka  2013l [cited 01.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/561906/Sri-Lanka/278847/Independent-
Ceylon-1948-71. 
Encyclopædia Britannica. Taipei  2013m [cited 26.03.2013. Available from 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/580809/Taipei/231554/History. 
EULEX, Kosovo European Rule of Law Mission. The European Union Rule of Law Mission 
in Kosovo  23.01.2013 [cited 23.01.2013. Available from http://www.eulex-
kosovo.eu/en/front/. 
Everwyn, Gerhard. 1962. "Which Way in Katanga?" African Affairs no. 61 (243). 
Factbook, CIA World. The World Factbook: Mongolia  02.06.2013 [cited 02.06.2013. 
Available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mg.html. 
Failed States Index.  2012 [cited 06-12-2012. Available from 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive. 
Fawn, Rick. 2008. "The Kosovo- and Montenegro-effect." International Affairs no. 84 (2). 
Federal Research Division. 2005. Country Profile: Eritrea, September 2005. In Library of 
Congress – Federal Research Division. 
Feridun, Mete, Bansi Sawhney, and Muhammad Shahbaz. 2011. "The Impact of Military 
Spending on Economic Growth: The Case of North Cyprus." Defence and Peace 
Economics no. 22 (5). 
Flamand, Sabine. Decentralization as a Way to Avoid Secessionist Conflict: the Role of 
Interregional Inequality  2013 [cited 27.05.2013. Available from 
http://pareto.uab.es/sflamand/research/conflict_final.pdf. 
Fleischer, Carl August. 1994. Folkerett. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget. 
xxxi 
 
Fraser, Hugh, Sir. 1918. The Representation of the people act, 1918. edited by Parliament of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Abkhazia  1998a [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/abkhazia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Azerbaijan  1998b [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/azerbaijan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Bosnia and Herzegovina  1998c [cited 
29.04.2013. Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world/1998/bosnia-and-herzegovina. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Chechnya  1998d [cited 21.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/chechnya. 
Freedomhouse. 1998e. Freedom in the World 1998: Comoros. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Croatia  1998f [cited 29.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/croatia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: East Timor  1998g [cited 16.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/east-timor. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Eritrea  1998h [cited 03.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/eritrea. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Ethiopia  1998i [cited 03.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/ethiopia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Georgia  1998j [cited 22.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/georgia. 
Freedomhouse. 1998k. Freedom in the World 1998: Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Kosovo  1998l [cited 30.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/kosovo. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Nagorno-Karabakh  1998m [cited 22.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/nagorno-
karabakh. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Northern Cyprus  1998n [cited 15.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/northern-
cyprus. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1998: Transnistria  1998o [cited 01.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1998/transnistria. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Cyprus  1999a [cited 15.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/cyprus. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: East Timor  1999b [cited 16.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/east-timor. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Indonesia  1999c [cited 16.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/indonesia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Moldova  1999d [cited 01.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/moldova. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Russia  1999e [cited 21.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/russia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Somalia  1999f [cited 21.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/somalia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 1999: Yugoslavia  1999g [cited 30.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/yugoslavia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World: Sri Lanka  1999h [cited 18.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/sri-lanka. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2007: Serbia  2007a [cited 30.04.2013. Available from 
xxxii 
 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/serbia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2007: Sudan  2007b [cited 21.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2007/sudan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2008: Comoros  2008a [cited 05.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/comoros. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2008: Kosovo  2008b [cited 30.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/kosovo. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2008: Serbia  2008c [cited 30.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2008/serbia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2009: Georgia  2009a [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/georgia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2009: South Ossetia  2009b [cited 22.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/south-
ossetia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2009: Sri Lanka  2009c [cited 18.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2009/sri-lanka. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Abkhazia  2012a [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/abkhazia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Azerbaijan  2012b [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/azerbaijan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Cyprus  2012c [cited 28.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/cyprus. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Georgia  2012d [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/georgia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Moldova  2012e [cited 01.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/moldova. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Nagorno-Karabakh  2012f [cited 22.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/nagorno-
karabakh. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Northern Cyprus  2012g [cited 28.05.2013. 
Available from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/northern-
cyprus. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Somalia  2012h [cited 04.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/somalia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Somaliland  2012i [cited 04.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/somaliland. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: South Ossetia  2012j [cited 22.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/south-ossetia. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: South Sudan  2012k [cited 07.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/south-sudan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Sudan  2012l [cited 07.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/sudan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Taiwan  2012m [cited 26.03.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/taiwan. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2012: Transnistria  2012n [cited 01.05.2013. Available 
from http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/transnistria. 
Freedomhouse. Freedom in the World 2013: China  2013 [cited 26.03.2013. Available from 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/china. 
Friedhaber, Gretchen, Archena Kabra, Rachel Kingsley, Alicia  Moore, and David  Schwartz. 
Serbia-Kosovo: the Economic Situation  2000 [cited 30.04.2013. Available from 
xxxiii 
 
http://www.rochester.edu/College/REL/faculty/homerin/REL247/Class/serbia/noframe
s/economy.html. 
Gagauzia Info. About Gagauzia: Economy  27.03.2013a [cited 27.03.2013. Available from 
http://gagauzia.info.md/index.php?do=static&page=a1. 
Gagauzia Info. About Gagauzia: History  27.03.2013b [cited 27.03.2013. Available from 
http://gagauzia.info.md/index.php?do=static&page=a3. 
Gailbraith, Peter. 2004. "How to Get Out of Iraq." The New Yourk Review of Books no. 51 (8). 
Gauthier, David. 1994. "Breaking up: An Essay on Secession." Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy no. 24 (3). 
Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers you Get: Selection 
Bias in Comparative Politics." Political Analysis no. 2 (1). 
Gegic, Zlatko, and Artyom Harutyunyan. 2008. "Survey and Ordinance Disposal in the 
Polisario-controlled Areas of the Western Sahara." Journal of Mine Action: Middle 
East and North Africa no. April. 
Generalitat de Catalunya. 1979. Statute of Autonomy 1979. Section One: Powers of the 
Government of Catalonia (Articles 9-28). 
Generalitat de Catalunya. 2006. Statute of Atonomy of Catalonia 2006. 
Ghai, Yash, and Anthony J. Regan. 2006. "Unitary State, Devolution, Autonomy, Secession: 
State Building and Nation Building in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea." The 
Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs no. 95 (386). 
Gikes, Patrick. 1999. "Briefing: Somalia." African Affairs no. 98 (393). 
Gilligan, Emma. 2010. Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Global Edge. Zimbabwe: History  05.04.2013 [cited 05.04.2013. Available from 
http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/zimbabwe/history. 
Global Edge. Zimbabwe: Economy  25.02.2013 [cited 25.02.2013. Available from 
http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/zimbabwe/economy. 
Global Security. Sudan - First Civil War  07.04.2013 [cited 07.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan-civil-war1.htm. 
Global Security. Formation of the Korean Workers' Party  2011a. Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/leadership-factions.htm. 
Global Security. South Ossetia - Background  2011b [cited 21.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/south-ossetia-3.htm. 
Gobierno de España. 1978. Spanish Constitution. 
Goertz, Gary. 2006a. "Assessing the Trivialness, Relevance and Relative Importance of 
Necessaary or Sufficient Conditions in Social Science." Studies in Comparative 
International Development no. 41 (2). 
Goertz, Gary. 2006b. Social Science Concepts - a User’s Guide. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Gosh, B.N., and Sule.L. Aker. 2006. "Future of North Cyprus: An Economic-strategic 
Appraisal." Futures no. 38. 
Government of Somaliland. 2011. National Development Plan (2012-2016). edited by 
Ministry of National Planning and Development. 
Grendstad, Gunnar. 2007. "Causal Complexity and Party Preference." European Journal of 
Political Research no. 46. 
Grofman, Bernard, and Carsten Schneider. 2009. "An Introduction to Crisp Set QCA, with a 
Comparison to Binary Logistic Regression." Political Research Quarterly no. 62 
(662). 
Guiberneau, Montserrat, and John Rex. 2012. The Ethnicity Reader - Nationalism, 
Multiculturalism and Migration. UK: Polity Press. 
xxxiv 
 
Gunter, Michael. 1993. "A de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq." Third World Quarterly 
no. 14 (2). 
Gunter, Michael. 1996. "The KDP-PUK Conflict in Northern Iraq." The Middle East JOurnal 
no. 50 (2). 
Hannum, Hurst. 1998. "The Specter of Secession. Responding to Claims for Ethnic Self-
Determination." Foreign Affairs no. 13. 
Harrell, Steven, and Chun-chieh Huang. 1994. "Introduction." In Cultural Change in Postwar 
Taiwan. Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press. 
Harris, P. B. 1969. "The Changing Rhodesian Political Culture: 1969." Department of 
Political Science, University College of Rhodesia, Salisbury. 
Harris, Ralph. 1971. "Nixon and Pakistan: an Unpopular Alliance." The Miami News, 
17.12.1971. 
Harvey, James, and Gareth Stansfield. 2011. "Theorizing Unrecognised States: Sovereignity, 
Secessionism, and Political Economy." In Unrecognised States in the International 
System, edited by Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield. USA and Canada: Routledge. 
Haugland, Ragnhild   2008. Escaping Limbo. Why some states are recognised and others are 
not., Comparative Politics, University of Bergen (UiB). 
Hechter, Michael. 1992. "The Dynamics of Secession." Acta Sociologica no. 35. 
Hergum, Hans Petter. 22.04.2013. Rhodesia. Store Norske Leksikon. 
Herrmann, Andrea Monika, and Lasse Cronquist. 2009. "When Dichotomisation Becomes a 
Problem for the Analysis of Middle-sized Datasets." International Journal of Social 
Research Methodology no. 12 (1). 
Hesse, Brian. 2010. "Lessons in Successful Somali Governance." Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies no. 28 (1). 
Hicks, Alexander M., Joya Misra, and Tang Nah Ng. 1995. "The Programmatic Emergence of 
the Social Security State." American Sociological Review no. 60 (3). 
Hilde, Paal Sigurd 1999. "Slovak Nationalism and the Break-Up of Czechoslovakia." Europe-
Asia Studies no. 51 (4). 
Hillier, Tim. 1998. Sourcebook on Public International Law.: Routledge. 
Hillman, Ben. 2012. "Power-sharing and political party engineering in conflictprone societies: 
the Indonesian experiment in Aceh." Conflict, Security & Development no. 12 (2). 
Hoch, Tomas. 2011. "EU Strategy Toward post-Soviet De-Facto States." Contemporary 
European Studies (2). 
Hocking, John 2009. Case No. IT-00-39-A. Prosecutor v. Momcilo Krajisnik. Judgement. 
edited by International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. 
Holthuis, Hans. 2003. Case No. IT-00-39&40/1-S. Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavsic. Sentencing 
Judgement. edited by International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. 
Holthuis, Hans 2007. Case No. IT-99-36-A. Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin. Judgement. 
edited by International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991. 
Hroch, Miroslav. 1998. From National Movement to the Fully Formed Nation. 
http://web.fc.edu/faculty/mpyka/HIS351/15.%20Case%20Study%20III%20Ireland/Hr
och,%20From%20National%20Movement,%20New%20Left%20Review.pdf. 
HRW, Human Rights Watch. Human Rights in Iraq  01.04.2013 [cited 01.04.2013. Available 
from http://www.hrw.org/middle-eastn-africa/iraq. 
xxxv 
 
HRW, Human Rights Watch. 1999. Annual Report 1999: Indonesia and East TImor. 
HRW, Human Rights Watch. 2006. Chechnya: Research Shows Widespread and Systematic 
Use of Torture. 
Hughes, James. 2001. "Chechnya: The Causes of a Protracted Post-Soviet Conflict." Civil 
Wars no. 4 (4). 
Hughes, matthew. 2010. "Fighting for White Rule in Africa: The Central African Federation, 
Katanga and the Congo Crisis, 1958-1965." The International History Review no. 25 
(3). 
Huliaras, Asteris. 2010. "The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional 
Geopolitics." Journal of Contemporary African Studies no. 2. 
ICJ, The International Court of Justice. 1995. Case Concerning East Timor (Portugal v. 
Australia). 
ICTY, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 05.05.2013. PRLIĆ et 
al. The Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, 
Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić. 
Igga, James Wani. 10.06.2011. South Sudan Independence Declaration. Youtube.com. 
Ioannides, Dimitri, and Yiorgos Apostolopoulos. 1999. "Political instability, War, and Tourism 
in Cyprus: Effects, Management, and Prospects for Recovery." Journal of Travel 
Research no. 38 (51). 
IRIN, Integrated Regional Information Networks. Comoros: Anjouan road to recovery now 
open  05.04.2013 [cited 05.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRIN,,COM,,482005791d,0.html. 
Ishiyama, John, and Anna Batta. 2012. "The Emergence of Dominant Political Party Systems 
in Unrecognized States." Communist and Post-Communist studies. 
Islam, M. Rafiqul. 1985. "Secessionist Self-Determination: Some lessons from Katanga, 
Biafra and Bangladesh." Journal of Peace Research no. 22 (211). 
Islam, M. Rafiqul. 1991. "Secession Crisis in Papua New Guinea: The Proclaimed Republic 
of Bougainville in International Law." Harvard Law Review no. 453. 
Islam, Syed Serajul 1984. "The State in Bangladesh under Zia (1975-81)." Asian Survey no. 
24 (5). 
ISO, The International Organization for Standardization. 2013. ISO 3166 - 1: Country Codes. 
ISS. 2010. "The EU's Non-Recognition and Engagament Policy Towards Abkhazia and South-
Ossetsia." European Union Institute for Security Studies. 
Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosenberg. 1982. "Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: the 
Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." World Politics no. 35 (1). 
Jasenovac Memorial Site. List of Individual Victims of Jasenovac Concentration Camp  
29.04.2013 [cited 29.04.2013. Available from http://www.jusp-
jasenovac.hr/Default.aspx?sid=6711. 
Jasenovac Reasearch Institute. What was Jasenovac?  29.04.2013 [cited 29.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.jasenovac.org/whatwasjasenovac.php. 
Jayasinghe, Amal Sri Lanka: Independence-seeking Tigers Already Run Shadow State  2006 
[cited 18.04.2013. Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/sri-lanka/sri-lanka-
independence-seeking-tigers-already-run-shadow-state. 
K-FOR. NATO Kosovo Force  2013 [cited 23.01.2013. Available from 
http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor.aspx. 
Kamanu, Onyeonoro S. 1974. "Secession and the Right to Self-determination. An O. A. U. 
dilemma." The Journal of Modern Africal Studies no. 12 (3). 
Kangas, Olli. 1994. "The Politics of Social Security: On Regressions, Qualitative 
Comparisons, and Cluster Analysis." In The Comparative Political Economy of the 
Welfare State, edited by Thomas Janoski and Alexander M. Hicks. Cambridge: 
xxxvi 
 
Cambridge University Press. 
King, Charles. 2001. "The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized 
States." World Politics no. 53 (July). 
King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research. Edited by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney 
Verba. Princeton, New Yersey: Princeton University Press. 
Kohen, Marcelo G:. 2006. "Introduction." In Secession - international law perspectives, 
edited by Marcelo G. Kohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kolstø, Pål. 2006. "The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States." Journal of 
Peace Research no. 43 (6). 
Kolstø, Pål. 2008. Opening the World Order to de facto States – Limits and Potentialities for 
de facto States in the International Order. In The European Parliament 15.05.2008. 
Brussels, Belgium. 
Kolstø, Pål. 2012. "De Facto States and Democracy: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh." 
Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Kolstø, Pål, and Helge Blakkisrud. 2008. "Living with Non-recognition: State and Nation-
building in South Caucasian Quasi-states." Europe-Asia Studies no. 60 (3). 
Kolstø, Pål, and Andrei Malgin. 2007. "The Transnistrian Republic: A Case of Politicized 
Regionalism." Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity no. 26 
(1). 
Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Countries that have recognized the Republic of Kosova  
04.12.2012. Available from http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,33. 
Krasner, Stephen D. . 2004. "Sharing Sovereignty, New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing 
States." International Security no. 29 (2). 
Krever, Mick, and Joe Vaccarello. 2011. "With Security Council report, Palestinian statehood 
bid stalled at U.N." CNN US, 11.11.2011. 
Laracy, Hugh. 1991. "Bougainville Secessionism." Journal de la Société des Océanistes no. 1 
(2). 
Lemarchand, Rene. 1962. "The Limits of Self-Determination: The Case of the Katanga 
Secession." The American Political Science Review no. 56 (2). 
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2006. "Linkage versus leverage. Rethinking the 
International Dimention of Regime Change." Comparative Politics no. 38 (4). 
Lieberson, Stanley. 1992. "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning 
in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases " In What is a Case?, 
edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard Becker. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." The American 
Political Science Review no. 65 (3). 
Lloyd, Angela M. 1994-1995. "The Southern Sudan: A compelling Case  For Secession." 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law no. 419. 
Lortz, Michael Garrett 2005. Willing to face Death: A History of Kurdish Military Forces - the 
Peshmerga - from the Ottoman Empire to Present-Day Iraq, International Affairs, 
Program in, Florida State University. 
Lynch, Dov. 2002. "Separatist States and post-Soviet Conflicts." International Affairs no. 78 
(4). 
Madar, Sh. Ibraahim Sh. Yuusuf Sh. , and Axmed Maxamed  Aadan. 2001. The Constitution 
of the Republic of Somaliland. edited by International Relations and Security 
Network. 
Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2004. "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative  
Cases in Comparative Research." American Political Science Review no. 98 (4). 
xxxvii 
 
MAR, Minorities at Risk. 2004. Chronology for Chechens in Russia. 
Markedonov, Sergei 2007. "The Paradoxes of Russia’s Georgia Policy." Russia in Global 
Affairs no. 2. 
Marks, Kathy. 2004. "Australia casts a shadow over East Timor's future " The Independent. 
Marolov, Dejan. 10.12.2012. "The EU Policy Towards the Dissolution of Yugoslavia. Special 
Emphasis on the EU Policy Towards the Republic of Macedonia." 
Mayardit, Salva Kiir. 2011. South Sudan Independence Declaration. edited by The 
Governement of South Sudan. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-sJugNxYVA8  
Mazrui, Ali A. 1995. "The Blood of Experience: The Failed State and Collapse in Africa." 
World Policy Journal no. 12 (1). 
McDougal, Myres, and W. Michael Reisman. 1968. "Rhodesia and The United Nations: The 
Lawfulness of International Concern." Yale Law School Legal Repository no. 1 (1). 
McNemar, Donald. 1967. "The Post-Independence War in the Congo." Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting no. 61. 
Mesfin, Berouk. 2009. "The political Development of Somaliland and its Conflict With 
Puntland." ISS Institute for Security Studies Paper no. September. 
Mikhelidze, Nona 2009. "After the 2008 Russia-Georgia War: Implications for the Wider 
Caucasus." The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs no. 44 
(3). 
Mill, John Stuart. A System of Logic  1843. Available from 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27942. 
Minorities at Risk (MAR). Chronology for Kurds in Iraq  01.04.2013 [cited 01.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=64504. 
Minorities at Risk (MAR). Chronology for Gagauz in Moldova  27.03.2013. Available from 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=35901. 
Modvig, J, J Pagaduan-Lopez, Rodenburg J, CMD Salud, R V  Cabigon, and C I A Panelo. 
2000. "Torture and Trauma in Post-Conflict East Timor." The Lancet no. 356. 
Morgan, Andy. 2012. "The Causes of the Uprising in Northern Mali." Think Africa Press, 
06.02.2012. 
Naamani, Israel T. 1966. "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determination." Middle East Journal 
no. 20 (3). 
Nafziger, Wayne, and William Richter. 1976. "Biafra and Bangladesh: the Political Economy 
of Secessionist Conflict." Journal of Peace Research no. 13 (2). 
Naldi, Gino. 1998. "Separatism in the Comoros: Some Legal Aspects." Leiden Journal of 
International Law no. 11 (2). 
Nation Master. Taiwan - Economy  25.02.2013 [cited 25.02.2013. Available from 
http://www.nationmaster.com/country/tw-taiwan/eco-economy. 
NATO. Statement on Former Yugoslavia  1992 [cited 10.12.2012. Available from 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23974.htm?selectedLocale=en. 
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 1999. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on 
Kosovo. 
NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 2013. Backgrounder: Deepening Relations 
with Georgia. 
Natsios, Andrew, and Michael Abramowitz. 2011. "Sudan's Secession Crisis - Can the South 
Part from the North Without War?" Foreign Affairs no. 19. 
Nayar, Kaladharan M. G. 1975. "Texas International Law Journal." 321. 
NBC. 2009. "Nearly 25 percent of Iraqis Live in Poverty " NBC News. 
Negroponte, John D. Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte, United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on the situation in the Middle East, 
at the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly, August 5, 2002  2002 
xxxviii 
 
[cited 28.01.2013. Available from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050514210213/http://www.usunnewyork.usmission.gov/
02_112.htm. 
Nichol, Jim 2008. Russia-Georgia Conflict in South Ossetia: Context and Implications for 
U.S. Interests. edited by Congressional Research Servica. 
Nichols, Johanna 1995. "Who are the Chechen?" Newletter of the Center for Slavic and East 
European Studies (UC Berkeley) no. Spring. 
Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 1967. Proclamation of the Republic of Biafra. 
Olson, Robert. 2006. "Relations Among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, 
and Iran." Mediterranean Quarterly no. 17 (4). 
Omstead, Katie 2009. "The Tarnished Pearls of Africa. A Comparative Historical Analysis of 
Pre-colonial, Colonial, and Post-colonial States in Africa." Articulate no. 2 (1). 
OSCE, The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Referendum on 
Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina February 29-March 1, 1992. 
Oslo II. Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip (Oslo II)  1995 [cited 12.02.2013. Available from 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/interim.html. 
Ottenheimer, Harriet Joseph, and Martin Ottenheimer. 1976. "The Classification of the 
Languages of the Comoro Islands." Anthropological Linguistics no. 18 (9). 
Owtram, Francis. 2011. "The Foreign Policies of Unrecognised States." In Unrecognised 
States int he International System, edited by Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield. 
USA and Canada: Routledge. 
Pashayeva, Gulshan 2009. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the Aftermath of the Russia-
Georgia War. In Reassessing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the aftermath of the 
Russia-Georgia war. Fletcher School 
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 26-27 September 2009. 
Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2011. "Recursive Secession of Trapped Minorities: A Comparative 
Study of the Serb Krajina and Abkhazia." Nationalism and Ethnic Politics no. 17 (3). 
Pavkovic, Aleksandar, and Peter Radan. 2007. "Creating new states - theory and practice of 
secession." In Creating new states - theory and practice of secession. Cornwall: TJI 
Digital. 
Pedersen, Jon , and Marie  Arneberg. 1999a. Summary. In Social and Economic Conditions in 
East Timor, edited by Jon  Pedersen and Marie Arneberg. Oslo: Fafo Institute of 
Applied Social Science. 
Pedersen, Jon, and Marie Arneberg. 1999b. Governance. In Social and Economic Conditions 
in East Timor, edited by Jon Pedersen and Marie Arneberg. 
Pedersen, Jon, and Marie Arneberg. 1999c. Natural Resources and Resource Management. In 
Social and Economic Conditions in East Timor, edited by Jon Pedersen and Marie 
Arneberg. Oslo: Fafo. 
Pegg, Scott. 1998. International Society and the De Facto State: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
Pellet, Allain. 1992. "The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. A Second Breath 
for the Self-Determination of Peoples." European Journal of International Law no. 
178. 
Pfaffenberger, Bryan. 1987. "Sri Lanka in 1986: A Nation at the Crossroads." Asian Survey 
no. 27 (2). 
Pfirter, Frida Armas, and Silvina Gonzales Napolitano. 2006. "Secession and International 
Law: Latin American Practice." In Secession - international law perspectives, edited 
by Marcelo G: Kohen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pietsch, Sam 2010. "Australian imperialism and East Timor." Marxist Interventions no. 2. 
Pinkston, Bobby Ray. 2005. The Rhodesian Insurgency: A Failure of Regional Politics. U.S. 
xxxix 
 
Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050. 
Post, Ken W.J. 1968. "Is there a Case for Biafra?" International Affairs no. 44 (1). 
Prohnitchi, Valeriu , Ana Popa, Alexandru Oprunenco, Alaxandru Gamanjii, Vitalie Sochirca, 
and Denis  Cenusa, eds. 2008. Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia: Analysis of 
the economic situation and development potential. Budapest: OSI (Open Society 
Institute). 
Protsyk, Oleh. 2012. "Secession and Hybrid Regime Politics in Transnistria." Communist and 
Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Protsyk, Oleh 2010. "Gagauz Autonomy in Moldova: the Real and the Virtual in Post-Soviet 
State Design." In Asymetric Autonomy as a Tool of Ethnic Conflict Settlement, edited 
by Marc Weller and Katherine Nobbs. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
Ragin, Charles. Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis Software  15.03.2013 [cited 
15.03.2013. Available from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml. 
Ragin, Charles. 1997. "Turning the Tables: How Case-oriented Research Challenges Variable-
oriented Research." In MethodologicalIssues in Comparative Social Science, edited by 
Lars Mjøset, Fredrik Engelstad, Grete Brochmann, Ragnvald Kalleberg and Arnlaug 
Leira. Connecticut: Jai Press Inc. 
Ragin, Charles. 1999. "Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis to Study Causal Complexity." 
Health Services Research no. 34 (5, part 2). 
Ragin, Charles. 2000. Fuzzy Set Social Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ragin, Charles. 2007. "Making Comparative Analysis Count." RHC: Revista de História 
Comparada. 
Ragin, Charles. 2008. Redesigning Social Inquiry : Fuzzy Sets and Beyond. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, Ltd. 
Ragin, Charles, and John Sonnett. 2004. "Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited 
Diversity, Counterfactual Cases and Comparative Analysis." In Vergeleichten in der 
Politikwissenschaft, edited by Sabine Kropp and Michael Minkenberg. Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sosialwissenschaften. 
Raic, David. 2002. Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination. New York: Kluwer Law 
International. 
Ramsay, D.I. 1978. "Alternative Perceptions of Development in Post-UDI Rhodesia." Journal 
of the University of Zimbabwe no. 6 (1). 
Ravid, Barak. 2011. "Palestinians Set up Diplomatic 'War Room' ahead of September Vote on 
Statehood." Haaretz, 04.07.2011. 
Regan, Anthony J. 2008. "Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict." The Journal of 
Pacific History no. 33 (3). 
Rich, Roland. 1993. "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union." European Jounar of International Law (Symposium: Recent developments in 
the Practice of State Recognition). 
Rihoux, Benoit, and Gisele De Meur. 2009. "3 Crisp-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(csQCA)." In Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques edited by Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin. 
California: SAGE Publications. 
Rihoux, Benoit, and Charles Ragin. 2009. "7 Addressing the Critiques of QCA." In 
Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and 
Related Techniques, edited by Benoit Rihoux and Charles Ragin. California: SAGE 
Publications. 
Roberge, Michal, and Youkyung  Lee. 2009. "Backgrounder: China-Taiwan Relations." 
xl 
 
Council on Foreign Relations no. August. 
Rogers, John, Jonathan Spencer, and Jayadeva Uyangoda. 1998. "Sri Lanka. Political 
Violence and Ethnic Conflict." American Psychologist no. 53 (7). 
Roper, Jeff. 2010. "Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of Transnistria and Gagauzia." 
Regional and Federal Studies no. 11 (3). 
Ross, Will. 08.07.2011. "South Sudan becomes an independent nation." BBC World. 
Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. "Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics." The American 
Political Science Review no. 64 (4). 
Scheindlin, Dahlia. 2012. "Phanton Referendums in Phanton States: Meaningless Farce or a 
Bridge to Reality?" Nationalism and Ethnic Politics no. 18 (1). 
Scott, Catherine, and Neles  Tebay. 2006. "The West Papua Conflict and its Consequences for 
the Island of New Guinea: Root Causes and the Campaign for Papua, Land of Peace." 
The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs no. 94 (382). 
Seventh International Conference of American States. 1933. Montevideo Convention on the 
Rights and Duties of States. 
Sibanda, Arnold Elson. 1991. "The Lancaster House Agreement and the Post-Independence 
State in Zimbabwe." Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies. 
Simão, licinia. 2012. "The problematic role of EU democracy promotion in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh." Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1995. "International Law in a World of Liberal States." European 
Jounar of International Law no. 503. 
Slomanson, William R. 2009. "Legitimacy of the Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
Secessions: Violations in Search of a Rule." Miskolc Journal of International Law no. 
6 (2). 
Smith, Ian Douglas 1965. Modern History Sourcebook: Rhodesia: Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence Documents, 1965. 
Smolar, Piotr. 2013. "Serbia and Kosovo sign Historic Agreement." The Guardian, 
30.04.2013. 
Smolnik, Franziska. 2012. "Political rule and violent conflict: Elections as "institutional 
mutation" in Nagorno-Karabakh." Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Sonmez, Sevil F., and Yiorgos Apostolopoulos. 2008. "Conflict Resolution Through Tourism 
Cooperation? The Case of the Partitioned Island-State of Cyprus." Journal of Travel 
and Tourism Marketing no. 9 (3). 
Spillius, Alex. 2011. "Barack Obama tells Mahmoud Abbas US will veto Palestinian 
statehood bid." The Telegraph, 22.09.2013. 
State, U.S. Departement of. 05.04.2013. "Electronic Research Collection Archive, 
Background Notes: Africa, Zimbabwe." Country Background Archive. 
Stockemer. 2012. "Fuzzy set or Fuzzy logic? Comparing the Value  of Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) Versus Regression Analysis for the Study of Women's 
Legislative Representation." European Political Science no. 12. 
Stokke, Kristian. 2006. "Building the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State Institutions and 
Forms of Governance in LTTE-Controlled Areas in Sri Lanka." Third World Quarterly 
no. 27 (6). 
Sudetic, Chuck. 1991. "Rebel Serbs Complicate Rift on Yugoslav Unity." The New York 
Times. 
Svensson, Emma. 2008. Afrikanska Unionens insatser i Komorerna - MAES och Operation 
Democracy. edited by Eva  Mittermaier: FOI, Totalförsvarets Forskningsinstitut. 
Swiss Info. 2007. "Moving towards the UN in slow motion." Swiss Info - International 
Service of the Swiss Broadcasting Corporation. 
Taiwan DC. Lee Teng-hui: "nation-to-nation" relations 26.03.2013 [cited 26.03.2013. Available 
xli 
 
from http://www.taiwandc.org/news-lee.htm. 
The African Union. Transition from the OAU to the African Union  2002 [cited 05.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/background/oau_to_au.htm. 
The African Union. 2012. L'Union Africaine Rejette Totalement la Pretendue Declaration 
d'Independance faite par un Groupe Rebelle dans le Nord Mali. 
The Chechen Republic. 1992. The Constitution of Chechen Republic Ichkeria. 
The Economist. 2007. "Russia and Chechnya, The warlord and the spook." The Economist. 
The Economist. 2013. "Serbia and Kosovo - a Breakthrough at last." The Economist, 
20.04.2013. 
The European Commission of Human Rights. 1976. Report of the Commission to 
Applications 6780/74 and 6950/75: Cyprus against Turkey. 
The Government of Eritrea. 1993. "Eritrea - Birth of a Nation." In, ed The Government of 
Eritrea: The Government of Eritrea, Department of External Affairs. 
http://www.dehai.org/conflict/history/birth_of_a_nation.htm (accessed 03.05.2013). 
The Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. FYROM name issue. 
The House of Representatives. 2001. Puntland Constitution. edited by The House of 
Representatives. 
The Nagorno Karabakh Republic. 1991. Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. 
The Negroponte Doctrine. “The Negroponte Doctrine” concerning UN Security Council 
Resolutions on the Middle East  2003 [cited 28.01.2013. Available from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20031224063630/http://www.un.int/usa/03jdn-
me1006.htm. 
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. Who and why recognise Palestine  2011 [cited 
11.12.2012. Available from http://www.nad-
plo.org/userfiles/file/fact%20sheet/who%20and%20why%20recognize%20Palestine%
20Factsheet%20-%20english%20July%202011_pdf.pdf. 
The Parliament of Gagauzia. 1994. Law on Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz-Yeri) 
Nr.344-XIII din 23.12.94. 
The Republic of Armenia. The President of the Republic of Armenia  2013 [cited 23.01.2013. 
Available from http://www.president.am/en/robert-kocharyan/. 
The Republic of Kosovo. 2008. Kosovo Declaration of Independence. edited by Assembly. 
The Robinson Library. Biafra  2012 [cited 10.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.robinsonlibrary.com/history/africa/britishwest/nigeria/biafra.htm. 
The Swiss Confederation Federal Department of Foreign Affairs. Frequently asked questions: 
Switzerland and the UN  2012 [cited 02.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/recent/dossie/ch10un/faq.html. 
The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. 1992. Ethnic map of Yugoslavia based on 1991 census 
data. 
The United Nation Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). 2003. Standards for Kosovo. 
The United Nations. Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present  07.12.2012a [cited 
07.12.2012. Available from http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml. 
The United Nations. How does a new State or Government obtain recognition by the United 
Nations?  07.12.2012b [cited 07.12.2012. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/members/about.shtml. 
The United Nations. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET)  10.02.2013 [cited 10.02.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/etimor/etimor.htm. 
The United Nations. Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories (1945-1999)  24.03.2013a 
[cited 24.03.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml. 
xlii 
 
The United Nations. The United Nations and Decolonisation  24.03.2013b. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/questions_answers.shtml. 
The United Nations. Charter of the United Nations  1945 [cited 25.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml. 
The United Nations. Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. The United Nations 1960 [cited 10.12.2012. Available from 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/dicc/dicc.html. 
The United Nations. The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Amongst States. The United Nations 1970 [cited 
07.12.2012. Available from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,459d17822,459d17a82,3dda1f104,0.html. 
The United Nations. 1974. "UN Monthly Chronicle."  no. 11. 
The United Nations. 1975. "The United Nations Year Book: 1975, Chapter four: The Situation 
in Southern Rhodesia." In. 
The United Nations. "The former Yugoslavia" Map No. 3689 Rev. 12 UNITED NATIONS June 
2007  2007 [cited 29.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/frmryugo.pdf. 
The United Nations. About Permanent Observers: What is a Permantent Observer?  2013a. 
Available from http://www.un.org/en/members/aboutpermobservers.shtml. 
The United Nations. Non-member States: Permanent Observes  2013b [cited 02.06.2013. 
Available from http://www.un.org/en/members/nonmembers.shtml. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 1945. General Assembly Rules of Procedure. The 
United Nations. 
The United Nations General Assembly. Eritrea: Report of the United Nations Commission for 
Eritrea; Report of the Interim Committee of the General Asembly on the Report of the 
United Nations Commission for Eritrea 1950 [cited 03.05.2013. Available from 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/059/88/IMG/NR005988.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 995 (x). Admission of New Members to the United 
Nations  1955 [cited 01.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNMembers%20ARES995%20X.pdf. 
The United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 1541: Principles Which Should Guide 
Members in Determining Whether or nor (sic) an Obligation Exists to Transmit the 
Information Called for Under Article 73e of the Charter 1960 [cited 21.02.2013. 
Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/153/15/IMG/NR015315.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 2383: Question of Rhodesia  1968 [cited 
25.02.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/243/43/IMG/NR024343.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 2758 (XXVI). Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the 
People's Republic of China in the United Nations  1971 [cited 03.05.2013. Available 
from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 3203 (XXIX). Admission of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh to Membership in the United Nations  1974 [cited 13.05.2013. Available 
from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/738/05/IMG/NR073805.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 34 / 37: Question of Western Sahara  1979 [cited 
03.06.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
xliii 
 
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/376/64/IMG/NR037664.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations General Assembly. With Admission of Switzerland, United Nations 
Family now Numbers 190 Member States  2002a [cited 10.02.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GA10041.doc.htm. 
The United Nations General Assembly. With Admission of Switzerland, United Nations now 
Numbers 190 Member States  2002b [cited 02.06.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/GA10041.doc.htm. 
The United Nations General Assembly. Report of the Open-ended Working Group on the 
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council  2004 [cited 
13.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=a/58/47%28supp%29. 
The United Nations General Assembly. 65/308. Admission of the Republic of South Sudan to 
membership in the United Nations  2011 [cited 07.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,UNGA,,SSD,4e719c482,0.html. 
The United Nations Peacemaker. Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian - 
Ossetian Conflict (Sochi Agreement)  1992 [cited 21.04.2013. Available from 
http://peacemaker.un.org/node/1777#. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 143: The Congo Question  1960 [cited 
01.04.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/157/32/IMG/NR015732.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 161: The Congo Question  1961a [cited 
23.01.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/171/68/IMG/NR017168.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 166: Admission of new Members to the UN: 
Mongolia  1961b [cited 02.06.2013. Available from http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/RES/166%20%281961%29&Lang=E&Area=
RESOLUTION. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 216: Question Concerning the Situation in 
Southern Rhodesia 1965a [cited 25.02.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/222/88/IMG/NR022288.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 217: Question concerning the situation in 
Southern Rhodesia 1965b [cited 15.01.2013. Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/222/88/IMG/NR022288.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 353: Cyprus  1974 [cited 06.04.2013. 
Available from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/289/72/IMG/NR028972.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 384: East Timor  1975 [cited 12.04.2013. 
Available from 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/384%281975%29. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 541: Cyprus  1983 [cited 07.12.2012. 
Available from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,RESOLUTION,CYP,,3b00f16528,0.html. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 688: Iraq  1991 [cited 12.03.2013. Available 
from http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/24/IMG/NR059624.pdf?OpenElement. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1272: on the Situation in East Timor  1999 
[cited 30.05.2013. Available from http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-
1272%281999%29.pdf. 
The United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1414:  The Admission of new Members: 
xliv 
 
East-Timor  2002 [cited 13.05.2013. Available from 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/UNMembers%20SRES1414.pdf. 
The United Nations Security Council. Adopting Resolution 1999 (2011) Without Vote, Security 
Council Recommends Admission of Republic of South Sudan as United Nations 
Member 2011 [cited 07.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10322.doc.htm. 
The World Bank. Data by Country: South Sudan  07.04.2013a [cited 07.04.2013. Available 
from http://data.worldbank.org/country/south-sudan. 
The World Bank. Data by Country: Sudan  07.04.2013b [cited 07.04.2013. Available from 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/sudan. 
The World Bank. 2002. Sahan Lagu Sameeyey Dhaqaale-Bulsheedka Soomaaliya 2002. 
The World Bank. Mapping for Results - Bosnia and Herzegovina , Europe and Central Asia  
2012a [cited 30.04.2013. Available from http://maps.worldbank.org/eca/bosnia-and-
herzegovina#&location=44.685038,17.263077,8&sectors=agriculture,communications
,education,energy,finance,health,industry,public,water,transportation,&indicator=Popu
lation_Density. 
The World Bank. Mapping for Results - Croatia, Europe and Central Asia  2012b [cited 
30.04.2013. Available from http://maps.worldbank.org/eca/croatia. 
Tishkov, Valery. 1997. "Ambition and the Arrogance of Power: The Chechen War." In 
Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflicy in and after the Soviet Union. London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. . 
Transparency International. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012  2012 [cited 10.06.2013. 
Available from http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. 
Trbovich, Ana. 2008. A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Trenin, Dmitri 2006. "Russia Leaves the West." Foreign Affairs no. 85 (4). 
TRNC. 1983. Constitution of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. edited by Constituent 
Assembly of Northern Cyprus. 
Tshombe, Moise. 1960. La Constitution du Katanga. 
Tsygankov, Andrei Pavlovich. 2003. "Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical 
Thinking after the Soviet Break-up." Communist and Post-Communist Studies no. 36. 
U.S. Department of State. Comoros: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices  2000. 
Available from http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/235.htm. 
UN News Centre. 2013. "Ban Welcomes ‘Landmark’ Agreement Between Serbia and Kosovo 
Negotiators." 15.06.2013. 
UNDP, The United Nations Development Programme. MPI: Multidimensional Poverty Index  
2013 [cited 10.06.2013. Available from 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/indicators/38406.html. 
UNHCR, The United Nations High Commisioner for Human Righsts. Situation in the 
Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, Commission on Human Rights 
resolution 2000/58  2000 [cited 21.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%29/E.CN.4.RES.2000.58.
En?Open. 
UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Somalia/Ethiopia/and Eritrea: 
Clan Rivalries, and Clan-based Discrimination, Internal Flight Alternative (IFA), 
Presence of NGOs; Situation of Minorities in Somalia and Somaliland; Situation of 
Deportees from Ethiopia; Military Service in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1999 [cited 
04.04.2013. Available from 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,IRBC,,ERI,,3ae6ad833c,0.html. 
xlv 
 
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 828: New member: Eritrea 1993 [cited 
13.05.2013. Available from http://www.refworld.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?docid=3b00f20c0. 
UNPO, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. Somaliland: Stable Economic 
Growth  2008 [cited 04.04.2013. Available from http://www.unpo.org/article/8308. 
UNPO, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation. Abkhazia  2009 [cited 30.04.2013. 
Available from http://www.unpo.org/article/7854. 
USDA. International Macroeconomic Data Set: GDP Shares by Country and Region 
Historical  05.04.2013 [cited 05.04.2013. Available from 
www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/Historical_Data_File
s/HistoricalGDPSharesValues.xls. 
USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations. UN Security Council Veto List  
13.05.2013 [cited 13.05.2013. Available from 
http://usun.state.gov/documents/organization/136634.xls. 
van Bruinessen, Martin. 1986. "The Kurds Between Iran and Iraq." MERIP Middle East 
Report no. 141. 
Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Cornell: 
Cornell University Press. 
Vatchagaev, Mairbek 2008. "Oil in Chechnya: A Brief History." North Caucasus Analysis no. 
9 (5). 
Vick, Karl. 2011. "The Palestinians' Statehood Dilemma: Full U.N. Membership or Observer 
Status?" Time World, 01.09.2011. 
Vink, Maarten, and Olaf van Vliet. 2009. "Not Quite Crisp, Not Yet Fuzzy? Assessing teh 
Potentials and Pitfalls of Multi-Value QCA." Field Methods. 
von Steinsdorff, Silvia. 2012. "Incomplete State Building - Incomplete Democracy? How to 
Interpret Internal Political Development in the Post-Soviet de facto States. 
Conclusion." Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
von Steinsdorff, Silvia, and Anna Fruhsdorfer. 2012. "Post-Soviet de facto States in Search of 
Internal and External Legitimacy. Introduction." Communist and Post-Communist 
studies no. 45. 
Walker, Edward W. 1998. "Chechnya and the Economic Consequences of Secession." 
Contemporary Caucasus Newsletter no. Winter (7). 
Wallensteen, Peter, and Margareta Sollenberg. 1999. "Armed Conflict 1989-98." Journal of 
Peace Research no. 36 (593). 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy. 1991. "A Qualitative Comparative Approach to Latin American 
Revolutions." The International Journal of Comparative Sociology no. 32. 
WIPO. 2002. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. 
Wolff, Stefan. 2010. "Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the Status of i Disputed Territory in 
Post-American Iraq." International Affairs no. 86 (6). 
Wood, John R. 1981. "Secession: A Comparative Analytical Framework." Société 
québequoise de Science Politique no. 14 (1). 
Xunta de Galicia. 1981. O Estatuto de Autonomía de Galicia. 
Yin, Robert. 2008. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. California: SAGE 
Publications. 
Youzhnaia Ossetia. 2001. "The Constitution (Organic Law) of the Republic of South Ossetia." 
Youzhnaia Ossetia. 
Zabarah, Dareg. 2012. "Opportunity Structures and Group Building Processes: An 
institutional Analysis of the Secession Processes in Pridnestrovie and Gagauzia 
Between 1989 and 1991." Communist and Post-Communist studies no. 45. 
Ziblatt, Daniel. 2006. "How Did Europe Democratize?" World Politics no. 58 (2). 
xlvi 
 
Zimmerli, Christopher. 1971. "Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Southern Rhodesia." 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly no. 62 (1). 
Österlund, Ö. 1997. "The Narrow Gate: Entry to the Club of Sovereign States." Review of 
International Studies no. 23. 
 
